APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kwaku Aryel Okraku, was convicted of one count of aggravated child neglect where the neglect caused serious bodily injury to the child, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated child neglect where a controlled substance was used to accomplish the neglect, a Class A felony, and one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony.  He received a sentence of sixty years for each conviction of aggravated child neglect and a twelve-year sentence for reckless homicide, all to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of sixty years.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in permitting the jury to hear testimony regarding a prior incident involving drugs; and the trial court erred in permitting testimony about the defendant’s statements about selling cocaine.  After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment sheet that reflects the merger of the aggravated child neglect convictions, with aggravated child neglect through the use of a controlled substance remaining as the sole conviction for aggravated child neglect.      

Jenkins Bonding Company executed as a surety an appearance bond for the Defendant, Aliscia Caldwell, on several cases as detailed below.  The Defendant failed to appear, and the general sessions court forfeited the bond and issued a scire facias and a capias for the Defendant’s arrest.  The bonding company physically surrendered the Defendant to the trial court and rquested that it be relieved as surety.  The trial court denied the surrender and released the Defendant on the same bond.  Subsequently, the Defendant failed to appear at another court hearing.  The trial court entered a final forfeiture judgment against the bonding company.  The bonding company filed a motion to alter or amend the forfeiture judgment against it, saying that it should be exonerated of the bond because it lawfully surrendered the Defendant.  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, the bonding company argues that the trial court did not have the authority to deny the surrender and release the Defendant over the surety’s objection.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, and we remand the case for entry of an order releasing Jenkins Bonding as surety in this case.

Father in this juvenile court custody dispute has filed a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal de novo as required by Rule 10B, §2.06, we summarily affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.

Plaintiff was injured in an accident involving three tractor-trailer trucks. Plaintiff, who was riving a tractor-trailer, sued the other truck drivers and the trucking company owners of the ehicles. However, prior to trial, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with one of the trucking companies whereby Plaintiff and the agreeing defendant agreed to cooperate regarding the litigation and to work together to expose the defenses asserted by the non-agreeing defendant. The jury returned an itemized verdict of $3,705,000 for the Plaintiff against the non-agreeing defendant. The trial court denied the non-agreeing defendant’s motion for a new trial, but it suggested a remittitur of $1,605,000, for a total award of $2,100,000. Plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and the non-agreeing defendant appealed to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and we reverse in part. Specifically, we affirm the physical pain and mental anguish and permanent injury awards as reduced by the trial court; we reverse the trial court’s suggested remittitur of the loss of earning capacity award and we instead reinstate the jury verdict of $1,455,000; and we further reduce the loss of enjoyment of life award to $50,000. Thus, we approve a total award to Plaintiff of $2,105,000.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Coy J. Cotham, Jr., also known as Cory J. Cotham, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to life without parole and twenty-five years, to be served consecutively.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in:  (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants; (2)  denying his motion to suppress Wi-Fi evidence; (3) denying his motion to recuse; (4) concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (5) allowing evidence of statements to the police by the victim’s husband; (6) allowing evidence of threats made by the defendant; (7) allowing proof as to the affidavit of indigency; (8) instructing the jury regarding parole; and (9) setting the defendant’s sentences and determining that they would be served consecutively.  We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the defendant’s assignments of error are without merit.  Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.

Claimant insurance company challenges the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax. It filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimant appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimant also raises several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kevin R. Beasley, for attempted first degree premeditated murder.  The trial court ordered that the Defendant undergo a forensic evaluation, after which it found the Defendant was competent to stand trial.  The Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to police, which the trial court granted.  The case was dismissed, and the State filed a notice of appeal.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  As such, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatoryinsurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

Father in this juvenile court custody dispute has filed a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal de novo as required by Rule 10B, §2.06, we summarily affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.

