APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Amelia M., the minor child (“Child”) of James M. (“Father”) and Bethany L. (“Mother”). On September 14, 2011, Mother filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father, which was subsequently joined by Mother’s new husband, William H. (“Stepfather”). Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit her and willfully failing to provide financial support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute over grandparent visitation. Whitney Nichole Huffman Lewis (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Isaiah Huffman (“the Child”). Billy W. Huffman and Lora D. Huffman (“the Grandparents,” collectively), father and stepmother of Mother, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) to establish visitation rights with the Child. The Child had visited often with the Grandparents, but Mother ended the visits after a falling out with Mr. Huffman. Following a trial, the Trial Court denied the Grandparents’ petition after finding there was no significant relationship between the Grandparents and the Child and that there was no risk of substantial harm to the Child. The Grandparents appeal to this Court. We find and hold that while the Grandparents and the Child did have a significant existing relationship, the Grandparents failed to prove that cessation of this relationship would pose a danger of substantial harm to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

Petitioner, Adrian Curb, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, or in the alternative, a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging the conviction resulting from his 1997 guilty plea to aggravated assault. As grounds for relief, he claimed that his attempted first degree murder indictment was improperly amended to aggravated assault, thus coercing him into involuntarily pleading guilty to the amended charge. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition because petitioner failed to establish an exception to the one-year statute of limitation for petitions for post-conviction relief. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate the requisite factors for newly discovered evidence as required for writ of error coram nobis relief. Following our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Troy Reynolds (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty in February 2012 to evading arrest by vehicle, theft of property valued at over $1,000, and burglary. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of three years to be suspended and served on supervised probation, consecutive to an earlier suspended sentence. The State later filed a violation of probation warrant. The Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Eric Cathey, filed in the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Stanley B. Hill, was convicted by a Blount County jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife, Vickie Hill, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) allowing the medical examiner to use demonstrative evidence that was inherently unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, and not disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial and (2) excluding a piece of physical evidence as a sanction for his violation of the reciprocal discovery obligations under Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James M. Bowley and Barbara A. Bowley (“Plaintiffs”) sued Richard Lane, Alvin Butler, and Danny Nicholson (“Defendants”) alleging defective construction of a log home built by Defendants for Plaintiffs. After trial, the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendants had breached the implied warranty of habitability, and that Plaintiffs had sustained $50,000 in damages as a result of this breach. Defendants appeal to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in approving the verdict and denying their motion for new trial or for remittitur. Plaintiffs also raise an issue alleging that the evidence does not support the verdict. We find and hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and further find no error in the Trial Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for new trial or for remittitur, and the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial or for additur. We affirm.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Josh L. Bowman, of three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After the jury announced its verdicts, the appellant pled guilty to one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony when, at the time of the offense, the appellant had a prior felony conviction. The trial court merged the murder convictions, merged the burglary convictions, merged the employing a firearm convictions, and sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of life plus sixty years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police, by allowing the State to show a transcript of his statement simultaneously with his video-recorded statement, and by failing to instruct the jury as provided by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court’s failing to instruct the jury properly pursuant to White constitutes reversible error. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to that offense.

Homeowners’ association filed suit against general contractor because of drainage issues alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and breach of the implied warranty of “good and workmanlike” construction. The trial court found in favor of homeowners’ association. The general contractor appeals. We affirm.

A man and woman lived together for six years and worked jointly on a number of business ventures during that period, but never married. After their relationship ended, the woman filed a complaint for a division of property, under the theory that the parties had entered into an implied partnership. The trial court heard conflicting testimony as to the respective contributions of each party to the acquisition, improvement and preservation of the properties at issue. The court declined to find that a partnership had existed between the parties, but ruled that the woman had an interest in all the real property acquired during the relationship. The court awarded her one parcel which the parties owned as cotenants in common and an additional $50,000 based on the value of her interest in the other properties. The man argues on appeal that the trial court overestimated the woman’s contributions during the relevant period and underestimated his own contributions. We affirm the trial court.
 

I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which holds the trial court did not err by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress his statement. I disagree with the remaining parts of the opinion and therefore would affirm all the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Carlos Smith, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count each of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous offense, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever offenses and that the State violated the tenets of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Discerning no error, we affirm.

