APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, John E. Carter, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because, at the time of his trial, he was not given “fair warning” that the negation of an element of a criminal offense was recognized as a defense in this state. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Brandon Mobley, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel allowed a stun belt to be placed on the Petitioner without a hearing or any evidence from the State that use of the stun belt served a legimate necessity. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that wearing the stun belt forced him to testify against his will, affected his demeanor while testifying, impeded his ability to communicate with trial counsel, and “imparied his ability to take an active interest in the presentation of his case.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns three notes executed by the defendants and made payable to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations for recovery on the notes had passed. The trial court denied the motion for the summary judgment. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendants were estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that they had revived the obligation after the limtiations period ran. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the applicability of an arbitration agreement. The plaintiffs purchased decking product manufactured by the defendant. The product was covered by a limited warranty, which included an arbitration agreement. The limited warranty was never provided to the plaintiffs. Instead, a notice was attached to the product, advising them to retrieve a copy of the limited warranty through the defendant's website. Following installation of the product, the plaintiffs experienced problems with the product. The defendant advised the plaintiffs that the issue was merely cosmetic. The plaintiffs filed suit. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the parties had not entered into an agreement to arbitrate disputes. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Robert R. Bishop, pleaded guilty to simple possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation.  Subsequently, the general sessions court found that appellant violated his probation.  He appealed the general sessions court’s judgment to criminal court.  After a hearing, the criminal court also found that appellant had violated his probation.  He now appeals to this court, arguing that his due process rights were violated when the probation office disposed of potentially exculpatory evidence and that the minimum due process requirements for probation revocation proceedings were not met.  Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

This appeal involves claims asserted by a beneficiary of various trusts against numerous defendants, including the beneficiary’s sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. Among other things, the beneficiary alleged that the defendant-trustees breached their fiduciary duties by failing to pay the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response to the motion for partial summary judgment, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void because he executed them due to undue influence. In a previous appeal, this Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment on the issue of undue influence, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The parties engaged in additional discovery on remand, and after lengthy proceedings and numerous evidentiary and other rulings, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant-trustees and denied a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the beneficiary. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees and discretionary costs to the defendants. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns a child custody dispute between a child’s Mother and Grandparents. When the child was one year old, Mother signed an order transferring custody of the child to Grandparents. One year later, Mother petitioned to modify custody and have the child returned to her. Grandparents claimed that Mother was addicted to drugs and emotionally unstable. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Mother presented a risk of substantial harm to the child if custody was returned to her. However, the court granted Mother visitation for the majority of each year. Grandparents appealed, claiming the trial court erred by granting more parenting time to Mother than to Grandparents. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Jeffery Combs, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for eighteen counts of forgery and one count of theft of property valued at $1,000.00 or more but less than $10,000.00, for all of which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, arguing that his identity was not sufficiently established to support the eighteen counts of forgery; that one count of forgery was for an electronic check which he did not sign and, therefore, cannot be guilty of; that he cannot intend to steal property or defraud someone of their money if that person was known to have died; and that it was improper to aggregate the amount of each separate forgery to support the conviction for Class D felony theft. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The appellant, Joe Clark Mitchell, filed in the Maury County Circuit Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  The motion was summarily denied, and the appellant timely appealed the ruling.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to support, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the grant of two motions for directed verdict. Appellants contracted with Appellee chimneysweep company to redesign and reconstruct portions of their fireplace and chimney to address a problem with smoke escaping into the den, upper floors, and attic. More than a year after the construction was completed, Appellants’ home was damaged by a fire, which started when wood flooring joists in close proximity to the firebox ignited. Appellants brought claims for negligence and breach of contract against Appellee. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of Appellants’ proof, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motions for directed verdict on the ground that the Appellants had failed to establish that the Appellee owed them a duty of care to conduct a destructive investigation of the safety of the Appellants’ fireplace and also on the ground that the suit was barred by the applicable statute of repose. We affirm and remand.

The plaintiff filed the instant action on September 28, 2012, alleging claims against the defendant of breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligent construction, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Despite several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process upon the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently served process upon the defendant via registered mail pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04, but that mailing was returned “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed a return of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11). The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had been properly served with process. The defendant in turn moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied that motion. The defendant has appealed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the defendant was properly served with process. However, we determine that the default judgment was improperly entered in violation of the express language contained in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10). We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Former Tennessee State University Professor filed a claim for damages, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and negligent deprivation of statutory rights. On the State’s motion to dismiss the claim, the Claims Commission held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the breach of contract claim and that the professor failed to state a claim for negligent deprivation of statutory rights; accordingly, the Commission granted the State’s motion. Professor appeals. We reverse the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, Tracy Dale Tate, guilty of one count each of sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of an elementary school and one count each of sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a recreational center. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -432. The trial court merged count two into count one and merged count four into count three, resulting in convictions for sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of an elementary school and sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a recreational center. The Defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He further argues that the trial court erred by failing to merge his four guilty verdicts into a single conviction, and the State concedes this point. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions, but we agree that the trial court erred by failing to merge all the Defendant’s guilty verdicts into a single conviction, and we therefore remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting this merger.

