APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Everett Russ, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to consecutive terms of nine years for each conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the State’s failure to respond properly to his request for a bill of particulars should have resulted in a mistrial and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but because of inappropriate sentencing, we reverse the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting concurrent sentences.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to further address the causation aspect of the trial court’s rationale in excluding portions of Dr. Law’s testimony.

The petitioner, Ira Ishmael Muhammad, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 11-year-old Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and felony reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Reba Nell Woods, of three counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony, and two counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park, a Class B felony.  The trial court sentenced her as a Range III, career offender to an effective sentence of ninety years.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court committed numerous reversible errors regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the appellant’s convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5.  Therefore, those convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for new trials on those charges.  We also conclude that although the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant sold twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, the evidence is insufficient to show that she did so within 1,000 feet of a park.  Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of those judgments.  Finding no errors that warrant reversal of the appellant’s convictions for selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, those convictions are affirmed.  However, upon remand, the trial court is to consider whether the appellant’s mandatory thirty-year sentences should be served consecutively.
 

This appeal involves the question of whether the trial court properly limited a medical expert’s testimony at trial regarding the standard of care in an informed consent health care liability action. In the case at bar, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert at trial regarding risks that should have been disclosed to the plaintiff to only those risks that actually resulted in injury. The trial court granted the motion. A jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that the trial court committed reversible error when it restricted the ability of the plaintiff’s medical expert to testify about other known risks. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I respectfully dissent. Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment for two counts of aggravated assault against the victim. One of the convictions for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant

did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a rifle, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.]

The other conviction for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant

did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.]

Justin B. Conrad (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property of $1,000 or more.  The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions.  See State v. Justin Brian Conrad, No. M2008-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103776, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

Petitioner, Jonathan Tears, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the petition because the State violated his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory information, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  More specifically, Petitioner contends that the State (1) failed to disclose a statement made by the victim; (2) failed to disclose the statement of Ashton Davis; (3) failed to disclose the statement of Felice O’Neal; (4) failed to disclose the statement of Tangelia Alexander; and (5) failed to disclose payment from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund.  Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to “investigate, interview, subpoena, and call to the stand” Shelby Harris, Darron Little, Alexander Harris, Jarrod Robinson, Zeldra Swaggerty, and Adriana Cross; (2) failing to request Jenck’s material and cross-examine the victim concerning his statement to Detective Oliver; (3) failing to request a ballistics expert to testify at trial; and (4) failing to investigate and assert the defense of self-defense.  Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise Brady issues.  Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief and remand this cause for a new trial.
 

The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brandy Lea Birdwell, contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, citing the following bases:  (1) failure to provide a copy of discovery; (2) failure to adequately prepare and advise the Petitioner prior to her testimony; (3) failure to request a jury out hearing before the State impeached the Petitioner with a pending criminal charge; (4) failure to conduct a proper investigation with a private detective; and (5) failure to subpoena a material witness at the Petitioner’s request.  After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
 

The parents of six children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on two grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions, and the determination that termination of both parents rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, No. M2011-01210-SC-R3-CD, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013).   See State v. Glenn Lydell McCray, No. M2011-02411-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).  Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that although the jury was not properly instructed pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  Upon further review, we conclude that the omission of the White instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.  The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Darryl Thomas Harmon, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendants, Barry Smith, Barron Smith, and Julian Kneeland, were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of eight counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; one count of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; eight counts of reckless endangerment, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102, 39-13-103, 39-14-406 (2010). The trial court merged the eight counts of reckless endangerment with the eight counts of aggravated assault. Defendant Barry Smith was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each aggravated assault conviction, one year for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective ten-year sentence. Defendant Barron Smith was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years for each aggravated assault conviction, three years for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective fourteen-year sentence. Defendant Julian Kneeland was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for each aggravated assault conviction, one year for the reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively and the remainder of the convictions to run concurrently, for an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendants contend that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a 9-1-1 recording, and (3) the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the Defendants’ convictions except the aggravated assault convictions in Count 21, which we reverse and dismiss. We vacate the judgments for the remaining aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions and remand the case for entry of a single judgment for each aggravated assault conviction, noting merger of the reckless endangerment convictions.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1102(1)(A)(i). We conclude that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support is met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights is in the child's best interest. Affirmed and remanded.

Petitioner, Darren Brown, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition without an evidentiary hearing, based upon a finding that the petition was filed in violation of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jerry Haley, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Grandparents were awarded custody of Child after a dependency and neglect finding. Grandparents later filed petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and to adopt Child. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights after concluding Mother abandoned Child and that it was in Child’s best interest for Mother’s rights to be terminated. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned Child by failing to visit her in the four months leading up to Grandparents’ petition, but the evidence is not clear and convincing that it is in Child’s best interest that Mother’s rights be terminated.

The Petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, Jr., appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that the habeas corpus court committed a “misdemeanor in office” by denying his petition for relief, that he was illegally sentenced as a repeat violent offender, and that he did not have the requisite prior convictions to be sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction (DOC). After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Brandon Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Teresa Ann Kingsmill, pled guilty to eight charges, all of which stemmed from her possessing or manufacturing methamphetamine.  The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of twenty-one years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced her because it failed to adequately state its reasoning for the Defendant’s sentence in the record.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it sentenced the Defendant.  We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Deshawn Mitchell, entered guilty pleas in Case No. 12-CR-136 to sale of a counterfeit substance, which he represented to be cocaine (count 1) and delivery of a counterfeit substance (count 2); in Case No. 12-CR-137 to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 1) and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 2); in Case No. 12-CR-138 to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 1) and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base (count 2); and in Case No. 12-CR-139 to possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base (count 1), possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine base (count 2), resisting arrest (count 3), and evading arrest (count 4).  The plea agreement stated that the length and manner of sentencing in these cases would be determined by the trial court, and the trial court sentenced Mitchell as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years in confinement.  On appeal, Mitchell argues that his sentence is excessive.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed retaliatory discharge suit against his former employer, Defendant. According to his complaint, Defendant’s owner engaged in illegal activity. Plaintiff complained to Defendant’s owner of the illegal activity and was subsequently terminated. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff did not report the illegal activity to any person or entity other than the Defendant’s owner, who was a participant in the illegal activity. Plaintiff contends that where a company’s owner is a participant in illegal activity, reporting the illegal activity solely to the owner should not preclude a retaliatory discharge claim premised on refusal to remain silent. We do not agree and therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

The Defendant, James Michael Flinn, was convicted by an Anderson County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of his backyard and car, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from his warrantless detention, (4) he was denied the right to counsel at a pretrial hearing, (5) he was denied preliminary hearings after his arrests on two dates, (6) the trial court erred in revoking his bond, (7) he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him by the trial court’s admission of the victim’s death certificate, (8) he was denied his right to testify by the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony regarding the reason he made statements to a witness, (9) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his purchase of a shotgun, (10) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of vandalism of the victim’s house and truck, (11) the trial court erred in receiving as exhibits the no true bills returned by the grand jury regarding a prior incident in which the victim hit the Defendant, (12) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on the Defendant’s silence when he was detained by the police, (13) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by misstating the evidence, (14) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding admissions against interest, and (15) the trial court violated the Defendant’s right to due process by entering judgment and sentencing him on the same day. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.