APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Gordon Wayne Davis, pleaded guilty to multiple felony offenses including one count of possession with intent to sell a Schedule II narcotic in a park zone, two counts of sale of a Schedule II narcotic, one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of simple possession. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range II offender, to an effective sentence of fifteen years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. We therefore reverse the post-conviction court's judgment.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s notice of intent to relocate to Pennsylvania with the parties’ minor children. The father responded by filing a petition in opposition to the requested relocation. The trial court granted the father’s petition. The mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antonio Bonds, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s preliminary order dismissing his third petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as time-barred. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s preliminary order dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Charles Ward, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because the alleged illegal sentences had expired prior to the filing of the motion. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

At issue in this case is whether a defendant, which claims to be merely the broker of a shipment that was being delivered, may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the delivery driver. This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident involving a tractor-trailer that was owned and operated by Mounir Benouttas. At the time of the accident, Mr. Benouttas was delivering a shipment pursuant to a contractual arrangement with MGR Freight Systems, Inc. In addition to suing Mr. Benouttas and MGR, Plaintiff sued AllStates Trucking, Inc., which had contracted with MGR to deliver the shipment to AllStates’ customer. Plaintiff claimed AllStates was vicariously liable under the doctrines of respondeat superior and joint venture. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to include the additional theory of implied partnership. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against AllStates because Plaintiff could not establish an agency relationship, joint venture, or implied partnership. Plaintiff appeals contending summary judgment was inappropriate because material facts are at issue. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s decision to consider only the legal theories Plaintiff explicitly stated in her complaint, the court’s partial denial of Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, denial of her motion for summary judgment, and its decision to allow AllStates to rely on untimely filings. Finding no error with the trial court’s decisions, we affirm. 

The petitioner, Danny R. Mays, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Rutherford County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Brooke G. (“Mother”) to the minor child Zachariah G. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding the grounds of severe abuse and abandonment by wanton disregard by clear and convincing evidence and finding also that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The Defendant, Jordan Gregory Love, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, Class A felonies, and two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, Class A felonies.  See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2010) (amended 2011, 2012, 2016).  The trial court merged the aggravated child abuse convictions and merged the aggravated child neglect convictions and sentenced the Defendant to concurrent eighteen-year sentences at 100% service.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting the non-testifying codefendants’ statements into evidence.  We conclude that although the evidence sufficiently established that the victim suffered bodily injury, the evidence is insufficient to show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury and that the victim’s injury was inflicted by a dangerous instrumentality.  Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the non-testifying codefendants’ statements into evidence.  The Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect by inflicting serious bodily injury are reversed.  Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence at the trial, the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the lesser charges of child abuse and child neglect.  The Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect by inflicting injury with a dangerous instrumentality are vacated, and the charges are dismissed

I agree with the majority’s conclusions regarding Mr. Pilarski’s testimony and the trial court’s committing reversible error by admitting the codefendants’ statements.  To me, the fact that the State even pursued charges against everyone in the home and the victim’s father is troubling.  I write separately, though, to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jayme Conkin, of first offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and she received a sentence of eleven months and twenty nine days, suspended to supervised probation after forty-eight hours' incarceration in the Sullivan County jail. On appeal, Conkin contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine; (3) the Tennessee DUI statute is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, requiring a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a post-divorce civil contempt petition. Approximately three years after the parties’ divorce, the former wife filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the former husband in civil contempt for willfully breaching provisions of their property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce decree that required him to pay certain debts and transfer certain real and personal property to her. The husband did not attend the contempt hearing, and the trial court found that he willfully violated the divorce decree based on the wife’s testimony. The trial court ordered that the husband be incarcerated and fined $50 per day until such time as he came into compliance with the divorce decree. On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court lacked the authority to enforce the property settlement agreement by contempt and that his failure to comply was not willful. We hold that contempt is a proper remedy for the breach of a property settlement agreement that has been incorporated into the divorce decree. Additionally, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the husband’s failure to comply with the divorce decree was willful. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified in this opinion.

