APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The juvenile court established a permanent parenting plan for the minor child of unwed parents and ordered the father to pay child support. The father argues that the juvenile court erred both in fashioning the parenting plan and in calculating his child support obligation. Because the court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its calculation of the father’s gross income for child support purposes, we vacate the court’s child support order and remand for entry of an order in compliance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In all other respects, we affirm.

The Defendant, Angela Smith, appeals her conviction for aggravated arson and her resulting sentence of thirty-five years at 100% as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant raises issues challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the photographic line-up, and her sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2012, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Ronald Henry Aho, in case number F-13913 for aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000. Petitioner was also indicted in case number F-13974 for two counts each of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000. In January 2014, Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas in case numbers F-13913 and F-13974 to a total of two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft over $1,000 but less than $10,000 in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and the dismissal of charges contained in three additional indictments. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a total effective sentence of twenty-three years, with the first fifteen years to be served at sixty percent release eligibility and the last eight years to be served at forty-five percent release eligibility. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Matthew Perry, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by leaving before the close of the trial, which effectively pressured the Petitioner not to testify in his own defense, and by failing to introduce an exculpatory photograph into evidence. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a long-running dispute between unmarried parents over parenting issues concerning their young son. After years of contentious and continuous litigation and eight days of trial, the trial court found the father in criminal contempt and modified the parties’ existing parenting arrangement to reduce the father’s parenting time somewhat and to grant the mother sole decision-making authority for major decisions. The trial court imputed income to the father for purposes of child support and awarded current and retroactive child support. The trial court also awarded the mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. The father appeals, challenging each of these rulings. We vacate the trial court’s imputation of income and child support awards and remand for additional findings regarding Father’s income, but we otherwise affirm the trial court on all other issues.

A patron at a convenience center owned and operated by a metropolitan government fell and injured himself at the center. The trial court found that the metropolitan government breached its duties and was at fault for the patron’s injuries, but that the patron was also at fault in failing to notice the drainage cut that caused his fall. The trial court apportioned eighty percent of the fault to the metropolitan government and twenty percent to the patron. The metropolitan government appeals, arguing that the patron was at least fifty percent at fault. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gregory Nelson, appeals as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. After a review of the briefs of the parties, the postconviction court’s order, and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Dwight Harris, pled guilty in case no. 14-02706 to aggravated burglary. He received a six-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. Petitioner pled guilty in case no. 15-00395 to aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. He received an effective sentence of six years as a Range I standard offender to be served consecutively to the sentence in case no. 14-02706. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntary. After a hearing on the petition, it was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, Petitioner also asserts that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not voluntary. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Richard Eugene Reed, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony; possession with intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony; possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine within a drug-free childcare zone, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more in a drug-free childcare zone, a Class B felony; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver), 39-17-432 (2014) (drug-free school zone and drug-free childcare zone enhancement), 39-13-1324 (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession of firearm during commission of a dangerous felony), 39-17-1307 (2014) (amended 2017) (unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon). The trial court merged the drug-related convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this legal malpractice case, defendant-attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that they complied with the applicable standard of care. In response to the summary judgment motion, Appellant failed to offer any expert proof that
defendant-attorneys breached the applicable standard of care. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment on this basis. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant for the purchase of a convenience market, whereby Plaintiff purchased the store’s inventory and assumed the lease and other contractual obligations of the business. Three years after the sale, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Trade Mark act of 2000, all in connection with the sale and operation of the business. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm the judgment.

A state employee who lost his job due to a reduction-in-force was placed on administrative leave with pay and received a severance package. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied his claim for unemployment benefits for the period in which he received administrative leave with pay. As the employee acknowledges, he subsequently received the maximum unemployment benefits allowable for the applicable one-year period. Therefore, the employee cannot receive benefits for the contested period, which is the relief sought in this case. This case cannot provide relief to the employee, and the appeal is moot.  

Trial counsel pursued an appeal following a guilty plea by Petitioner, wherein trial counsel’s work resulted in Petitioner’s appeal being dismissed for a procedural reason. The procedural reason for dismissal of the appeal was that the certified question of law was not dispositive of the case.

