APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a five-day divorce trial, the trial court valued and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate, awarded $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife, and declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On cross-motions to alter or amend, the trial court altered its division of marital property as to several assets, and it modified the alimony award from $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to $4,300 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four years. Wife then filed another post-trial motion, pro se, which the trial court denied. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for such other proceedings as may be necessary.

This is a health care liability action in which Defendants sought dismissal, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of repose, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, as interpreted by Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). Plaintiff alleged that the Court’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bernard Frazier, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel but that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. As such, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court.

Petitioner, Elijah Truitt, pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of greater than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell in Davidson County. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years for possession of cocaine and two years for possession of a firearm to be served consecutively. Petitioner was placed on community corrections. Petitioner’s community corrections sentence was eventually revoked and he was ordered to serve his original sentence as imposed. The trial court filed an amended judgment reflecting the revocation and imposition of the sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his sentence was illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner’s arguments are meritless. Therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, James Garrett, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions. He argues that he is entitled to relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary, and his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c) and the prohibitions against double jeopardy. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Brian Hervery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his constitutional rights were violated by his being placed on a forty-eight-hour hold. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child neglect, and one count of attempted child neglect. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, this court reversed and dismissed one of the aggravated child neglect convictions based on insufficient evidence. State v. Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, No. M2009-02607-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2682173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2011). Petitioner’s sentence was unaffected by this court’s decision. In her post-conviction petition, petitioner alleged that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied her petition, and she now appeals from that denial. Specifically, petitioner argues that trial counsel should have moved to suppress petitioner’s statements to police, that he did not ensure she understood the significance of her decision not to testify at trial despite being aware that she had a learning disability, and that he should have called a witness at trial or at the sentencing hearing to testify about her learning disability. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Reed, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to obtain an expert witness to testify regarding a 911 recording; and (2) for failing to “effectively address the issue of the lack of blood on the Petitioner’s person and possessions.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Shadeed Rasta, also known as Robert Williams, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2009 conviction of felony murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Bryan Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Sedrick Williams, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his judgment of conviction is facially void because it fails to reflect that he is to serve 100% of the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 8, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 9, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an appeal from a finding of contempt. When the parents of a six year old girl divorced, they agreed to name the father as the child’s primary residential parent. The mother subsequently acted in a hostile and uncooperative way towards the father, and her parenting time was reduced. Shortly thereafter, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had failed to pay court-ordered child support for four consecutive months. Following a hearing, the trial court held the mother in contempt. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred by trying criminal and civil contempt in the same proceeding. She also argues that the trial court’s order was invalid, because it did not specifically state that her actions were “willful.” We affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child on May 21, 1997. He filed a petition for post- conviction relief on July 25, 2013. He now appeals from the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he contends that the State breached a condition of his plea agreement, that the breach occurred outside of the statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings, and that due process should preclude the strict application of the statute of limitations in his case. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Richard Herrera, appeals from the second summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition after this court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Because the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case to the post-conviction court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The petitioner, Ronald E. Boykin, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his judgments for sexual battery by an authority figure are void because he never agreed to a hybrid plea and was not informed that he would be subject to community supervision for life. He further argues that the condition of lifetime community supervision is in direct contravention of a statute and is, therefore, illegal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court denying the petition.

Petitioner, John E. Lane, stands convicted of one count of first degree murder. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to two pictures of the deceased victim’s body and wounds that were displayed on a projector during the trial. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I am constrained to agree with the majority that the trial court’s decision in this case must be affirmed. I write separately for two reasons. First, I would point out that the facts of this case dramatically illustrate the results dictated by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s continuing restriction, if not effective evisceration, of the community caretaking doctrine in Tennessee. As the majority points out, this restrictive interpretation recently was reaffirmed, and arguably expanded, by the majority opinion of the our supreme court in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013).

Petitioner, Randall Turner, pleaded guilty to first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery, for which he received agreed-upon sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and thirty years. The pro se petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he requested DNA analysis of his “clothing, pants, shoes and socks” as well as a witness’s “pajamas.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal follows. On appeal, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court should have: (1) recused itself from considering his case; (2) appointed counsel to represent petitioner; and (3) granted his petition for DNA testing. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the scant record before this court, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his motion to re-open his original petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a murder he committed as a juvenile. On appeal, he claims that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the new precedent established in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that it violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole without individual consideration of mitigating circumstances. Following review of the applicable law and the record before us, we conclude that the motion was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, Jr., appeals as of right from the Morgan County Circuit Court’s orders denying his petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis. The petitioner challenges his 1993 Rutherford County Criminal Court convictions of three counts of aggravated assault for which he received a total effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Evan Davis, was found guilty by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of selling and delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, in case number 12CR157 and in case number 12CR158. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the respective convictions in each indictment and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years’ confinement. The Defendant’s twelve-year sentence in 12CR157 was ordered to be served consecutively to convictions in two unrelated cases. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Nichols, pro se, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding his 2005 convictions for nine counts of aggravated sexual battery and five counts of rape of a child for which he received an effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief because (1) the judgments in case numbers 02-530 through 02-538 for his aggravated sexual battery convictions do not contain the required community supervision for life provision and (2) the rape of a child convictions in case number 02-706, which required the victim to be under age thirteen, concerned a thirteen-year-old victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Myron Jay Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following his convictions of promoting prostitution and money laundering, the petitioner, Joseph Chi-Choi Wong, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the summary dismissal of his petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.