APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Chester L. Wallace, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He alleges that his sentence had expired before an outstanding probation violation warrant was executed and served upon him. Therefore, he claims that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation and impose the sentence. Petitioner also argues that the trial court erroneously failed to award him thirty months of pretrial jail credit from his arrest in 2006 to his guilty plea in 2008. He further asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint “new counsel” to represent him at the probation revocation hearing and that the trial court should have appointed counsel for Petitioner’s habeas corpus proceedings. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in the habeas corpus proceedings.

David Hoke Ware (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of burglary of an automobile, twelve counts of identity theft, twelve counts of fraudulent use of a debit or credit card, and two counts of theft over $500. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered this sentence to be served in incarceration and ordered the Defendant to pay restitution of $1,093.84. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying probation or other alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On November 5, 2010, Petitioner, Domonic Lacy, pleaded guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The offenses occurred when Petitioner was a juvenile and he had been transferred from juvenile court to criminal court. He received an agreed total effective sentence of twelve (12) years. No appeal was made from the judgments and they became final thirty days after they were entered on November 5, 2010. More than a year after the judgments became final, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on March 26, 2013. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations, and Petitioner has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

The defendant, Michael McKissack, was found guilty by a jury of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of attempted carjacking. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a stop of the vehicle he was riding in, asserting that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery, ten years for the aggravated robbery, and four years for the facilitation of attempted carjacking.  The trial court ordered the defendant’s aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted carjacking convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to his especially aggravated robbery conviction.  The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.  After review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper.  We affirm the judgments from the trial courtThe defendant, Michael McKissack, was found guilty by a jury of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of attempted carjacking. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a stop of the vehicle he was riding in, asserting that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery, ten years for the aggravated robbery, and four years for the facilitation of attempted carjacking.  The trial court ordered the defendant’s aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted carjacking convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to his especially aggravated robbery conviction.  The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.  After review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper.  We affirm the judgments from the trial courtThe defendant, Michael McKissack, was found guilty by a jury of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of attempted carjacking. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a stop of the vehicle he was riding in, asserting that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery, ten years for the aggravated robbery, and four years for the facilitation of attempted carjacking.  The trial court ordered the defendant’s aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted carjacking convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to his especially aggravated robbery conviction.  The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.  After review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper.  We affirm the judgments from the trial The defendant, Michael McKissack, was found guilty by a jury of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of attempted carjacking. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a stop of the vehicle he was riding in, asserting that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery, ten years for the aggravated robbery, and four years for the facilitation of attempted carjacking.  The trial court ordered the defendant’s aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted carjacking convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to his especially aggravated robbery conviction.  The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.  After review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress, and the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper.  We affirm the judgments from the trial court

The petitioner, David Hearing, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief from his two convictions of felony murder and the accompanying life sentences. The coram nobis court denied relief, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Kristopher Blake Kincer, pleaded guilty as a Range I offender to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (Supp. 2013) (theft of property); 39-14-105(a)(3) (2010) (amended 2012) (grading of theft). The plea agreement called for a two-year sentence, and the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the Defendant should be placed on community corrections.

In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the video-recorded forensic interview of the child-victim at trial. Specifically, he contends that the admission of the interview was improper for the following reason: Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, the statute under which the video interview was admitted, is unconstitutional because it is in conflict with the existing rules of evidence and established case law and violates the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Algie Lavell McClure, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for first degree murder, reckless endangerment, and aggravated burglary. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the following ways: (1) by counsel’s “opening the door” during his cross-examination of Kenya Houston to prejudicial testimony of the Petitioner’s violent nature; (2) by counsel’s failing to obtain Latasha Hinton’s medical records showing her intoxication at the time of the shooting to impeach her identification of the Petitioner as the shooter; (3) by counsel’s failing to present all law enforcement officers and accompanying reports as evidence that Ms. Hinton initially identified two, unknown black males as the perpetrators; (4) by counsel’s failing to call an expert witness to challenge Ms. Hinton’s identification of the Petitioner and to discredit the jailhouse informants; (5) by counsel’s failing to adequately impeach several witnesses with the specifics of their prior criminal records; (6) by counsel’s failing to review the jail records to verify the location of the jailhouse informant, Kordell Butler, at the time the Petitioner allegedly confessed to him; (7) by counsel’s failing to interview the State’s witnesses; (8) by counsel’s failing to object to the State’s improper closing argument; and (9) “in the manner that was presented” at the post-conviction hearings as testified to by the various witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the 1 denial of relief.

The Defendant, Anthony Adinolfi, entered an Alford “best-interest” plea to two counts of solicitation to commit statutory rape, for which he received an effective sentence of 11 months and 29 days to serve at 75%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for judicial diversion and alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Stephan Lajuan Beasley, Sr., was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. On May 24, 2007, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis arguing that new evidence exists. Following a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the Petitioner timely appealed. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Willie Hampton, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and his Range III, fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Harley Upchurch, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his sentence of three years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Johonauan J. R. (“Father”) to the minor child Zoey F. (“the Child”) on the grounds of willful failure to visit, wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, and substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. As there is uncertainty regarding the time frame relied upon by the Juvenile Court for the ground of willful failure to visit, we modify the Juvenile Court’s judgment to exclude the ground of willful failure to visit. Otherwise, we find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child.

