APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. Because the record does not contain an adjudicatory order of dependency and neglect, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions. We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment and on the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Ronald Cauthern (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Gibson County Circuit Court, alleging that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition after concluding that the petition was untimely. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of coram nobis relief. Upon review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s determination that the Petitioner’s claim regarding an unedited videotape is time-barred. However, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court as to the Petitioner’s claim regarding lab bench notes and remand for the coram nobis court to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling on this claim.

In this second appeal of the amount of restitution ordered in a Class E felony theft case, the defendant, James Allen Ballew, appeals the $36,473.00 at the rate of $50 per month that the trial court ordered he pay to the victim lumber company, arguing that the amount is unreasonable given the evidence of the victim’s losses presented at the second restitution hearing, the two-year length of his sentence, and his financial resources and future ability to pay.  The State concedes that the trial court erred by imposing an amount of restitution that the defendant could not reasonably be expected to pay and by ordering a payment schedule that exceeds the length of the sentence.  Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to restitution and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Lamont Harshaw, pled guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies; three counts of aggravated assault, Class B felonies; reckless endangerment by firing into an occupied habitation, a Class C felony; two counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, Class D felonies; and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. He received an effective sentence of thirty-six years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner also argues that the criminal gang enhancement statute, which was applied to increase his aggravated assault convictions from Class C felonies to Class B felonies, is unconstitutional. Upon review, we conclude that pursuant to State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), the criminal gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional; therefore, we must reverse the judgments for the aggravated assault convictions in counts three, four, and five in case number 100379; vacate the criminal gang enhancements in those convictions; and remand for entry of judgments reflecting that each aggravated assault conviction is a Class C felony with a sentence of fifteen years. The Petitioner's total effective sentence remains the same. The judgments of conviction are affirmed in all other respects.

Plaintiff James R. Goan’s mail delivery vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Billy B. Mills as Plaintiff was delivering mail. The Plaintiff and his wife, Judy Goan, sued Mills. During settlement negotiations, Plaintiffs offered to settle for $100,000, the limits of Defendant’s insurance policy. Defendant accepted the offer on December 4, 2013. Over a year later, Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that there had been no meeting of the minds and no enforceable agreement. The trial court enforced the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner, Ryan James Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings leading to his convictions for one count of second degree murder and one count of voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petition for writ of certiorari of Reginald Dion Hughes (“petitioner”) to the chancery court from the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole‟s denial of parole was dismissed pursuant Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 following the discovery that petitioner still owed $258.58 from prior cases. Petitioner appealed the chancery court's decision, but the Court of Appeals also dismissed the appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812. Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. Prob. and Parole, No. M2015-00722-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 1, 2015) (order dismissing appeal), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2016). Petitioner then requested permission to appeal to this court, alleging that section 41-21-812 was unconstitutional. We granted petitioner‟s request to review this case and to determine “[w]hether Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812(a) is constitutional as applied to this case.” After reviewing the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss petitioner's appeal.

The Court bars Mr. Hughes’s access to the courthouse based on its interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-801 to -818, an act that adopted procedures and penalties for prison inmates who file frivolous or malicious lawsuits. As noted by the Court, the purpose of this act was to “offset the tide of frivolous inmate litigation filtering through the court system.” Under this act, a trial court may dismiss an inmate’s claim upon a finding that the claim is frivolous or malicious or if the inmate has previously filed three or more claims found to be frivolous or malicious. The specific section at issue is section 41-21-812(a), which provides that “on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.” Id. (emphasis added).

We granted permission to appeal believing this case presented us with an opportunity to address the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 (2014)—an issue that merits our attention given a 2014 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding the statute unconstitutional as applied in certain circumstances.  See Clifton v. Carpenter, 775 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding the statute unconstitutional when applied to bar a petitioner whose parole had been revoked from appealing the parole board’s decision because he owed $1,449.15 in court costs from prior cases).  Having now reviewed the record on appeal and the relevant statutory provisions, I am convinced that the statute does not apply to authorize dismissal of Mr. Hughes’s appeal.  As a result, I have concluded, like Justice Lee, that it is unnecessary to address the constitutionality of this statute in this appeal.  See West v. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d 482, 493–94 (Tenn. 2015)(“[C]ourts decide constitutional issues only when necessary.”).  Therefore, while I do not disagree with the majority’s discussion of the relevant constitutional principles or take issue with the outcome the majority reaches on the constitutionality of the statute, I am unable to join the majority decision affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal.  Rather, I would hold that dismissing an inmate’s claim based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 is permissible only if the record establishes that the inmates’ outstanding court costs were assessed against the inmate “under this part,” meaning in a manner consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-808(b).Because the record on appeal fails to establish that costs of the divorce action were assessed against Mr. Hughes “under this part,” consistently with section 41-21-808(b), I would reverse the dismissal and remand to the trial court for consideration of Mr. Hughes’s petition for certiorari on the merits.

