APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Sevier County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dustin Matthew Lucio, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a suggestive pretrial identification of him as the perpetrator, that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of the victim’s drug use to corroborate his version of the events, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs are siblings and two of the four adult children of the decedent. The defendants include a third adult child and his wife. In the months preceding her death, the decedent changed her bank accounts, originally titled solely in her name, to become joint accounts with the defendant son with right of survivorship. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant sibling exerted undue influence over the decedent in these transactions. They sought the return of all monies withdrawn from those bank accounts to the decedent's estate. Following a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $284,800. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This parenting dispute arose upon the parents' competing motions for modification of the existing permanent parenting plan as to the parties' minor child. The trial court previously had entered a permanent parenting plan order on May 11, 2010, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and awarding equal residential co-parenting time to both parents in an alternating weekly schedule. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance warranting modification of the residential co-parenting schedule had occurred since entry of the permanent parenting plan. The trial court further found that reducing the father's co-parenting time to alternate weekends during the academic year, while reversing this co-parenting schedule during the summer break, was in the child's best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A grocery store employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his back at work and that he also sustained a mental injury as a result of the back injury. His employer denied that he suffered a permanent physical injury or any mental injury at all. The trial court awarded benefits for both injuries. The employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

A Sevier County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dustin Matthew Lucio, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a suggestive pretrial identification of him as the perpetrator, that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of the victim’s drug use to corroborate his version of the events, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Troy D. Bartley, appeals the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal presents the issue of whether service of process was properly effected upon a nonresident defendant. The defendant filed a limited appearance and motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, asserting that he had never been properly served with process. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that service of process was never properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The pro se appellant, Jerry McGaha, appeals as of right from the Cocke County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions of nine counts of rape of a child. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion to affirm by memorandum opinion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Cocke County Circuit Court.

In this wrongful death appeal, the main issue is whether, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(c)(1), a surviving spouse must have abandoned the decedent for a period of two years to have waived his or her right to institute an action or collect proceeds under that section. We have concluded that the two-year period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(c)(1) applies only to “willful withdrawal.”

The appellant, Andrew Lee Davis, was convicted of domestic assault.  He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, with all but thirty days of the sentence suspended.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Thomas Eugene Lester, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered because he was suffering from an untreated medical condition at the time he entered his plea. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Mario D. Taylor, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violates his double jeopardy rights; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow a lay witness to testify regarding appellant’s mental and physical health; and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow appellant to introduce the entirety of his videotaped interrogation. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Carl C. Dotson, charging him with theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000 and driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. A jury trial was held, and Defendant was convicted of the offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of two years as a Range One offender for theft to be served in confinement and eleven months, twenty-nine days for DUI to be served concurrently. The judgment for DUI indicates that Defendant is to serve 160 days of his sentence for DUI in confinement and then eleven months and twenty-nine days on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jamie Lou Haneline, appeals the dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis. He was convicted of rape of a child in 2001 and received a sentence of thirty-eight years. In the petition for relief, which was filed in 2013, the petitioner alleged a newly discovered witness with information not previously known at trial. After a hearing, the court dismissed the petition as untimely and, further, found that the witness’s testimony would not have changed the verdict in the petitioner’s case. The petitioner contends that the error coram nobis court erroneously reached those conclusions. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the court.

The appellant, James Murray Washington, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress his statement to the police, and that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation by allowing a doctor who did not perform the victim’s autopsy to testify regarding the autopsy and by admitting the autopsy report into evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the majority’s conclusions in all aspects relative to the issues raised by the Appellant. I write separately to address the Appellant’s dual convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault because I conclude as a matter of plain error that the dual convictions violate double jeopardy principles.

I join in the majority opinion except that portion which concerns the appellant’s challenge that his constitutional right to confront a witness was denied by admission into evidence of the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ann L. Bucholtz, M.D. The appellant was entitled to cross-examine Dr. Bucholtz prior to admission of the autopsy report. Therefore, I conclude it was error to admit the autopsy report itself into evidence as an exhibit. However, my conclusion does not extend to bar the use of Dr. Bucholtz’s autopsy report by the testifying physician to form his own expert opinion.