In two separate cases, the Defendant, Amber R. Galemore, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and to theft of property. She was sentenced to an effective sentence of eight years on probation. As part of the Defendant’s plea agreement, she reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The question is articulated in the record as, “Whether the search warrant issued by a General Sessions Judge for Montgomery County, Tennessee, which was based on statements of an unknown person outside the defendant’s residence and computer keystroke software results[,] provided a sufficient nexus to make a probable cause determination.” After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The Defendant, Stanley Abernathy James, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sheila Dunlap (“plaintiff”) brought this action alleging liability for the wrongful death of her daughter (“deceased”) on the part of the nursing home operated by Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc. (“defendant”) where deceased was living. Although the allegations of the complaint were couched in terms of ordinary negligence, the trial court determined that the cause of action was one for medical malpractice. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which requires the filing a certificate of good faith with a medical malpractice complaint. We hold that the plaintiff’s claims that the nursing home failed to properly administer medication and a medical device prescribed by a physician, and failed to monitor the medical condition of the deceased at all times prior to her death, sound in medical malpractice. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed this action for professional malpractice based upon the running of the statute of limitations. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, from the trial court’s grant of a mistrial based upon a “manifest necessity.” The Defendant, Lamar Parrish Carter, appeals the trial court’s ruling, arguing that his attorney’s cross-examination of a co-defendant about her range of punishment, which was also the range of punishment for the Defendant, was not improper and did not warrant a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the interpretation of an exclusionary clause in an automobile casualty insurance policy. The policy excluded coverage for a loss resulting from an accident occurring while the vehicle was being driven by an unlisted driver who “is a regular or frequent operator of” an insured vehicle. Caleb Jenkins, who was not listed in the policy as a “driver,” was involved in an accident while driving the vehicle of Kelly Weed (“Insured”). Insured brought suit after First Acceptance Insurance Company of Tennessee, Inc., (“Insurer”) denied her claim. Insurer moved for summary judgment, alleging that Jenkins was a regular and frequent operator of Insured’s vehicle. Based on Insured’s statement that Jenkins was a “fairly regular” driver of her vehicle who had been driving it once or twice a week for six months, the trial court denied coverage and granted Insurer summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the policy excluded coverage because Insured’s admission establishes that Jenkins was a “regular or frequent operator” of her vehicle.

In this case, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the constitutional protections afforded him to be protected from double jeopardy. Defendant asserts in this interlocutory appeal that the trial court erred by denying the motion. I concur in the results reached by the majority, but write separately to express my opinion that the only justifiable reason for the trial court to deny the motion was the Defendant’s failure to explicitly object to the declaration of a mistrial.
 

In this post-divorce action, Father filed two petitions asserting several counts of criminal contempt against Mother based on alleged violations of the Parenting Plan. Father also petitioned the court to modify the Parenting Plan to name him the primary residential parent and grant him sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency healthcare, and extracurricular activities. Mother then filed a petition seeking to permanently enjoin Father’s new wife (“Step-mother”) from participating in certain activities with the children, such as signing their school report cards, volunteering at the school, and sending home notes in their lunch boxes. After a three-day hearing, the trial court found Mother guilty on three counts of criminal contempt, and assessed a $150 fine (fifty dollars per count), which the court required her to pay toward counseling with Father. The trial court denied Father’s Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, finding there was no material change of circumstances affecting the children’s interest, a finding which Father does not appeal. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition for a permanent injunction against Step-mother, finding it was unnecessary. Both parties were required to pay their own attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Mother’s request for a permanent restraining order against Step-mother. However, we have determined the trial court erred in finding Mother guilty of criminal contempt, and we reverse all three convictions. Finally, we find Mother is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court in defense of Father’s Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for a determination and award thereof.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Albert Lamont Bennett, Jr., of attempted aggravated assault and attempted aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years for each offense, to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court granted Father’s petition to modify child custody and child support, and denied Mother’s petition to increase alimony. Mother appeals. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to Mother’s petition to modify alimony, and remand for findings of fact and further proceedings, if necessary. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner, Brian Wesley Lacey, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Darryl Jerome Moore, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine, conspiracy to deliver 300 pounds or more of marijuana, money laundering, possession with intent to deliver ten pounds or more of marijuana, and unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted previously of a felony drug offense, and his resulting effective sentence of ninety-three years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he pled guilty unknowingly and involuntarily. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, William Paul Eblen, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred in concluding that testimony from two witnesses alleging that the victim later recanted her allegations against the Petitioner was not credible. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.