APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Robert Wilson, of especially aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life in prison.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments.  State v. James Robert Wilson, No. M2000-00760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1050259, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 24, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2002).  In 2003, the Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief.  James Robert Wilson v. State, M2004-00933-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 1378770, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 10, 2005), perm. app. denied (Oct. 31, 2005).  In 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief contending that the trial court “constructively amended the indictment in this case” when it charged the jury using language that did not fully comport with the language used by the grand jury when it indicted him.  The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

In this health care liability action, Defendants moved to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs‘ failure to provide the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") medical authorization required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Based on its determination that the Plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with the foregoing statute, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations and repose under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) and accordingly concluded that the Plaintiffs‘ claims were time-barred. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs‘ constitutional challenges to the viability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 were without merit. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This case involves a trustee's disbursement of funds from two trusts, without authorization of the trusts' respective beneficiaries, in order to pay legal expenses incurred in defending against a prior action filed against the trustee on behalf of the beneficiaries. The trial court had dismissed the prior action with prejudice in an agreed order entered on August 31, 2012, which further provided that the funds at issue would be disbursed by the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries. On April 13, 2015, the beneficiaries filed a complaint, alleging that the trustee had violated the terms of the August 2012 order and her fiduciary duty by writing checks against the trust funds in an amount totaling $30,563.16. The trustee filed an answer, asserting that pursuant to Maryland law governing the establishment of the trust accounts, she was entitled to be reimbursed from the trust accounts for legal fees incurred in defense of the prior lawsuit filed on behalf of the beneficiaries and ultimately dismissed. The beneficiaries filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the beneficiaries, awarding each beneficiary, respectively, $15,281.58 plus prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. The trustee appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees upon the finding that the trustee breached her fiduciary duty, we further determine an award to the beneficiaries of attorney's fees on appeal to be appropriate. We remand for the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the beneficiaries during the appellate process.

Defendant, Quincy Terrell Sharpe, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury, along with his co-defendant DeAndre D. Rucker, for premeditated first degree murder.  Defendant and Rucker were tried jointly, and both were convicted as charged.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct by the State during closing argument.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Gregory Scott Barnum, was convicted of Class E felony indecent exposure and received a sentence of two years’ incarceration.  On appeal from his conviction, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously found that he was a “sexual offender” based on his 1998 Kentucky convictions for indecent exposure and thus subject to enhanced punishment under Tennessee’s indecent exposure statute. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cephus D. Spicer, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm on a college campus, claiming that his due process rights were violated by the State’s reading of the indictment to the jury without proper instructions, that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a custody case involving two children.2 C.W.H. (Father) and L.A.S. (Mother) modified, by an agreed order, an existing parenting plan for their children, P.H. and V.H. The modification continued Mother as the children's primary residential parent. Soon thereafter, Father learned that Mother worked in Nevada as a prostitute. He filed a motion seeking an emergency temporary custody order and a temporary restraining order. The juvenile court magistrate found that a material change in circumstances had occurred. It changed the identity of the children's primary residential parent from Mother to Father. Mother appealed to the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court (1) confirmed the magistrate's decision and (2) designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed to this Court. In the first appeal, we held that the trial court's order lacked a “best interest” analysis. As a result, we vacated that order and directed the trial court to (1) make a best interest analysis and thereafter (2) enter a new permanent parenting plan. On remand, the trial court (1) incorporated its past findings, (2) conducted a best interest analysis, and (3) held in Father's favor. Mother again appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence preponderates, in part but significantly, against the trial court's factual findings supporting its judgment.

A water transportation carrier company challenges the assessment of personal property taxes against it by the Board of Equalization for tax years 2008, 2010, and 2011. With respect to tax years 2010 and 2011, we find merit in the carrier’s argument that the record does not establish that the Board provided the carrier with notice sufficient to satisfy due process and, therefore, remand for a determination as to whether the carrier received such notice. As to the Board’s back assessment of the carrier for tax year 2008, we affirm the Board’s assessment.  

