APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Richard Alan Hatchel, was indicted by the Tipton County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder and felony reckless endangerment under T.C.A. § 39-13- 103(b)(3). Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for his first degree murder conviction and three years for his reckless endangerment conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts and the State concedes that the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment because the proof at trial showed that Defendant was inside the house, and an element of the offense for which Defendant was charged is that he discharged a firearm from outside of the house. Defendant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. After a careful review of the record before us, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder, but the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for felony reckless endangerment as charged. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for first degree murder is affirmed. The judgment of conviction for felony reckless endangerment is reversed and the charge of felony reckless endangerment is dismissed with prejudice.

This appeal arises from a petition in juvenile court to modify custody. In December 2006, the juvenile court issued an order granting Mother primary residential custody of the parties’ two children and granting Father visitation. In May 2013, Father petitioned the court for custody of the children. A hearing was conducted in October 2013. The court found that Father met his burden of showing a material change of circumstances but determined that the children’s best interests would not be served by granting Father custody. We affirm.

This appeal presents two issues for review: 1) whether a person asserting a health  care  liability claim must  give  written  notice  of  the claim to  all  potential  health  care defendants before re-filing a complaint, or whether notice given before filing the first complaint is  sufficient  notice for  a  subsequently filed  complaint against the same defendants; and 2) if pre-suit notice is required for each complaint, whether the sanction for noncompliance is a dismissal with or without prejudice.  The plaintiffs, before filing their health care liability complaint, gave the defendants written notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1).  Thereafter, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint.   The plaintiffs  re-filed their complaint but  did  not provide  the  defendants  with  notice before the re-filing.  The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1).  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had to give pre-suit notice only once and that  pre-suit notice for the first complaint was sufficient for any subsequently filed complaints asserting the same claims against the same defendants. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) requires that plaintiffs notify prospective defendants of a forthcoming health care liability lawsuit before the filing of each complaint.  The sanction for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) is a dismissal without prejudice. 

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical providers on the basis that the plaintiffs’ health care liability complaint was filed after the expiration of the Governmental Tort Liability Act statute of limitations. Because we conclude that, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c), plaintiffs were entitled to a 120-day extension on the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse and remand.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1)provides thatanyperson who has a potential claim for health care liability must serve written notice on each defendant at least sixty days before filing a complaint.  In this case, the Court of Appeals held that Samuel E. Foster and his wife, Mary Foster (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), complied with the plain language of this statute by sending notices of their potential claims well over sixty days prior to filing their complaint. Because I believe that the Court of Appeals properly interpreted the statute, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by my colleagues and would remand this action for a trial on the merits rather than dismiss without prejudice to the filing of a third complaint.

Michael Baker a/k/a Michael Simmons (“the Defendant”) was charged with first degree murder in the attempt to commit robbery, criminal attempt: especially aggravated robbery, and criminal attempt: aggravated robbery. The jury convicted the Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns an allegation of child sexual abuse against a parent. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) against Alan O. (“Father”) alleging that he had sexually abused his then three year old daughter Emmalee O. (“the Child”). The Child had disclosed that Father had “poked” and “rubbed” her vagina. For his part, Father asserted that he touched the Child’s vaginal area only as part of his normal parenting duties, and that he never touched her in an inappropriate manner. After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that the Child was a victim of severe child abuse by Father. The case was appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). After a new trial, the Trial Court found that the Child was a victim of severe child abuse by Father. Father appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the evidence rises to the level of clear and convincing sufficient to establish severe child abuse. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Nicholas Keith Phillips, of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective forty-year sentence to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that his dual convictions for the offenses violate principles of double jeopardy.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions of aggravated sexual battery but conclude that his dual convictions of rape of a child violate double jeopardy principles and must be merged. Moreover, because the trial court improperly sentenced the appellant, the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The defendant, Don Arturo Hyler, was convicted of the sale of 26 grams or more of cocaine and possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell in a drug-free school zone and received a total effective sentence of fifteen years at 100%.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; that the court should have instructed the jury as to the lesser-included offense of facilitation; that the State made an improper reference in the opening statement regarding prior bad acts of the defendant; and for failing to grant a severance of charges for trial.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action by a prospective member of a start-up limited liability company for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty and fair dealing against the company and its managing member. Plaintiff claims to have an enforceable agreement to acquire a five percent interest in the limited liability company in consideration for her intangible capital contributions, that being her sweat equity rendered during the formative phase of the company. Defendants deny all claims and insist that Plaintiff knew she would have to contribute $30,000 in cash as her capital contribution in exchange for the agreed upon membership interest in the company.The trial court summarily dismissed all claims upon the conclusion that Plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case for any of her claims as she could not show any contract or enforceable promise existed, that she was compensated as an employee, and that the remaining claims failed as a matter of law. We affirm the dismissal of the claims of promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty; however, we have determined that material facts are disputed concerning the existence of a contract which precludes summary dismissal of the claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Two South Carolina insurance companies challenged their Tennessee retaliatory tax assessments. The Tennessee Claims Commission held that the Departmentof Commerce and Insurance did not calculate the South Carolina tax burden correctly because it did not include reimbursements received by the insurance companies from South Carolina’s Second Injury Fund. The Commission also denied the Department’s motion to strike portions of an affidavit. The Department appealed. We find that the Department’s calculation of the South Carolina tax burden was correct and reverse that decision of the Claims Commission. We affirm the Commission’s denial of the Department’s motion to strike.