Petitioner, Gregory L. Hatton, pleaded guilty on July 18, 1977, to armed robbery, first degree burglary, two counts of simple kidnapping, assault with intent to commit murder, grand larceny, and rape in the Giles County Circuit Court.  The offenses in this case occurred in Maury County, and Petitioner’s brief states that a motion for a change of venue had been filed in 1977.  Maury and Giles County are in the same judicial district. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus thirty years. Gregory Hatton v. State, No. M2000-00756-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 567845 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2001).  He filed a request pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 seeking testing of any physical evidence in his case.  The post-conviction court summarily denied relief based upon affidavits from the relevant authorities stating that no physical evidence remained for testing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Cordalle Benton (“the Defendant”) for one count of rape of a child that allegedly occurred between December 1, 2012, and July 16, 2013. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to thirty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Perrier, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony in Count 2, aggravated assault in Counts 3 through 7, and assault in Count 8. The trial court merged Count 3 with Count 1 before sentencing Perrier to an effective sentence of thirty years. In this delayed appeal, Perrier argues: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on self-defense; (2) the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on possession of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony as a lesser included offense of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony; (3) the employment of a firearm count is void because it fails to name the predicate felony for the firearm offense; (4) the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for assault. We conclude that although the self-defense instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Pamela Moses, entered guilty pleas to theft of merchandise worth $500 or less, tampering with or fabricating evidence, forgery, perjury, stalking, and escape in exchange for an effective sentence of seven years. Shortly after entry of these judgments, Moses filed a motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, which was denied by the trial court following a hearing. On appeal, Moses argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw her plea. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea but remand for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms.

The Petitioner, Dyron Norm Yokley, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree felony murder conviction and resulting thirty-five-year, Range II sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Joseph A. Cundiff, was indicted by a Sumner County Grand Jury for premeditated first degree murder of his wife and unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon.  After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder.  Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.  The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder and two years for unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon. On appeal, Defendant argues that:  1) the trial court erred by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal; 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support his second degree murder conviction; and 3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence for second degree murder.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the individual who signed a commercial lease agreement on behalf of the corporate tenant also agreed to be personally liable for the tenant’s obligations when he signed the agreement a second time. Over a dissenting opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the individual’s second signature did not personally bind him because he handwrote “for Mobile Master Mfg. LLC” after his name. We hold that the second signature, which followed a paragraph clearly indicating that the parties agreed that the individual would be personally responsible for the tenant’s obligations, was effective to bind the individual. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   

The Defendant-Appellant, Randall Evans, was convicted by a Bradley County jury of one count of casual exchange of a controlled substance. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418. Evans received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with fifteen days’ incarceration and the remainder on supervised probation, and a $750 fine. He subsequently filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court interpreted as a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and, following a hearing, the motion was denied. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court improperly denied Evans’s motion for sentence reduction. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Joseph Corso (“Employee”) was employed by D & S Remodelers, Inc., also known as Servpro (“Employer”). On September 29, 2011, he sustained a compensable injury to his left shoulder. While under treatment for that injury, Employee sustained an injury to his right shoulder. Employer denied that claim because of discrepancies about the date of injury. Employee continued to work for Employer until May 2013. However, he was reassigned from a production job to a sales position. He was subsequently terminated based on a customer complaint. The trial court found that the right shoulder injury was compensable and that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. As a result of its finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the medical impairment. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by incorrectly weighing the expert medical proof and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his nearly three-year-old child. In 2014, the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his parents’ substance abuse, including the fact that the child was born with illegal drugs and non-prescribed medication in his system. In 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse. The juvenile court found that the grounds of abandonment and severe child abuse were proved by clear and convincing evidence and also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of father’s rights was in the child’s best interests. The father appeals. We affirm.     

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and this matter must be dismissed.

The defendant, Bradley Keith Cathey, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s finding of criminal contempt for failing to appear at a scheduled attorney setting.  The trial court found the defendant in direct contempt of court and summarily sentenced him to ten days incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him in summary contempt.  Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and vacated. The cause is remanded for a hearing in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b).

The Defendant, Baby Dashea Nix, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s partial revocation of her effective twelve-year community corrections sentence.The Defendant contends that the evidence presented at the revocation hearing was insufficient to establish that a violation of the conditions of her sentence occurred and that, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion.  The Defendant also submits that she was not afforded due process because counsel failed to present the testimony of the Defendant’s mother at the revocation hearing.  Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s partial revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.