APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Tracy D. Boyd, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of three counts of impersonating a licensed professional, two counts of theft of property, and one count of forgery. He claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Cristobal Jose Vasquez, of solicitation of a minor and aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony concerning uncharged criminal conduct; and (2) excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by the victim or, alternatively, prohibiting him from recalling the victim to lay a foundation for that evidence. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal regarding Tennessee’s survival statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102, we hold that a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion does not abate upon the death of the person whose privacy was invaded. Here, an elderly woman with severely impaired cognitive functioning was a resident of the defendant skilled nursing facility. While an employee of the facility was helping the resident take a shower, the employee took a personal video call with her incarcerated boyfriend. During the call, the employee propped her cell phone in the shower in a way that displayed the resident’s nude body to the boyfriend. The resident’s conservator sued the defendant facility claiming, inter alia, invasion of the resident’s privacy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the facility, and the plaintiff appealed. While the appeal was pending, the resident died, and her estate was substituted. The Court of Appeals reversed; it held the complaint stated a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion, and that the claim did not abate upon the death of the resident. We granted the defendant facility permission to appeal on abatement. Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102 provides that no civil action based on “wrongs” abates upon the death of either party, “except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff.” On appeal, the defendant facility argues that the claim abated either because section 20-5-102 does not apply at all, or because the character exception in the statute applies, since a claim for intrusion upon seclusion is an action for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff.” We hold that the survival statute, section 20-5-102, applies to the claim of intrusion upon seclusion, and that the exception for actions for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” does not apply. Therefore, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that the claim for intrusion upon seclusion did not abate upon the death of the resident whose privacy was invaded.

The Defendant, Diamond Leah Wilson, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of aggravated neglect of a child who was age eight or less, a Class A felony, for which the Defendant is serving a sixteen-year sentence at 100% service. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (Supp. 2024). On appeal, she contends that (1) the trial court erred in approving the verdict in its role as thirteenth juror, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review in this case to decide whether our collateral estoppel doctrine bars relitigation of a prior class certification denial which was affirmed on appeal. In 2014, Plaintiff Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. filed a putative class action against Defendant BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. EMCF alleged that BCBST had breached various contracts with it and other similar entities by applying a cap on certain payments for medical services after an action by TennCare. The trial court denied class certification, and the Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded. EMCF subsequently voluntarily nonsuited its claims. After getting a favorable ruling in a separate lawsuit against TennCare, EMCF refiled its case against BCBST, again seeking class certification. The trial court held that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of class certification, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the trial court got it right. In this case, the same plaintiff filed suit against the same defendant for the same claims on behalf of the same putative class based on the same common questions. Our collateral estoppel doctrine exists to prevent this type of second-chance relitigation. Certain decisions are final and binding, including when a trial court and appellate court conclude that a particular class cannot be certified. The plaintiff here is certainly entitled to have the merits of its substantive claims heard in its refiled action, but it does not get a do-over on class certification.

The Petitioner, Michael Terrell McKissack, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a codefendant’s recanted testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence. Based on our review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of the petition.

In the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”), William R. Smith and Judy M. Smith (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint to enforce a contract for the sale of land owned by Keith Prater and Janet Prater (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing because Defendants had entered into the contract with Plaintiffs’ limited liability company, “R & J 44, LLC” (“the LLC”), rather than Plaintiffs themselves. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking permission to file a second amended complaint to clarify that they were suing both individually and in their capacities as members of the LLC. The Trial Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, finding undue delay in amending the complaint, and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Charles Hardy, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him not to testify, and provided ineffective counsel pretrial and at trial. He also argues he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s individual errors. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Ashley Nicole Thomas, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition, in which she challenged her multiple convictions related to the sexual abuse of a child and her effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Tyrone McCurdy, of multiple counts of vandalism and theft, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-two years to be served in confinement as a persistent offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute between a property owner and her homeowners’ association. Appellant’s property is governed by the homeowner’s association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. There are two improvements to appellant’s property, a main house and a carriage house, both of which were originally roofed with vintage concrete tiles. Appellant replaced the roof on the carriage house with asphalt shingles, but did not replace the roof on the main house. Rather, appellant had the main house roof cleaned, which resulted in a lighter appearance. The homeowners’ association demanded that appellant replace the main house roof with shingles to match the carriage house. Appellant refused and filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunction. The association filed a counter-complaint alleging that appellant was in breach of certain provisions of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed appellant’s declaratory judgment action on its finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellant failed to join all necessary parties. The trial court granted the homeowners’ association’s motion for summary judgment on its counter-complaint and awarded attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s order does not adequately explain its reasons for dismissing appellant’s declaratory judgment action, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of that holding, and we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint. There are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of attorney’s fees to the homeowner’s association.

