APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Jerry P. Haley, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s
summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for
aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his
effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred
by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Jerome Griggs, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated rape conviction, for
which he is serving a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the postconviction
court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, acting pro se, entered guilty pleas to various
felony offenses and received an effective sentence of six years’ imprisonment. A few
weeks later, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming they were
unknowing and involuntarily entered because he was not advised of the consequences of
the guilty pleas.1 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. For
the first time in this appeal, the Defendant claims that his waiver of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; therefore, his subsequent guilty
pleas were constitutionally invalid. The Defendant additionally claims the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and determining
that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review, we
conclude that the trial court’s investigation of the factors bearing upon the Defendant’s
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel complied with Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). We further conclude that the
Defendant failed to establish that manifest injustice required the withdrawal of his guilty
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the amount and duration of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife/Appellee. Husband also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife for Husband’s alleged failure to comply with discovery. We conclude that the amount of alimony in futuro exceeds Wife’s need. As such, the award of alimony in futuro is modified to $3,451.00 per month and shall terminate upon Wife’s death or remarriage, or Husband’s death in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(3). We vacate the trial court’s award of $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Wife and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

This is a post-divorce action in which both parents seek to modify the permanent parenting plan and the father seeks to reduce his financial support obligations. The mother filed her Petition to Modify Permanent Parenting Plan in which she requested, inter alia, a reduction of the father’s parenting time and that she be awarded sole decision-making authority for the non-emergency medical and educational decisions for the parties’ two minor children. The father filed his Counter-Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan seeking, inter alia, that he be awarded the tie-breaking vote for all medical decisions for the children; that joint decision-making authority for educational decisions be maintained between the parties; that his financial obligations be modified, including child support as well as previously agreed-upon additional educational and medical expenses; and that he be awarded more parenting time. Following a trial that spanned 10 days, the trial court found in a 53-page memorandum opinion and final order that neither party proved a material change of circumstance that justified modification of the parenting schedule. However, the court found the parents’ inability to successfully co-parent under the existing joint decision-making provision adversely affected the children’s non-emergency healthcare and educational needs. The court also found that it was in the children’s best interests that the “[m]other have sole decision-making authority over their non-emergency healthcare and day-to-day education, free of any interference or delays by the father and without being required to consult with him in advance.” The court denied the father’s request to modify child support as well as his request to modify responsibility for educational, medical, and extracurricular expenses. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that the mother is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in defending this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

A defendant employer appeals the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in this action alleging breach of a plaintiff nurse’s employment contract. We conclude that the contract language is unambiguous and that partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly granted. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Appellant was convicted by an Anderson County jury of reckless aggravated assault
and child abuse, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, he argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court: (1) misapplied
certain enhancement factors, and the resulting sentence is inconsistent with the purposes
and principles of the Sentencing Act; and (2) imposed consecutive sentences based on the
dangerous offender classification without making the requisite findings. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

Nicholas Thomas Beauvais, Defendant, pleaded guilty as a Range II offender to Class C felony voluntary manslaughter, reserving all sentencing issues for the trial court. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by sentencing him to nine years’ incarceration. We determine that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Defendant and affirm the judgment.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Petitioner, Stephen D. Demps, of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and five counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Demps, No. M2017-00641-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 156, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2018), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that law enforcement altered evidence, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This case arises from a protracted and contentious child support action, which began in
2005 with a petition for child support filed on behalf of the mother seeking child support
assistance from the father for care of the parties’ minor son. Over the years, the parties
filed numerous petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt for
failure to pay medical and other expenses, petitions for changes in visitation with the child,
objections to the appointment of magistrates by the juvenile court judge, and requests to
rehear many of the motions and petitions. All pending matters were ultimately dismissed
for failure to prosecute in an order entered December 1, 2020.1 This appeal arises from
two petitions filed by the mother after the dismissal for failure to prosecute. The first was
a petition for contempt against the father for failure to pay medical and dental expenses for
the child and failure to pay the full child support amount, and the second was a petition
seeking payment of extraordinary expenses for the child related to his senior year of high
school and an extension of the father’s child support obligations until the child reached the
age of twenty-one. Upon thorough review of the record and consideration of the issues
raised by the mother on appeal, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Manning, of rape, attempted rape, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court erred in finding that the State’s expert was qualified and by allowing the expert to testify outside of her area of expertise. In response, the State argues, in part, that the Defendant waived any issue concerning the expert by failing to object at trial and by filing an untimely motion for a new trial. On our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. We also conclude that the “interest of justice” does not require us to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal, and we respectfully dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns a petition to access public records filed against a private entity. David L. Hudson, Jr. (“Hudson”) and Public.Resource.Org filed a petition against Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a division of LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”), in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (“the TPRA”) seeking access to and a copy of the complete and current electronic version of the Tennessee Code Annotated (“the TCA.”).1 The Tennessee Code Commission (“the Commission”) intervened on Lexis’s side in part to protect the state’s alleged copyright interest in the TCA. The Trial Court held that the TCA is exempt from disclosure because Tennessee law provides a separate avenue for publication of the TCA. In addition to its dispositive ruling, the Trial Court held that Lexis operates as the functional equivalent of a governmental entity, and that the TCA is disqualified from copyright protection. Hudson appeals. Lexis and the Commission raise issues as well. We hold, inter alia, that Lexis is a private company performing specific services for the state on a contractual basis. It has not assumed responsibility for public functions to such an extent as to become the functional equivalent of a governmental entity. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in that respect. Otherwise, we affirm.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Tharpe, was convicted at a bench trial of burglary of a
vehicle, retaliation for past action, theft of property, assault of an officer, evading arrest,
and coercion of a witness. In this consolidated appeal, he challenges: (1) the legal
sufficiency of the evidence supporting four of his convictions; and (2) the trial court’s
imposition of partial consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

