APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (2009) certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Based on the undisputed facts, the District Court has asked this Court to determine whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant, even though the statute of limitations on that claim has expired. We hold that the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed. Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer or amended answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor.

On December 11, 1995, appellant, Marcus Deangelo Lee, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it during the commission of a crime, and the sale of cocaine. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve concurrent sentences of three years, one year, and three years, respectively, in the county workhouse. After numerous unsuccessful attacks on his convictions, on December 3, 2012, appellant filed a motion to correct clerical errors entitled “Motion to Correct Clerical Errors in the Judgment or Entry that Renders the Judgments Void Nunc Pro Tunc.” The trial court determined that appellant’s motion was time-barred and dismissed the motion. On appeal, appellant alleges that: (1) the trial court made a clerical error in appellant’s judgments; (2) the trial court erred by failing to vacate his judgments under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) his judgments should be corrected in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he received illegal sentences. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Marquest Mays (“the Defendant”) was indicted for first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. A competency hearing was held, and the trial court found that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. The Defendant proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction and dismissed the aggravated child abuse conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it declared him competent to stand trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (3) the trial court prevented him from presenting a defense when it excluded expert testimony regarding his vulnerability to giving a false confession. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentences in this case. I agree with the majority that the trial judge in this case recited his reasons for imposing consecutive sentences and that the ruling is therefore entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. See State v. James Allen Pollard, -- S.W.3d --, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *7-9 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). “So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be presumed reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (“The order [for consecutive sentences] shall specify the reasons for this decision and is reviewable on appeal.”)); see also State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705 (Tenn. 2012). I agree as well that the record supports the trial judge’s determination that appellant’s record of criminal activity is extensive pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(2). That, however, in my opinion does not end our inquiry.

This appeal involves questions regarding when the police may legally arrest a suspect based on information provided by an accomplice and the amount of corroboration required to convict a person who has confessed to a crime. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both convictions after deciding (1) that the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed because it was the result of an illegal arrest and detention and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence, independent of the defendant’s confession, to corroborate the commission of the attempted robbery. State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012). We have determined that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. We have also determined that the defendant’s in court confession did not require corroboration but that, had his extrajudicial confession required corroboration, the State presented ample evidence that this confession was trustworthy. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

In this child support case, Father appeals the trial court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. We have reviewed the record and the relevant authorityand find that the trial court did not err in concluding that Father was underemployed for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation. We affirm.

Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr., (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each first degree murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The trial court then merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr., No. E2010-01147-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2732566, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

In this appeal, the defendant, Lane Lee Coggins, challenges his Cocke County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of driving under the influence, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a), and violating the financial responsibility law, see id. § 55-12-139(c), via a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). Because the defendant failed to properly reserve the certified question, the appeal is dismissed.

A Monroe County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jonathan Michael Brown, of facilitation of second degree murder and being an accessory after the fact to second degree murder, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss based upon the loss or destruction of evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the denial of alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Egan Underwood, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This action involves a dispute regarding the validity of an $80,000 check written against the revocable living trust account of the decedent by the defendant, who is the decedent’s nephew. Two days before the decedent’s death, the defendant deposited the check into a personal savings account he held jointly with the decedent. The plaintiff, serving as trustee and as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a complaint seeking recovery of the $80,000. The trial court issued an ex parte restraining order, directing, inter alia, the bank where the joint account was held to transfer $80,000 to the clerk and master for safekeeping in the registry of the court. Following a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the $80,000 check at issue was a forgery and that the defendant did not have permission from the decedent to sign the check. The court directed the $80,000 to be transferred from the clerk and master to the decedent’s estate account and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for damages. The defendant appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Christopher Lee Pirtle, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The petitioner, Franklin Fitch, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Clinton Travis Simpson, appeals the revocation of the three-year probationary sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant, Joey Godwin, was convicted of two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, for which he received consecutive sentences of thirty years each. He appeals his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) the evidence underlying the convictions was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the State did not improperly exercise some of its peremptory challenges during jury selection. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey D. Miree, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2012 petition for post-conviction relief from his 1990 conviction of first degree murder as time barred. Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff filed an action against Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, in addition to its Tennessee affiliate and others, seeking damages arising from alleged sexual and emotional abuse of a minor child by a Big Brothers Big Sisters of Middle Tennessee volunteer. The trial court determined that the national organization did not owe a duty to the minor child and entered summary judgment in favor of the organization. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Johnson County Criminal Court’s grant of habeas corpus relief to the petitioner, Michael W. Belcher, in the form of pretrial jail credits. Because the habeas corpus court’s order awarding jail credits is somewhat vague, we vacate that order and remand the case to the habeas corpus court for the entry of an order directing the trial court to amend the petitioner’s judgment in count two to reflect the grant of appropriate pretrial jail credits.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Scott Knerr, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in counts 1 and 2 for attempted aggravated rape, in counts 3 and 4 for aggravated sexual battery, in count 5 for attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and in count 6 for attempted aggravated kidnapping. A jury convicted Knerr of the lesser included offenses of attempted sexual battery in count 3, attempted aggravated sexual battery in count 4, and attempted false imprisonment in count 6 and acquitted him of the remaining counts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged count 3 with count 4 and sentenced Knerr to four years with all but sixty days suspended. In addition, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of six months with all but sixty days suspended for Knerr’s conviction for attempted false imprisonment. On appeal, Knerr argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted aggravated sexual battery and attempted sexual battery. Upon review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss. The Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-5-319, grants Tennessee appellate courts subject matter jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals only in specifically enumerated circumstances involving arbitration agreements. The statutory exceptions include appeals from orders denying an application to compel arbitration, and appeals from orders granting an application to stay arbitration. Because the order appealed in this case is simply a denial of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss, it does not fall within the statutory exceptions. Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Dismissed and remanded.

After foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Plaintiff, Plaintiff asserted numerous claims against Defendants. All claims were dismissed in the trial court. We affirm.

Petitioner, Willie Lewis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See State v. Willie Lewis, No. W2008-02636-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL1267070 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 31, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Sept. 3, 2010). Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the applicable sentencing range and failing to investigate his criminal record. Petitioner contends that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have proceeded to trial but would have accepted the State’s plea offer. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. We vacate the decision of the chancery court and we remand for further findings.

This appeal involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s decision modifying the parenting plan to designate Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ children. Finding no error in the court’s ruling, we affirm.