APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Derick D. Armstrong, was convicted of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and one count of employment of a firearm during the attempted commission of a felony, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer for sexual discrimination, employer retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, retention and supervision practices, and workers’ compensation retaliation. The parties entered into an agreement which settled Plaintiff’s claims; pursuant to the terms of the agreement,the parties submitted an agreed order dismissing the case which was entered by the court. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, and her former employer filed a motion to enforce the settlement. After a hearing on the motions, the court entered an order dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff filed a motion for relief, which the court denied. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether an Assistant City Attorney of the City of Memphis was an agent properly authorized to settle a dispute with a former employee. The former employee sued the City to enforce a settlement agreement he purportedly reached with the Assistant City Attorney for an amount in excess of $500.00. His complaint alleged that although he was never informed that the agreement was contingent on the Mayor’s approval, the Mayor subsequently rejected the agreement, and the City, based on the Mayor’s rejection, refused to honor it. The Memphis City Charter provides that the City Attorney has independent authority to settle claims against the City for amounts less than $500.00, but settlements for amounts exceeding $500.00 must be entered “by and with the approval of the Mayor.” After a period of discovery, the City filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the former employee’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the Assistant City Attorney acted with authority to bind the City to the settlement agreement. The former employee opposed the City’s motion and filed his own motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that evidence established the Mayor either actually or apparently authorized the Assistant City Attorney to enter the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the former employee’s motion for summary judgment after finding that the Assistant City Attorney acted with apparent authority to enter the settlement agreement. On appeal, we find that the record does not contain evidence sufficient to establish that the Assistant City Attorney acted with either actual or implied authority to bind the City. In light of our findings, we reverse the trial court and hold that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the City.

This is a will contest. Appellants, Bill Morris, Jr., and Cheryl Morris, appeal the trial court‟s determination that their Father‟s will was properly executed pursuant  to the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-1-104.  We conclude that the witnesses to the will only signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses and  not the will itself.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

The Defendant, Jay Herman Sanders, appeals from the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence and order to pay $250,000 in restitution.  He argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to 10 years in the Department of Correction and claims that the trial court failed to consider his future ability to pay restitution.  After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On June 29, 2011, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to several offenses, including one count of the possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine, a Class A felony, and two counts of money laundering, Class B felonies.  The petitioner received an effective twenty-year sentence for these crimes.  The petitioner’s total effective sentence was forty-one years, twenty-one of which were for crimes not at issue in this appeal.  The petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, challenging his convictions for possession of over 300 grams of cocaine and two counts of money laundering on the basis that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate these cases and that his trial counsel was operating under a conflict of interest when he represented the petitioner in the pleas.  The post-conviction court denied relief.  Because we conclude that trial counsel did not have an actual conflict of interest, that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that there was no showing of prejudice, and that the pleas were knowing and voluntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tyler Young, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and attempted aggravated robbery and argues that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Ray Jobe, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure: (1) to communicate the amount of restitution that was included as a part of his guilty plea; (2) to file a motion to vacate his plea; and (3) to effectively communicate with him. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Joshua Edward Kilgore, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his conviction for violating the sex offender registry requirements and ordering his four-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Deshawn Mahon Mancill, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of possession of heroin with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jared Booth Spang (“the Defendant”) was indicted for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault.  The Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.  Pursuant to a written plea agreement signed by the Defendant and the State, the State agreed it would take no position at the sentencing hearing as to whether the sentence would be deferred pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313.  At the sentencing hearing, the State argued against deferral, stating that “a permanent conviction is necessary [so as] not to depreciate the seriousness of this crime.”  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years probation and denied deferral, concluding “there is something permanent about death” and “there should be something permanent about . . . this conviction.”  We conclude that the State breached the plea agreement.  We, therefore, reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Lemario Hill, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure (1) to present a jury nullification defense or any other defense strategy, (2) to promptly investigate his case, and (3) to adequately communicate with him regarding his defense. Upon review, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