The Defendant, Tammy Joy Ogden, pleaded guilty in case number 35CC1-2014-CR-18 to delivery of morphine, a Class C felony, and to delivery of carisoprodol, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(2) (2012) (amended 2014) (delivery), 39-17-408(b)(1)(I) (2014) (classifying morphine as a Schedule II controlled substance), 39-17-412(c)(5) (2014) (classifying carisoprodol as a Schedule IV controlled substance). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent terms of ten years' confinement for the morphine conviction and eight years' confinement for the carisoprodol conviction. In case number 35CC1-2014-CR-113, the Defendant pleaded guilty to delivery of morphine, a Class C felony, and to delivery of alprazolam, a Class D felony. See id. §§ 39-17-417(a)(2) (delivery); 39-17-408(b)(1)(I) (morphine); 39-17-412(c)(1) (classifying alprazolam as a Schedule IV controlled substance). The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent terms of ten years' confinement for the morphine conviction and eight years' confinement for the alprazolam conviction. The court also ordered the sentences in each case to be served consecutively to each other, for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by (1) denying her alternative sentencing and (2) imposing partially consecutive service of the sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order modifying child support and setting arrearage. The trial court’s calculation of child support arrearage includes a set off for credits given the Appellee Father for necessaries provided. The trial court also found that Father was responsible for one-half of the children’s private school tuition for the three year period prior to Appellant Mother filing her petition for reimbursement of those expenses. The trial court further found that the parties had sufficient income to continue sending their children to private school and that each party should be responsible for one-half of the costs of the private school tuition and fees. Mother appeals. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for a fresh determination of child support arrearages from April 2007 forward, and sufficient findings on the issue of wage assignment in accordance with this opinion.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Hen Lac Liu, of four counts of sexual battery. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) that the trial court improperly excluded defense evidence of the victim’s bias and lack of credibility; and (3) that the cumulative effect of these errors warrants a new trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors by the trial court warrant a new trial for the Defendant.

This action was filed against a surgeon for breach of an employment agreement by his employers, a group owned equally by four optometrists and one non-physician. The trial court found that the group was entitled to recover damages arising from the breach. The surgeon appeals. We affirm.

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the defendant in General Sessions Court for problems related to the remodel of her residence. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to “withdraw” her complaint. The General Sessions Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Approximately one year after the dismissal, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment. The General Sessions Court denied the motion. The plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the Circuit Court.

Petitioner, Antonio Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his two petitions for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his sentences on the basis that the trial court failed to properly award all requisite pre-trial jail credits.  Following our extensive review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on K.G.S. (the Child), the minor daughter of K.G.S. (Mother).1 The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) took emergency custody of the Child based on allegations of sexual abuse and lack of supervision. The trial court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected. Both parents conceded the factual basis for this holding. After a trial, the court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination were established, and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals and challenges each of these holdings. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, stands convicted of criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and attempted second degree murder, for which he received an effective twenty-nine-year sentence.  He unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief from his convictions and now appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to: (1) submit a transcript of the hearing on petitioner’s motion to recuse the trial judge; (2) address petitioner’s bond increase without a hearing; (3) address petitioner’s allegedly unlawful interrogation by law enforcement officers; and (4) object to a judge hearing his appeal who allegedly was once assigned to hear his case at trial.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Gary Bohannon, was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the postconviction court denied. He now appeals, arguing that his right to due process and a fair trial was violated by statements that the trial court made to the jury during voir dire. He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not object to the statements of the trial court, failed to ask for a continuance or a recess after the direct testimony of a witness, failed to locate and call a witness, and erroneously stated in closing argument that the petitioner made a statement to police. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Petitioner, William Keith Blackburn, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery. He received an effective life sentence. Petitioner challenged his convictions on appeal, and a panel of this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. William Keith Blackburn, No. M2009-01140-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2893083 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2011). On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call John Haggard, Adrian Rich, and Brent Olive as witnesses at trial. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.