APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, William R. Holt, was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated robbery upon his “best interest” guilty pleas.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2014), 39-13-402 (2014).  As part of the plea agreement, he accepted a thirty-year sentence at 100% service for second degree murder and a concurrent twelve-year sentence at 100% service for aggravated robbery.  Almost two years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct errors in the judgments relative to his offender classification.  The trial court summarily dismissed the motion.  On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Richardson, was convicted as charged by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury in case number 11-07432 of first degree premeditated murder and in case number 11-02623 of twelve counts of attempted first degree murder (counts 1-12), twelve counts of aggravated assault (counts 14-25), one count of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count 27), and one count of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon (count 30). The trial court sentenced Richardson to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. It also sentenced Richardson to eighteen years at thirty percent release eligibility for each of the attempted first degree murder convictions, five years at thirty percent release eligibility for each of the aggravated assault convictions, six years at one hundred percent release eligibility for the employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony conviction, and two years at thirty percent release eligibility for the felony reckless endangerment conviction. The court ordered the sentences for the attempted first degree murder convictions served consecutively to one another, consecutively to the sentence of life imprisonment, and consecutively to the sentences in counts 27 and 30 but concurrently with the sentences in counts 14 through 25, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus 224 years. On appeal, Richardson argues: (1) the trial court’s response to two questions from a juror during trial invaded the province of the jury and improperly commented on the evidence; (2) the trial court committed plain error by informing the jury venire that the State was not seeking the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; (3) the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to support a conviction; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the first degree premeditated murder conviction, the attempted first degree murder convictions, and the aggravated assault convictions in counts 16, 17, 18 and 20 through 25; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partially consecutive sentences resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment plus 224 years. Upon review, we affirm Richardson’s convictions but remand the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. This hearing is limited to consideration of the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), to determine the propriety of consecutive sentencing in this case.

The petitioner, Derrick Garrin, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged his 1994 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder on grounds that his sentence was imposed in contravention of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ladell Walker, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to nine months in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Wayne Sellers, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated rape. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-three years as a Range I, standard offender and ordered to serve 100% of the sentence as an aggravated rapist. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of photographs of the victim’s genitalia at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Shawn Hatcher, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not putting on expert proof to support his defense theory of diminished capacity and that the post-conviction court erred by relying on Denton v. State and Black v. State to deny his petition on the basis that he failed to present the expert witness’ proposed trial testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Richard Lowell Blanchard, II, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from nine misdemeanor convictions spread across four separate indictments for which he received four consecutive sentences of 11 months 29 days. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Demond Hughlett, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a determination from a medical expert or the court regarding his competency to stand trial and in failing to inform him of his right to file a motion to reduce his sentence or to appeal his sentence. The Petitioner also argues that counsel’s errors rendered his guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Silio Hilerio-Alfaro, was convicted as charged by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of .5 grams of more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged the delivery count with the sale count and imposed an effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and vacate the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions.

In this procedurally complex case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Norris, of second degree murder in 1999, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years of incarceration. After several proceedings and filings, discussed in detail below, the U.S. Sixth Circuit granted the Defendant habeas corpus relief unless the State allowed the Defendant to reopen his original direct appeal and raise an issue regarding whether his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The State allowed the Defendant to reopen his appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession to police because he gave his confession after being held for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause hearing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that we must address the issue before us for plain error. After conducting our plain error review, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

The Defendant, Jaleel Jovan Stovall, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, and the trial court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence at 100% for this conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt because he was mistaken as to the victim’s age. Deeming the evidence sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She argues that the trial court erred in holding that clear and convincing evidence established that she engaged in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to her incarceration and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both of the trial court’s findings. We affirm.

The appellant, Atosha Dominique Moore, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, he challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This suit arises as a result of a contract to install a roof on a commercial building. The building’s owner argued that the roof has leaked since its installation and that the roofer would not or could not satisfactorily repair it. The roofer asserted that the roof had experienced some leaks but that all had been repaired. The roofer alleged that it had performed according to the contract and sued for total payment. The owner of the building alleged, inter alia, that the roofer breached the contract by failing to provide adequate materials and proper workmanship and filed a counter-complaint. The trial court issued its ruling in favor of the building owner on the counter-complaint and awarded $220,374.96 in damages. The court dismissed the roofer’s suit. The court also dismissed the building owner’s other claims against the roofer for deceptive business practices and for filing an improper lien. Both sides appeal. We affirm.

In this construction contract dispute, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant general contractor as to all of the plaintiff subcontractor’s tort claims. The parties proceeded to trial on the remaining issues and judgment was awarded in favor of the subcontractor. Both parties raise numerous issues on appeal. Because we conclude that the trial court applied an improper standard in granting summary judgment, we vacate the order of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor. In addition, because the subcontractor’s tort claims may alter the remaining issues in this case, we decline to consider the remaining issues raised by the parties. Vacated and remanded.

The Petitioner, Marty Joe Kelley, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for five counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, nine counts of rape without consent, eighteen counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor and resulting effective sentence of thirty-six years to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Caronna, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He also argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, including prior acts of financial fraud; bad acts relating to the victim’s mother; an extramarital affair; and the victim’s statements concerning the closing on a new house. After a thorough review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Eric T. Gilbert, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his five-year sentence in confinement.  Discerning no error, we affirm

Petitioner, Travis F. Chapman, pled guilty to attempted second degree murder and was sentenced to twelve years in incarceration as a Range I, Standard Offender. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. The postconviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Steve Carl King, appeals the Giles County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and resulting twenty-two-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner raises numerous claims regarding his receiving the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James E. Hurd, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain certain discovery materials, failing to adequately communicate with him, and failing to interview and call several character witnesses at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Initially, no words adequately describe the horrible nature of this murder.  Nevertheless, I concur with the majority that a new sentencing hearing is warranted based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty stage of the trial. Moreover, I believe that the deficiency in counsel's performance was such that an entirely new trial should be granted. In that regard, I dissent.

A shareholder in a closely-held family business brought this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-26-102(b) to inspect the company’s accounting records. The trial court determined that the shareholder’s request was made in good faith and for a proper purpose. On appeal, the defendants assert that the trial court erred in finding that the shareholder’s request was made in good faith and in awarding him his attorney fees and the expenses he incurred in hiring a forensic accountant. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award the shareholder the expenses he incurred for the forensic accountant, but remand for a determination of an award based on the accountant’s fees concerning testimony about whether the records requested by Mr. Daugherty were accounting records. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant Brandon Hicks’ (“Husband”) petition to terminate his alimony obligation. After his ex-wife, Appellee Barbara Hicks Vick (“Wife”), remarried, Husband petitioned the trial court for relief under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C). Wife moved to dismiss Husband’s petition, arguing that the  parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) contained a non-modification clause with respect to Husband’s alimony obligation. The trial court granted Wife’s motion, and Husband filed a timely appeal to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a premises liability action. The plaintiff fell while descending a set of wooden stairs leading to a rental cabin. The plaintiff filed the instant action against the owners of the cabin and the rental company, which manages and maintains the cabin. In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the trial court determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact by which a reasonable jury could find that either defendant had actual or constructive notice of any allegedly defective condition existing that caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s fall. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.