The defendant, Monterious Bell, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant, Terrance Johnson, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and burglary of an automobile. The trial court sentenced him to seventeen years for the murder conviction, six years for the firearm conviction, and one year for the burglary conviction for a total effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, appellant argues that the armed dangerous felonies statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324, does not list second degree murder as a dangerous felony in subsection 1324(i)(1) and that therefore (1) his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony cannot stand and (2) the trial court erred in its jury instructions with regard to this charge. The State concedes error and requests that this court reverse and dismiss the firearm conviction. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss appellant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

Appellant, Jasper Clayton, pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court granted him judicial diversion for a three-year period. The State petitioned the court to revoke appellant’s judicial diversion, and after a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s request, revoking appellant’s judicial diversion and sentencing him to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant contends that the State failed to comply with due process notice requirements and that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Lee Blunkall, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of testimony regarding the reaction of the victim’s family while the victim was missing, and the length of the sentence imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jasper Clayton, pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court granted him judicial diversion for a three-year period. The State petitioned the court to revoke appellant’s judicial diversion, and after a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s request, revoking appellant’s judicial diversion and sentencing him to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant contends that the State failed to comply with due process notice requirements and that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, George Geovonni Thomas, guilty of thirty-eight criminal charges, including first degree murder, aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury imposed sentences of life in prison for the first-degree murder convictions. The trial court imposed sentences for the remaining convictions for an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences plus twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals asserting that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements; (2) the trial court improperly admitted an “unreliable unrecorded statement attributed by law enforcement to [the Defendant];” (3) the criminal responsibility statute is void for vagueness; (4) the trial court erred when it retroactively applied the Dorantes evidentiary standard pertaining to circumstantial evidence; (5) the presentment was insufficient for failure to charge criminal responsibility; and (6) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Jeremy Garrett, was convicted, following a jury trial, of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery pertaining to the robbery and death of Dexter Birge. He appealed these convictions along with an additional conviction from the same jury trial for aggravated robbery of Mexwayne Williams. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the conviction for aggravated robbery of Mr. Williams, but affirmed the convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery of Mr. Birge. State v. Garrett, 331 S.W.3d 392 (Tenn. 2011). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner, and counsel filed an amended petition. After an evidentiary hearing the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, and Petitioner appeals that ruling. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This divorce action follows a long-term marriage of nearly twenty-five years.  Husband appeals the trial court's property division, determination of his income, award of transitional alimony to Wife, and the award of attorney's fees to Wife.  We affirm.

The Petitioner, Yoni Sales Barahona, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County.  He was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the appellate level.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Joshua Tyrell Cross, pleaded guilty to attempted rape, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-one days of time served followed by eight years of probation. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) his judgment is void because the information charging him with attempted rape failed to allege each of the required elements of the offense; (2) the factual basis submitted in support of the Defendant’s conviction is insufficient because it did not contain the required culpable mental state; (3) his judgment of conviction should be reversed because there is no record that he was arraigned or that he waived arraignment; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the case for a preliminary hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a preliminary hearing on the original charges.

This is an appeal of attorney’s fees in a post-divorce matter. The mother filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan suspend the father’s parenting time with the parties’ two minor children. The mother incurred around $16,000.00 in legal expenses litigating her petition and then changed attorneys. The parties eventually settled the petition with respect to the visitation issues, reserved the issue of attorney’s fees. Finding that the mother’s legal expenses of over $350,000.00 were not reasonable, the  Master recommended that the father only be required to reimburse the mother for approximately $124,000.00. The trial court the award further, awarding the mother approximately $42,000.00. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion because all of her attorney’s fees were reasonable. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Petitioners, the parents of the victims in the underlying criminal cases, sought to intervene in those proceedings for the purpose of challenging the trial court’s order to seal portions of an investigative file of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation that was identified during the motions for new trial in the underlying cases. Because we conclude that Petitioners have no statutory or constitutional right to access the sealed confidential information in the file, we affirm the trial court’s denial of their request to unseal.

The Petitioner, James Allen Gooch, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, raising seven grounds to support his claim.  Additionally, he claims that cumulative error necessitates reversal of the post-conviction court.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.