APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying a petition to terminate the parental rights of the appellant, Willie G., to his three minor children. Because the judgment of the trial court is not adverse to the appellant, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

Appellant, John D. Pruitt, entered guilty pleas to vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, burglary, felony escape, and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Pursuant to the terms of the guilty plea, appellant received an effective six-year sentence, and the State dismissed the remaining charges against him. The parties submitted the issue of alternative sentencing to the trial court for determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the effective six-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Appellant contends that the trial court did not properly consider his request for split confinement. Following our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

This appeal involves jurisdiction as to a parentage petition and related issues. The mother of the subject child lives in New York and the father lives in Tennessee. The child lives with the mother in New York. The mother filed this parentage petition in Tennessee. The Tennessee juvenile court entered an order establishing the father’s parentage and adjudicating child support, the designation of the primary residential parent, and the allocation of the parties’ residential parenting time. The mother appeals, challenging in part the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to adjudicate custody and child support. We affirm the juvenile court’s final order on the father’s parentage. We vacate the final order on the designation of primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time, as the Tennessee court did not have jurisdiction over these issues under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. We hold that the Tennessee court had jurisdiction to adjudicate child support, but vacate its final order on child support because the determination is based in part on the adjudication of the primary residential parent and the allocation of residential parenting time.

The defendant, Ronald McMillan, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and by ordering that he serve his six-year sentence consecutively to a previously-imposed eight-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Timothy Shane Hixson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the exclusion of certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sought permanent partial disability benefits for an injury to her hip and lower back. Her employer agreed that her hip injury was compensable, but denied that she had suffered a permanent disability. It also denied that her alleged back injury was compensable. The trial court found for the employee, and awarded permanent disability benefits for both injuries. Her employer has appealed, arguing that the medical evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Hoyte Mitchell Hobbs, appeals from his Warren County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of attempted second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by imposing a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Ricky Wayne Davis, Jr. charging him with two counts of felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and failure to use a seat belt. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of evading arrest, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and violation of the seatbelt law. He was found not guilty of one count of evading arrest and reckless endangerment, and the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two years of probation for felony evading arrest and eleven months, twenty-nine days of probation for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, to be served concurrently. The trial court also imposed a fine of ten dollars for the seat belt violation and a fine of one-hundred dollars for failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony evading arrest. After a thorough review, we reverse the conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana. All other judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Shirley Mason, appeals her Bedford County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of less than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine base, claiming that racial discrimination tainted the jury selection process in her case and that the trial court erred by refusing to strike the State’s notice seeking enhanced punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jerome Williams, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter his 1986 conviction of aggravated rape because the indictment failed to allege an offense. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Customer of a restaurant who was injured when she fell on a concrete ramp leading into the restaurant brought suit against the restaurant, alleging that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition and that the restaurant failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to customers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the ramp did not constitute a dangerous condition and that the owners did not have notice that the ramp constituted a dangerous condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

 The Petitioner, Yovonda S. Chambers, pled guilty to one count of identity theft and agreed to allow the trial court to determine sentencing. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to a second count of identity theft. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to four years to be served on intensive probation. The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that her attorney failed to adequately investigate the case, discuss the case with the Petitioner, and properly prepare for sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
 

A Davidson County Grand Jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Lam Hoang Nguyen, of sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to 18 months probation after service of 10 days in confinement. In this appeal, Nguyen argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for sexual battery; and (2) he was denied a fair and impartial trial due to jury bias. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ex-wife appeals from a trial court’s adoption of a report by the clerk and master that her ex-husband had fully satisfied a judgment for unpaid pension payments arising from the parties’ 1996 divorce and the determination that she is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in the underlying case and other proceedings. The clerk and master found that an October 2001 judgment for an unpaid arrearage in pension payments had been satisfied and the ex-wife did not timely file an objection. The trial court adopted the clerk and master’s report and entered judgment accordingly. The court also ruled that the ex-wife was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees in this or other proceedings including those specified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order. Although the ex-wife waived any objection to the report of the clerk and master, and thus, the trial court’s adoption of that report is affirmed, we have determined that the reference to the clerk and master was limited to determining the ex-husband’s pension obligations under the October 2001 chancery court judgment. Whether the sums owed by the ex-husband for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $13,904.44 identified in the 2003 bankruptcy court agreed order were not specified as issues in the order of reference to the master. Because the ex-husband’s obligations to pay to the ex-wife the attorney’s fees and costs specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order were not identified in the order of reference, the ex-wife’s failure to timely file an objection does not constitute a waiver of that issue. We have also determined that whether the sums owing under the 2003 bankruptcy order are a legal obligation of the ex-husband is a question of law, not a question of fact, and the failure to timely object to the master’s report does not constitute a waiver of an issue of law. The 2003 bankruptcy order expressly states the ex-husband owes the sum of $13,904.44, plus interest, to the ex-wife for her attorney’s fees and costs, and he is collaterally estopped from denying the debt specified in the 2003 bankruptcy order. Therefore, we have concluded that the ex-wife is entitled to recover $13,904.44, plus interest. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Gregory D. Valentine, entered best interest pleas to twenty counts of identity theft, six counts of criminal simulation, one count of forgery, one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, one count of money laundering, and one count of filing a false police report in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years and eight months, with service of thirty-two months at seventy-five percent in confinement at the county jail followed by service of ten years at thirty percent on state probation. Shortly after entry of these judgments, Valentine filed three pro se motions to set aside his pleas, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Valentine appealed, and this court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Gregory Darnell Valentine, No. M2010-02356-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3263117 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2012). On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and again denied the motions. On appeal, Valentine argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to set aside his best interest pleas. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the application of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctor, finding that the statute of limitations defense was not waived by her failure to raise it in her first pre-answer motion, that the defense was sufficiently pleaded, and that the undisputed facts in the record supported a finding that the statute of limitations had expired at the time of filing the initial complaint. Affirmed and remanded.