The employee filed a worker’s compensation action seeking reconsideration of a prior worker’s compensation settlement. The employer argued the employee was fired for misconduct which consisted of failing to complete reasonable work related tasks, and therefore, the employee was ineligible for reconsideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(2)(B) (2008). The trial court held the employee’s refusal did not constitute misconduct because it was based upon a reasonable belief she could not complete the tasks assigned to her because of her prior work-related injury. The employer has appealed from this decision. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Laquan Napoleon Johnson (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the denial of his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the petition”). The coram nobis court interpreted the petition to allege an error coram nobis claim as well as a post-conviction claim. It summarily denied the error coram nobis claim and dismissed the post-conviction claim as time-barred. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

In this appeal, the Court is asked to determine whether certain provisions of restrictive covenants recorded in 1917 are still in effect and enforceable against certain parcels of subdivision property that lay contiguous to North Broadway in Knoxville. Emma Harris filed a declaratory judgment action seeking the judgment of the trial court that a “used for residential purposes only” restriction is unenforceable as to her property due to changed conditions in the area and the abandonment of the restriction by waiver and/or acquiesence in other violations of the subject restriction. A defendant, Robert A. Whaley, a neighbor to the Harris property, filed a cross-claim seeking the same relief. The trial court, while finding that “it may well be that especially in [the] Harris[ ] case a just and equitable remedy would be the removal of the burden from her,” nevertheless went on to enforce the covenant. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to the property of cross-claimant Whaley, which property is improved with a relatively-large house inhabited by Whaley as his residence since 2001. The Harris property, on the other hand, consists of two contiguous unimproved lots that have never been built on since the subdivision was created in 1917. Considering the totality of the circumstances and equities, it is the judgment of the Court that, with respect to the Harris lots, the “residential purposes only” restriction is cancelled and unenforceable, but this decree is made subject to a restriction that no curb cut will be constructed to allow vehicular access from the Harris property to Gibbs Drive, a thoroughfare leading into the subdivision from North Broadway. Our decree is also subject to the Truan/plaintiffs agreement as reflected in Exhibit 33.

This is an appeal from an award of attorney’s fees following settlement of the underlying lawsuit. Appellees, law firm and attorney, represented Appellant in a lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. After protracted mediation, Appellee orally agreed to lower its contingency fee from 33 1/3% to 10% in consideration of Appellant’s agreement to settle her case against the tort defendants for $52,000. Appellant agreed to accept this offer and signed the settlement agreement at the conclusion of the mediation. Thereafter, Appellant allegedly refused to sign the releases drafted by the tort defendants. The trial court, upon the tort defendants’ motion, enforced the settlement agreement reached by the parties at mediation. Appellees assert that Appellant’s refusal to sign the releases drafted by the tort defendants constitutes a breach of the modified fee agreement and now seek to enforce an attorney’s fee lien for the full one-third of the recovery. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to enforce its lien for the full amount, and Appellant appeals. We conclude that the terms of the modified fee agreement between Appellees and Appellant only required Appellant to settle her case with the tort defendants for $52,000, which she did. Accordingly, the trial court erred in not enforcing the modified fee agreement. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act against the City of Jackson to recover for injuries sustained in a fall suffered by one plaintiff while she and her husband were walking across a bridge from a parking lot to the fairgrounds operated by the City. Following a bench trial, the court held that the bridge was in a defective and dangerous condition and that the City was not immune from suit; the court determined that the City was 60% negligent and the plaintiff 40% negligent. The court assessed damages at $62,817.35 for plaintiff wife and $8,400.00 for plaintiff husband; applying the comparative fault percentage, the court awarded plaintiff wife $37,690.41 and plaintiff husband $5,040.00. We modify the award of damages to plaintiffs; in all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue presented in this divorce appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to appoint a guardian ad litem for Thomas D. McClure, Sr. (Husband), and proceeding to trial in Husband's absence after he was duly notified of the trial date. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.