In 2011, for approximately four months, Plaintiff worked as a car salesman for Ted Russell Ford (“the dealership”) in Knoxville. After he was fired in November 2011, he brought this action against the dealership and others alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge under the common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1- 304 (2008 & Supp. 2013). Plaintiff alleged that his former employer fired him because he (1) refused to be involved when prospective customers test drove vehicles and (2) informed his supervisor that the dealership was breaking the law when it allowed test drives in cars that did not have dealer license plates or adequate proof of financial responsibility. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case because, in the court’s words, the plaintiff “did not engage in protected
activity by refusing to take test drives without a license plate on the vehicle or proof of registration or insurance in the vehicle.” The trial court held that these infractions did not implicate “a matter of fundamental or significant public concern, such as would overcome Tennessee’s employment-at-will doctrine.” Alternatively, the court held that the person responsible for firing plaintiff was not aware, prior to the firing, that plaintiff had refused to participate in test drives. The court held that “[t]he allegedly protected activity was not the basis of the adverse employment action taken against Plaintiff.” We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its dismissal of plaintiff’s action.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax. They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

Eric Johnson, acting individually and as next of kin of the decedent, Jana Lanell Johnson, and the Estate of Jana Lanelle Johnson (“Plaintiffs”), filed the instant action on April 27, 2010, regarding Ms. Johnson’s death. The action alleged health care liability claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115, as well as other claims, including ordinary negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. An agreed order granting partial summary judgment to Parkwest Medical Center (“Parkwest”) was entered with regard to Plaintiffs’ non-medical claims. Parkwest subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiffs failed to comply with all of the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 regarding the health care liability claim. Upon hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs filed additional motions regarding newly discovered evidence, including a motion seeking to set aside the prior order granting partial summary judgment or to amend the complaint, a motion to amend the certificate of good faith, and a motion seeking sanctions. The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion seeking to set aside the prior order granting partial summary judgment or to amend the complaint, as well as Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the certificate of good faith. The trial court failed to rule on Plaintiffs’ motion seeking sanctions. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ health care liability claim based on Plaintiffs’ failure to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. We vacate the trial court’s rulings with regard to Plaintiffs’ motions to amend and motion to set aside the partial summary judgment order. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims in which each challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax. They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

The petitioner, Ricardo Davidson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The petitioner was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine within a Drug Free School Zone, conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver over 300 grams or more of cocaine within a Drug Free School Zone, possession with intent to sell or deliver ten pounds or more of marijuana within a Drug Free School Zone, conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver over ten pounds of marijuana in a Drug Free School Zone, and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia.  He was subsequently sentenced to an effective term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction.  Following the denial of his direct appeal, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  On appeal, he specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately argue the motion to suppress; (2) failing to argue the issue of the racial makeup of the jury on the Motion for Acquittal or New Trial; and (3) failing to make an argument for and request a jury instruction under the natural and probable consequence rule.  The petitioner further alleges that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to adequately communicate with him during their respective representations.  Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax.  They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject. In addition, we affirm the commission’s decision not to allow Chubb’s proposed amendment as to the 2009 tax year payment.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a voluntary dismissal because a motion for summary judgment was filed prior to the entry of the order on the nonsuit. We hold that a motion for summary judgment filed after a written notice of nonsuit has been filed does not preclude the plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We also conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Affirmed and Remanded.

Claimant insurance companies challenge the state’s calculation of the retaliatory tax.  They filed claims for refunds in the claims commission. The commission ruled for the state. Claimants appealed, alleging that New York law required the charges at issue to be passed on to the policy holder, so the charges should not be included in the retaliatory tax calculation. We find that four of the charges should be included in the retaliatory tax calculation and two should not. Claimants also raise several constitutional challenges, all of which we reject.

The plaintiff, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant criminal court clerk. The plaintiff alleges that the court clerk induced a breach of contract by assessing him with court costs he asserts the State agreed to waive in return for his pleading guilty to felony charges. The trial court found that the plaintiff could not use his affidavit to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding an alleged oral promise made by the prosecutor when the criminal judgments and written plea agreement, taken together, unambiguously assessed court costs to the plaintiff. The court therefore found that the plaintiff was unable to prove an essential element of his claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed five separate tax refund claims inwhicheach challenges the imposition of retaliatory insurance premium taxes by the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The central issue presented is whether Pennsylvania’s surcharges or assessments forthree Workmen’s Compensation funds are imposed upon Tennessee-domiciled insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania and, therefore, fall within Tennessee’s retaliatory insurance premium tax statute. The Tennessee Claims Commission ruled in favor of the state and all of the Pennsylvania insurance companies appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on grounds of: (1) abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and (ii); and (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(2). We conclude that the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that clear and convincing evidence also exists that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Affirmed and remanded.