A Gibson County jury found the Defendant, Susan M. Barnett, guilty of one count of aggravated assault, two counts of assault, and one count of unauthorized use of an automobile. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a six-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction and concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the remaining convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for aggravated assault by seriously bodily injury because the victim did not suffer “seriously bodily injury.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles Graham, aka Charles Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, the Petitioner argued that his judgment of conviction for tampering with evidence was void because (1) the indictment was defective for failing to include the essential elements of the offense and (2) the facts alleged in the indictment demonstrate that he “mere[ly] abandon[ed]” the marijuana not that he tampered with the evidence. On appeal, he contends that there was a material variance between the indictment on the tampering with evidence count and the proof offered at trial. Following our review, we affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

Plaintiff filed a healthcare liability action in the general sessions court. At a docket call, defendant Methodist appeared and tendered a confession for the full $25,000 jurisdictional limit of the general sessions court. Plaintiff immediately sought to non-suit her claims against Methodist. The general sessions court denied Methodist’s tendered confession and it entered an order non-suiting Methodist. Plaintiff then refiled her suit against Methodist in the circuit court and Methodist moved for summary judgment based upon its tendered confession of judgment in the general sessions court. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Methodist. We reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment and we remand for further proceedings.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Mitchell S. Pozezinski, for one count of violating the terms of his community supervision for life, and the trial court sentenced him to ten days in jail plus six months of state probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly violated the terms of his community supervision for life. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

An Obion County jury found the Defendant, Jerry Sherrill, II, guilty of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years as a Range II, persistent offender. The Defendant appeals, asserting that: (1) the trial court improperly ruled that his prior theft convictions could be used for impeachment purposes should he testify at trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court improperly required the jury to continue deliberations; and (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury concerning possession of recently stolen property. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. The parents of the child at issue divorced in 2007. The father moved to Colorado, and the mother was designated the child’s primary residential parent. The father was given parenting time in Colorado during the child’s spring, winter, and summer vacations, as well as parenting time in Tennessee at any time, with reasonable notice. The father exercised his parenting time only for a single 30-day period each summer in 2008, 2009, and 2010. After the child’s summer 2010 visit, the father scheduled no parenting time. In July 2011, the mother and her husband filed the instant petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and for the mother’s husband to adopt the daughter. The petition alleged abandonment by willful failure to visit during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition. After a trial, the trial court denied the petition. It held that the petitioners did not establish grounds for termination and that the child’s best interest would not be served by terminating the father’s parental rights. The petitioners now appeal. After careful review of the record, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of the father’s parental rights, and so reverse the trial court’s denial of the petition.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark Anthony Anderson, of one count of arson. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements to police. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is the second interlocutory appeal from a class certification. In Roberts v. McNeill, No. W2010-01000-COA-R9-CV, 2011 WL 662648 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011) (“Roberts I”), we vacated the trial court’s class certification and remanded for reconsideration. Plaintiffs/Appellees are former owners of preferred stock in Equity Inns, Inc., who filed suit against Defendants/Appellants, the board of directors, for breaches of the  fiduciary duties allegedly owed to the preferred shareholders during the negotiation and approval of a merger. Upon remand from this Court, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification with respect to “the proposed preferred class stockholders.” Having previously enumerated three preferred classes of stockholders, the purported certification creates an ambiguity as to the global class. The trial court’s certification of three subclasses does not cure the ambiguity in the global class, and we cannot proceed to review under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in the absence of a clearly defined class. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further consideration.

This appeal involves a contract dispute. The appellant distributor challenges the damages awarded to the appellee supplier under a supply contract for bagged firewood. Additionally, the supplier challenges the trial court’s failure to award damages for lost profits and tortious interference with prospective business. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Dericko Jackson, appeals as of right from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. Petitioner attacks his 1998 convictions in Shelby County for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The convictions were the result of guilty pleas apparently negotiated with the State as to the conviction offenses, and length and manner of service of the sentences. The sentences of life imprisonment for felony murder and fifteen years for especially aggravated robbery were ordered to be served consecutively. The three-year sentence for aggravated assault was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for felony murder. Each of three judgments provides that Petitioner is allowed 480 days of pre-trial jail credit against the sentence imposed in each judgment for the time period of May 9, 1997 to August 31, 1998. Petitioner asserts that all the convictions are void because the provisions for any pre-trial jail credit in the sentence for especially aggravated robbery results in an illegal sentence. Petitioner argues that as a result he is entitled to habeas corpus relief for all three convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rickey Bradford, was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court jury of two counts of making a false report, Class C felonies, and extortion, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-502, 39-14-112 (2010). The trial court merged the false report convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years for making a false report and five years for extortion. The court ordered that the effective eight-year sentence be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding Navigator Telecommunications records, (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lost or destroyed evidence, (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs taken from a lost or destroyed video recording, (4) the trial court erred by admitting bank records without requiring the State to comply with the Financial Records Privacy Act, (5) the trial court erred by permitting the State to impeach him with his previous conviction, and (6) that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors requires a new trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Rickey Alvis Bell, Jr., of felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping, felony murder in the perpetration of a rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual battery. Following the penalty phase, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on the two counts of felony murder. The trial court merged the two felony murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty years each for the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual battery convictions. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the two twenty-year sentences concurrent to each other but consecutive to the death sentence, for an effective sentence of death plus twenty years. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of its intent to seek the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court erred in denying his two motions for a mistrial; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to question the victim’s husband regarding an extramarital affair; (5) the aggravating circumstance codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(7) is unconstitutional; (6) the absence of an intent to kill renders the death penalty disproportionate; (7) proportionality review should be modified and the pool of cases considered in proportionality review should be broadened; and (8) the sentence of death is arbitrary and disproportionate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.