The defendant, Tianna M. Amyx, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft over $500, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years and two years, respectively, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Defendant, James Henry Allen, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for premeditated first degree murder, unlawful possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of a first degree murder, and a violation of an order of protection in connection with the murder of his ex-wife’s cohabiting boyfriend. During trial, the trial court dismissed the charge related to a violation of an order of protection. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of a first degree murder. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective life sentence with the possibility of parole. He appeals, challenging the admission into evidence of his statement to the police, the 911 tape, and the damaged trailer door, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine: (1) the trial court properly admitted Defendant’s statement into evidence where there was no requirement that it be recorded; (2) the trial court properly admitted the 911 tape into evidence as an excited utterance and to rebut Defendant’s assertion that shots were fired from inside the trailer; (3) the trial court properly admitted the trailer door into evidence where there was ample secondary evidence to support the conclusion that the shots were fired from outside the trailer; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder. As a result, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Michael Jerome Inman a/k/a Michael Jerome Bivens, entered guilty pleas to six offenses: five counts of theft, which were three Class D felonies, a Class E felony, and a Class A misdemeanor, as well as one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. He eceived an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served on community corrections. A warrant was issued for violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence. After a hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his sentence in the penitentiary. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement; and, whether the defendant had a right to be present in court when his letter to the clerk requesting jail credit was discussed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee ex rel. Bradley County regarding delinquent real property taxes. The property at issue was sold during a tax sale in 2006. The owners of the property at the time of the tax sale subsequently filed an action to set aside the tax sale, alleging that they were not afforded due process and were never notified of the delinquent tax action. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owners and voided the tax sale due to lack of proper notice. The party who purchased the subject property at the tax sale has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendants, Larry Futrell and Terrell Smith, were convicted of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendants contend that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support their convictions. Mr. Smith also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to 26 years in the Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse in a divorce proceeding. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Wife, Leslie A. Muse (“Wife”), pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, along with the motion to dismiss this appeal filed by Husband, Robert L. Jolley, Jr. (“Husband”), we conclude that the petition was not timely filed. Accordingly, we grant the motion, and dismiss this appeal.

The defendant, Nico Farmer, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder and attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of life and eight years. He raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that his prior aggravated robbery convictions could be used to impeach his testimony; (3) whether the trial court erred by not charging the jury on self-defense; and (4) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by enhancing his sentence for attempted aggravated assault and ordering that the sentences be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal to clarify the analysis that should be used to determine the applicable statute of limitations when a complaint alleges more than one claim. We hold that a court must identify the gravamen of each claim alleged to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Identifying the gravamen of a claim requires a court to consider both the legal basis of the claim and the injuryfor which damages are sought. Here, the plaintiff contracted to sell the defendants real property in Rutherford County. The contract provided that the plaintiff would retain ownership of a sixty-foot wide strip of property along Interstate 24 to provide access to her remaining property. The contract also provided that its covenants would survive the closing. The warranty deed failed to include the sixty-foot reservation required by the contract. The plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging claims of breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants raised several defenses, including the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s intentionaland negligent misrepresentation claims butruled forthe plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and awarded her $650,000 in damages for the diminution in value of her remaining property due to the lack of the contractually guaranteed access route.  The defendants appealed, raising six issues, including an assertion that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals, focusing almost exclusively on the type of damages awarded, concluded that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s prevailing claim is injury to real property, and as a result, held that the claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to “[a]ctions for injuries to personal or real property.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105(1) (2000 & Supp. 2014). We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusions and hold that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s prevailing claim is breach of contract, to which the six-year statute of limitations for “[a]ctions on contracts not otherwise expressly provided for” applies. Id. § 28-3-109(a)(3) (2000). Because the plaintiff’s claim is not barred by the statute of limitations, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the intermediate appellate court for resolution of the other issues the defendants raised on appeal.

We granted review in this case to determine whether the mandatory minimum service requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(c) (2010) (the “Drug-Free School Zone Act”) renders offenses under that act ineligible for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the mandatory minimum service requirement of the Drug-Free School Zone Act does not render offenses under that act ineligible for judicial diversion. Although the trial court failed to adequately address the appropriate factors on the record, based on our own de novo review, we hold that the record demonstrates that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s request to be placed on judicial diversion. Accordingly, we reinstate the trial court’s judgments.

The sole issue presented in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether the trial court correctly found that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The employee, a Head Start teacher, sustained a compensable back injury.  She continued to work for about a year but then was not rehired because she had failed to meet a federal education mandate.  The trial court found that she had not made a meaningful return to work and awarded benefits in excess of one and one half times the an atomic alimpairment. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 50-6-241(d). The employer’s appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the trial court’s finding and remand for entry of a judgment based on one and one-half times the anatomical impairment.

In this petition to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent, we granted permission to appeal to address whether the State is required to prove that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child as a precondition to termination.  We hold that it is not. An action to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113. The language of Section 36-1-113 makes the State’s efforts to assist the respondent parent one of the factors to be considered in determining whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. After reviewing the language of Section 36-1-113, other pertinent statutes, the legislative history, and caselaw interpreting Section 36-1-113, we hold that, in a termination proceeding, the extent of the efforts made by the State is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis, but the State need not prove that it made reasonable efforts as an essential component of its petition to terminate parental rights. In so doing, we overrule In re C.M.M., No. M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004), and its progeny to the extent that those cases required the State to prove reasonable efforts as an essential component of the termination petition. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the respondent father.

The petitioner, Kenneth Eugene Black, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to two counts of sale of a schedule I controlled substance within a school zone, Class B felonies. As part of the agreement, he received concurrent eight-year Range I sentences to be served at 100%, which is the drug-free school zone release eligibility. The petitioner now contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide the petitioner with all discovery materials prior to his accepting the plea. Following review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Artterraces Buchanan, pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two-year sentence involving split confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for judicial diversion. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Carmel Borum, also known as Carnel Borum, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two felonies – theft and evading arrest. He received an effective sentence of 18 years as a persistent offender. On appeal, he claims that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about the value of the property in question and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.