Plaintiff John C. Hoynacki was helping his father, defendant Jerome Hoynacki, wax defendant‟s recreational vehicle (RV). He worked on a ladder in reaching the high places on the RV. The ladder fell with plaintiff on it, causing him injury. He brought this negligence action, alleging that defendant breached his duty to exercise reasonable care in securing and stabilizing the ladder. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding that defendant had no legal duty to hold the ladder at the time the plaintiff attempted to “climb down prior to his accident.” We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendant was negligent under the circumstances. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

American Honda wanted to establish a new motorcycle dealership in Kingsport, Tennessee and notified the current dealerships of this intent. Jim’s Motorcycle, located in Johnson City, filed a notice of protest with the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, and a hearing was held in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-17-114(c)(20). The Commission determined that the Kingsport area was within the relevant market area of Jim’s Motorcycle and ruled that American Honda was not authorized to establish a new dealership in Kingsport. American Honda appealed, and we affirm the Commission’s ruling.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Having reviewed the record as it relates to the grounds for termination and the best interests of the children, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Father’s parental rights.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court terminated his parental rights on three grounds: abandonment by willful failure to support, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions preventing reunification. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. After reviewing the record, we conclude that DCS did not meet its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home or persistence of conditions. But, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of willful failure to support and that termination was in the best interests of the children. Therefore, we affirm the termination of parental rights.  

The Appellant, Antonio Clifton, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because his illegal sentence had long ago expired. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

The appellant, Bridget Bondurant Shirer, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; one count of failure to appear, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery in the amount of $500 or less, a Class E felony.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served as eight years in confinement followed by six years on community corrections.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the length and manner of service of her effective fourteen-year sentence is excessive.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Lewis, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his second degree murder conviction and resulting fifteen-year sentence.  On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition due to various deficiencies in the petition.  Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief without first providing the petitioner with the opportunity to correct the deficiencies.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant landowners filed a complaint against the City of Clarksville under the theory of implied- in-fact contract, alleging that the City should repair and maintain Appellants’ sewer line and arguing that the broken sewer line is an extension of the City’s public sewer system. Appellants also requested compensatory damages resulting from the back-up of sewage into their home. The City argues that the broken sewer line is a private sewer, for which the City has no responsibility. The City filed a motion for summary judgment. Upon hearing the City’s motion, the trial court found that Appellants’ claim sounded in tort under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and that the complaint was time barred. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I unenthusiastically agree with the conclusion reached by the majority.  The legal soundness and logical result reached by the post-conviction court effectively delivers a wound to Petitioner by the hand of his out-of-state post-conviction attorney.  Such a wound is a mortal shot to Petitioner’s chances of post-conviction review.

This is a Title IV-D child support and paternity case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s order on paternity and child support. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case began as a petition for dependency and neglect filed in juvenile court by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The juvenile court found the child to be dependent and neglected, and Mother and Father appealed to the circuit court. A discovery dispute arose when their attorney requested records from a court appointed special advocate volunteer. In connection with the dispute, the parents’ attorney filed a petition for civil contempt and a petition for criminal contempt against the volunteer. The circuit court did not grant either petition, and in response, the non-profit organization with which the volunteer was affiliated filed motions for sanctions against the attorney under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the non-profit’s motions finding, among other reasons, that both petitions were filed for improper purposes. Mother and Father appeal the circuit court’s dismissal of their criminal contempt petition and the court’s decision to impose sanctions against their attorney. Because we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal contempt petition or in imposing sanctions against the attorney, we affirm. 

This appeal concerns premises liability in a slip and fall case. Vicki Matherne and Rodney Matherne ("Plaintiffs") sued Jerry West and Carolyn West ("the Wests"), owners of a vacation cabin rented by the Mathernes, and American Patriot Getaways ("APG"), which managed the cabin, (collectively, "Defendants") after Mrs. Matherne injured herself falling off an elevated parking level at the cabin. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court for Sevier County ("the Trial Court") granted Defendants‘ motion, finding that any hazardous condition was open and obvious and that Mrs. Matherne was at least 50% at fault. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We hold that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact regarding what Defendants could or should have done to prevent the risk of a fall from the elevated parking level and whether Mrs. Matherne was at least 50% at fault. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants‘ motion for summary judgment. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings.

Appellant was injured while attempting to leave the defendant hospital against medical advice. Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital, concluding that the hospital owed no duty to prevent Appellant from leaving the hospital. Discerning no error, we affirm.  

The defendant, Vanessa Renee Pinegar, was convicted of one count of facilitation of delivering 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a school zone and two counts of attempted delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a school zone.  The trial court merged her attempted delivery convictions and imposed an effective sentence of nine years and a fine of $2000.  The defendant appeals her convictions, challenging the denial of her motion to sever the trial of the defendants, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and her sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

The Petitioner, Richard Earl Madkins, Jr., filed a petition in the Hardeman County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction and resulting twenty-five-year sentence, alleging that his sentence had expired and that he was being imprisoned for a conviction that was overturned by our supreme court. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.