Defendant, Lesandru Deniesh Webster, was convicted of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. She received an effective sentence of thirty-five years and six months. On appeal, Defendant argues that she was denied her right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community and that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. After review, we hold that Defendant is not entitled to relief. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Tipton County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Bryan Austin DeMeza, on charges of aggravated child neglect, first degree felony murder, and three counts of aggravated child abuse. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement, which the trial court denied. The jury convicted the Defendant as charged and sentenced him to life for the first degree murder conviction. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse into his conviction for aggravated child neglect and sentenced the Defendant to twenty years to be served concurrently with his life sentence.The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion for new trial. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements because he was subject to custodial interrogations without being informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence of the Defendant’s prior false statements under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401 and 608(b); and (3) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues that the trial court erred in merging the Defendant’s three aggravated child abuse convictions into his aggravated child neglect conviction. After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and three counts of aggravated child abuse. Because the evidence at trial was insufficient for a rational juror to have found the Defendant guilty of aggravated child neglect beyond a reasonable doubt but was sufficient for a finding of guilt of child neglect, we reduce the Defendant’s aggravated child neglect conviction to child neglect and remand for sentencing on the child neglect conviction. We also conclude that the trial court erred in merging the three aggravated child abuse convictions into the aggravated child neglect conviction and remand for sentencing on the Defendant’s three aggravated child abuse convictions.

This appeal concerns an effort to re-assert causes of action under the Savings Statute. In July 2006, David Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed an action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). On February 12, 2016, Plaintiff took a voluntary non-suit. On February 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a purported complaint (“the February 2 Document”) attempting to re-assert his original claims, which featured his typewritten name rather than his handwritten signature. Victor Hazelwood and Advantage Title & Escrow, Inc. (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appealed. We hold that Plaintiff’s typewritten name qualified as his signature and that his filing, while quite deficient as a piece of legal writing, was not so deficient as to render it not a complaint in the first place. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant was convicted by a Rutherford County Jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), retaliation for past action, assault, and resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, of which Defendant was ordered to serve six months in incarceration and the balance of the sentence on supervised probation. Defendant appeals his conviction for retaliation for past action, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Dewayne Jones, of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his daughter, and he was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-five years. The Defendant appeals, asserting (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) that the trial court committed error in questioning a witness; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions; (4) that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences; (5) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (6) that he is entitled to relief under a theory of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of a judgment form to reflect the proper statutory provision for the conviction offense.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Corey Jones, of aggravated kidnapping, robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more. The trial court imposed an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in requiring that the Defendant wear physical restraints at trial and that the trial court made improper comments in the presence of the jury regarding the credibility of the State’s witnesses. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting a three-year sentence for the theft conviction.

The Petitioner, John Ashley Snider, pleaded guilty to six drug-related charges in exchange for an effective sentence of ten years of Community Corrections, after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days. At the time of the plea, he reserved a certified question for appeal regarding law enforcement officers’ warrantless entry into his home and the seizure of his person. This court dismissed the appeal, holding that the certified question was not dispositive of the case. State v. John Ashley Snider, No. W2014-01848-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5014605, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 25, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2015). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing, after which it denied the petition. On appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Perry Lewis Sisco, the Defendant, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child and four counts of rape and was sentenced to twenty-five years for rape of a child and to twelve years on each of the rape convictions. The four twelve-year sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the twenty-five-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for the recusal of the 13th Judicial District Attorney General and his staff; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue in this personal injury action is whether the trial court erred by striking the defendant’s affirmative defense that an unknown “John Doe” driver of an Averitt Express truck was comparatively at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries. Relying on Brown v. Wal- Mart Discount Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785 (Tenn. 2000) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the trial court struck the affirmative defense as to John Doe and Averitt Express upon the finding that the defendant failed to sufficiently identify John Doe so that the plaintiff may serve process on John Doe. We have determined the trial court’s discretionary decision to strike the affirmative defense of comparative fault as to John Doe and Averitt Express was premature because the defendant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to engage in pre-trial discovery to endeavor as to the identity of John Doe in sufficient detail for the plaintiff to serve process on John Doe. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Terry Sanders, the Movant, filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” pursuant Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure claiming that his sentence was illegal because the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement of intent to seek enhanced punishment, the State intentionally filed an improper notice to interfere with the Movant’s due process rights, and the trial court erred in calculating his prior felony convictions and sentencing him as a career offender. The trial court found that the Movant failed to state a colorable claim and summarily dismissed the motion. We affirm.

The defendant, Christopher M. Mullins, appeals the revocation of the six-year probationary sentence imposed for his 2013 conviction of manufacturing .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

James Harrison sustained a compensable injury to his right shoulder while employed by General Motors, LLC (“GM”). He filed a workers’ compensation claim contending he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims found he was not permanently and totally disabled and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in accordance with the statutory scheme. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(A) & (B) (2014 & 2017 Supp.) Mr. Harrison appeals contending the evidence preponderates against the finding he is not totally disabled. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.