In this divorce, the trial court sanctioned Husband for failing to participate in discovery. After a final hearing at which Husband failed to appear, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that awarded Wife monetary judgments and alimony, divided the marital property, adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, and set child support. Husband filed a motion to set aside, alter, or amend the final decree, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Husband challenges the sanctions and complains that the trial court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors when fashioning the permanent parenting plan. Although the trial court’s factual findings concerning the children’s best interest are deficient, we can “soldier on” by conducting a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. After that review, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an order requiring a petitioner to pay a filing fee or face dismissal of his case. Because the order is not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

Following mediation, family members signed a settlement agreement resolving their business dispute. One party then sought to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court determined that the party’s ability to withdraw was limited and ordered him to close on the transactions contemplated by the agreement. Because we conclude that the settlement agreement’s language was ambiguous, we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Gary Rollins, Defendant, was charged with one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in September of 2020.  At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury found Defendant not guilty of rape of a child but could not reach a verdict on the lesser-included offenses of rape of a child.  The jury could not reach a verdict on either count of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court granted a mistrial for the remaining lesser-included offenses of rape of a child and the two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  In a second trial on the same presentment, Defendant was again tried for rape of a child.  The jury found Defendant guilty of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  At sentencing, Defendant challenged the rape of a child conviction for the first time on the basis that it violated double jeopardy.  The trial court agreed, entering a judgment for the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for the attempted rape of a child conviction and fifteen years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction.  The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), that his second trial for rape of a child violated his right against double jeopardy, and that the trial court had no authority to modify the conviction on the jeopardy-barred offense to attempted rape of a child.  Because the Defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the attempted rape of a child absent the presence of the charge of rape of a child and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior bad act, we affirm the convictions.

A plaintiff was awarded a judgment against a defendant who failed to complete home improvement work. The defendant appeals; however, he has failed to provide an adequate record to allow for consideration of his arguments on appeal and has asked this court to perform fact-finding that is beyond the scope of our authority. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

A utility district sued a private corporation alleging that the corporation was illegally providing water services to customers in the utility district’s service area.  The trial court ruled in favor of the corporation.  On appeal, the district asserts that the trial court erred in requiring the district to prove that the company qualified as a “public utility” under the pertinent statute.  We have concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute.  We, therefore, reverse and remand. 

This appeal involves of the administration of an estate. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order closing the estate as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Mario Albanese, pleaded guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated
assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) (2014) (subsequently
amended). The Hawkins County Criminal Court sentenced him to an agreed-upon, nineyear
sentence, suspended to probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in
denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Johnny Tate, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Tony Brasfield, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of violating the rules of community supervision for life, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating the sexual offender registry for failing to register or report in person within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary residence, a Class E felony. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction of violating the sexual offender registry, arguing that a plain reading of the statute shows that the State failed to prove the essential elements of the offense. We agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, the Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for violating community supervision is affirmed, but we reverse and vacate his felony conviction for violating the sexual offender registry.

Defendant, Nicholas Cornelius Conner, pled guilty to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II drug. He received a nine-year community corrections sentence which was later transferred to probation. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested for new drug offenses. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation and by denying credit for time he successfully served on probation. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A homeowners’ association sued a resident for violations of neighborhood regulations. The resident did not answer requests for admission. The trial court found that the requests were, therefore, admitted and granted a judgment for the association. The resident appealed. We affirm.

Mother and Father entered into an Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan. Thereafter, Father learned of information he allegedly was not privy to before, namely, that the Mother’s new husband was physically abusive, had been using drugs, and has an extensive criminal record; additionally, new incidents involving domestic violence and other criminality occurred involving Mother’s new husband. In response, Father sought to modify the parenting plan. The Juvenile Court modified the plan, reducing the number of days of Mother’s visitation and limiting Mother to supervised visitation. Mother appeals the trial court’s modifications. We affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We now affirm.