The Defendant, Clyde Hobbs, appeals as of right from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and order of confinement for eight years.  The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the Defendant had violated specialized conditions of his probation.  Additionally, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking the Defendant’s probation without considering possible alternatives.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit them within the four month period preceding his incarceration and by engaging in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

John Hudson (“the Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting that he was entitled to relief because the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it revoked the Defendant’s probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Spencer Peterson (“the Defendant”) appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion.

The Petitioner, Tony Wolfe, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition on the basis of newly discovered scientific mental health evidence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion without conducting a hearing on the merits. Because the Petitioner has no appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to reopen and did not follow the procedure required for seeking permission to appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, William Crayton, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. After Appellant purchased a package of default loans, which contained Appellee’s second mortgage note, Appellant waited almost four years to file suit against Appellee for breach of contract. Appellee raised laches as an affirmative defense. The trial court held that gross laches applied to bar Appellant’s lawsuit. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in applying gross laches to bar Appellant’s claim in that Appellee’s injuries were only economic, and Appellee failed to pursue her claims for predatory lending, misrepresentation, and/or lender misconduct. Reversed and remanded.

The Appellant, Carl Hall, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants filed this lawsuit against Appellees for damages resulting from the alleged negligence of Appellees’ subcontractor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, ruling that they could not be vicariously liable for the subcontractor’s negligence because the uncontroverted facts conclusively established that the subcontractor was an independent contractor. We affirm.

The Defendant, Earl Vantrease, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of aggravated robbery in 2003 and received a sixteen-year sentence as a Range II offender.  Thirteen years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence.  The trial court summarily dismissed the motion.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a child support action involving one child, who was born in 1995 and had reached the age of majority by the time of trial. Upon the father’s voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the trial court entered an order of legitimation in April 1996. The State of Tennessee (“the State”), acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition to modify a child support order in April 2002. The father filed a motion to dismiss, and the State subsequently withdrew the petition because no prior child support order had been established. The mother then filed a petition for child support in September 2014. Following a bench trial before a special judge, the trial court established the father’s retroactive child support obligation in the amount of $79,647.00, giving credit to the father for $59,229.00 he previously had paid toward the child’s support and expenses. The court incorporated three income shares worksheets representing three different time periods during the child’s minority. The father has appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred by finding that the child had resided with the mother for 285 days per year during the time period of January 1, 2010, through May 31, 2014, because the child resided with the mother’s stepfather on weekdays while attending high school. To correct an apparent mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the number of months for which the first income shares worksheet is to be applied from eighty-one to ninetytwo and the number of months for which the third income shares worksheet is to be applied from sixty-four to fifty-three, resulting in a total reduction in the father’s retroactive child support obligation from $79,647.00 to $74,818.00. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Kelley Elizabeth Cannon, of first degree premeditated murder and a life sentence was imposed.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.  State v. Kelley Elizabeth Cannon, No. M2010-01553-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5378088, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 30, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 9, 2013).  The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel, asserts that the post-conviction court erred by preventing her use of trial exhibits for a demonstration and challenges the validity of the search warrants in this case.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Christopher Lee Williams, was convicted of reckless endangerment, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault.  Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether dual convictions for aggravated kidnapping resulting in bodily injury and domestic assault based on bodily injury are proper, and (2) whether the trial court failed to consider a statutory mitigating factor in fashioning Defendant’s sentence.  After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After pleading guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse, Petitioner sought unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty plea.  Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things.  The post-conviction court denied relief, and Petitioner appeals.  After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Troy Love, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2014) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2014) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-five years each for the rape of a child convictions and to a concurrent term of ten years for aggravated sexual battery, for an effective sentence of fifty years to be served as a Violent Offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (2) the court erred in denying the Defendant‘s pretrial motions relative to interaction between the victim and State agents and for a "taint hearing" to determine the victim‘s reliability, (3) the court erred in failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to corroborate the reliability of the Defendant‘s pretrial statements, (4) the court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict and for judgment of acquittal, (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (6) the court and the prosecutor improperly referred to "Count 8" despite the fact that only three counts were submitted to the jury, (7) the court erred in its jury instructions, (8) the sentence is improper, and (9) due process requires relief due to the existence of cumulative error. We affirm the rape of a child convictions, and we reverse the aggravated sexual battery conviction and remand for a new trial.