I would also affirm the dismissal of the petition for access to public records and to obtain judicial review of denial of access. But I would do so only “on the threshold issue” identified by the trial court. The trial court framed the issue as “whether Tennessee Code Annotated constitutes a document required for public access under the Public Records Act.” On that threshold issue, I reach the same conclusion as the trial court and the majority. State law otherwise provides for access to Tennessee Code Annotated, so Tennessee Code Annotated is not a “state record” subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2023) (making all state records “open for personal inspection by any citizen of this state . . . unless otherwise provided by state law”); see also Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 485 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tenn. 2016) (recognizing Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7- 503(a)(2)(A) as “a general exception to the Public Records Act, based on state law”). The trial court recognized that resolving the threshold issue was “dispositive, making it unnecessary to decide the other two defenses asserted.” Yet, “in the interest of avoiding a time-consuming and expensive remand” in the event of a reversal on the threshold issue, it also ruled on the other defenses.

This case involves a protracted and contentious child support action, which began when
the State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition for child support in
2005 against the father for financial support of the parties’ minor son. Over the years, the
parties filed numerous petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt
for failure to pay medical and other expenses, petitions for changes in visitation for the
child, objections to the appointment of magistrates by the juvenile court judge, and requests
to rehear many of the motions and petitions. The trial court addressed each of these
motions and pleadings as they were filed. On September 1, 2020, a magistrate judge
entered an order ruling on all of the mother’s outstanding motions for rehearing in the case
but reserved the mother’s outstanding petition for contempt against the father for failure to
pay the child’s medical and dental expenses and the mother’s petition for rehearing of a
motion to modify child support. Those matters were set for hearing on November 24, 2020,
before a special judge. At that time, the Tennessee Supreme Court had issued a standing
order that all in-person hearings and trials were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic;
therefore, the November 24, 2020 hearing was set to be heard remotely via “Zoom”
technology. The mother objected to the virtual hearing on grounds that the notice was
insufficient and accordingly sought a stay of the pending matters via a motion filed on
November 23, 2020. Neither party appeared for the Zoom hearing on November 24, 2020,
and the special judge dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The mother then filed
a motion for rehearing and a motion to alter or amend the judgment, both of which were
heard and denied by the special judge. The mother has appealed the trial court’s dismissal
of the child support action. The father has not appeared or filed a responsive brief. Upon
thorough review of the record and consideration of the issues raised by the mother on
appeal, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamil Toure Holloway, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder causing serious bodily injury, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns a petition to modify alimony. Gerald Edward Baker (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against his ex-wife Kim Covarrubias (“Respondent”) seeking to modify his alimony obligation as a result of a massive post-retirement drop in his income. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order declining to modify Petitioner’s alimony obligation despite having found that Petitioner was credible; that his decision to retire was objectively reasonable; and that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred. Petitioner appeals. We find, inter alia, that the Trial Court erred by failing to account for Petitioner’s ability to pay in light of all of his expenses. The Trial Court’s decision lacked a factual basis properly supported by evidence in the record; was not based on the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision; and was not within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Thus, the Trial Court abused its discretion. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to modify Petitioner’s alimony obligation.

In this matter, the petitioner seeks a reversal of the trial court’s decision not to recuse itself. Due to the failure of the petitioner to meet the mandatory requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2.03, this appeal is dismissed and the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

The defendant, Corey Brown, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of especially
aggravated robbery for which he received a sentence of twenty-one years in prison. On
appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction and that the trial judge failed to execute its responsibility as
thirteenth juror. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

The Defendant, Chandler Gant, pled guilty in the Robertson County Circuit Court to assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to 11 months, 29 days in the county jail, with 30 days to serve on consecutive weekends and the remainder of the time on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a sentence of partial confinement. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Morrieo Allen, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of
counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor and claiming constructive discharge. The Employer moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Plaintiff’s employment agreement. The Plaintiff responded by invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, which the trial court concluded invalidates the mandatory arbitration provision. We reverse the trial court’s decision because the harassment of the Plaintiff and her constructive discharge occurred prior to the effective date of the Act.

The Defendant, Jennifer Michelle Childs, was indicted in the Sumner County Criminal Court for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and filed motions to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment. The trial court held a hearing, ruled that the Defendant’s warrantless arrest was illegal, and dismissed the indictment. The State appeals the dismissal, arguing that the remedy for an illegal arrest is suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment is reversed, the indictment is reinstated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The parents of a child brought suit to personally recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress in relation to sexual abuse of their child that had been perpetrated by the
defendant church’s former paid volunteer coordinator. The church filed a motion to
dismiss the parents’ claims and argued that the parents’ attempt to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress was not legally cognizable because the parents did not
perceive any injury-producing event. The trial court countenanced this position and
entered an order dismissing the parents’ claims. The parents then filed a motion seeking
relief from the dismissal order and, alternatively, to amend their complaint. The trial court
ultimately denied the parents’ motion, following which the present appeal ensued. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.