Upon the death of her husband from asbestos-related pulmonary disease, the plaintiff filed suit for workers' compensation benefits. Because her husband had previously settled a disability claim for 400 weeks of benefits, the employer denied the claim. The trial court awarded the funeral expenses of the husband but declined to grant benefits to the plaintiff as his dependent over and above the amount of the settlement. Her appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rufe 51. Although the plaintiff may make a separate claim for benefits, she is not entitled to any recovery beyond funeral expenses because the amount of her entitlement, as controlled by the date of her husband's injury, would not be in excess of the amount of his settlement. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

The issue presented in this case is whether a county civil service board was authorized to order the county sheriff to equalize the pay of all sergeants employed within the sheriff’s office. A group of sergeants, who were paid varying amounts within an established pay range, filed a grievance regarding pay disparities among sergeants in the sheriff’s office. When the sheriff rejected the grievance, the sergeants filed a grievance with the sheriff’s department civil service board. The board upheld the grievance and ordered the sheriff to equalize the pay of all sergeants in the sheriff’s office. The sheriff and the county appealed to the Hamilton County Chancery Court, which held that the board did not have the authority to order pay equalization and declared the board’s ruling null and void. The Court of Appeals ruled that the board exceeded its statutory authority, but remanded the case to the board so it could direct the sheriff to take the necessary steps to eliminate the pay disparity. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-409(3) (2011), we hold that the board had the authority to hear the grievance, but in the absence of proof that the sheriff violated state law or the sheriff’s department civil service manual, the board lacked the power to order the remedy of salary equalization. There was no proof that the sheriff violated state law, and the civil service manual specifically gave the sheriff the authority to make individual pay determinations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Chancery Court for further proceedings as are necessary.

The appellant, Michael Dewey Ellington, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his girlfriend, Julia Kinsey, and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction of first degree premeditated murder, that the trial court erred in excluding photographs depicting the contents of the victim’s purse, and that the trial court erred by admitting a photograph depicting the victim’s wounds. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action arises out of the alleged breach of a construction subcontract due to the general contractor’s failure to pay for work performed by the subcontractor. At issue in this appeal are the plaintiff’s two claims against the general contractor and the insurer that provided the performance and payment bond. One claim is for breach of the subcontract; the other is for violation of the Prompt Pay Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 66-34-101 through -703.The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that both claims were time-barred by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-109(a)(3), the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. We affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence supports the verdict of first degree murder. In my view, the element of premeditation was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Civil service employee appeals the trial court’s judgment affirming the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate the employee for the good of the service pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-326. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court imposed a sentence of four years. On appeal, the defendant, who was forty-two years old at the time of the offense, argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the testimony of the fourteen-year-old female victim, a consenting accomplice in the crime, was not adequately corroborated by other proof. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the victim qualified as an accomplice to the crime but affirmed the conviction, holding that her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the evidence in the record. This Court granted review to determine whether a victim of statutory rape qualifies as an accomplice such that his or her testimony must be corroborated in order to support a conviction. We hold that the testimony of a victim of statutory rape does not require corroboration. Because the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the petitioner’s application for four billboard construction permits on I-240 in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee. The dispositive issues concern the zoning classifications of the proposed billboard locations. The Department of Transportation denied the permits based upon the finding that none of the proposed billboard locations met the zoning requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-21-103(4) or Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.03(1)(a)1, or the definitions for “Zoned Commercial” or “Zoned Industrial” in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.1680-2-3-.02(29). The trial court affirmed the Department’s denial of the permits, finding subsection (d) of 23 C.F.R. § 750.708, which states, “A zone in which limited commercial or industrial activities are permitted as an incident to other primary land uses is not considered to be a commercial or industrial zone for outdoor advertising control purposes” was controlling. The trial court also found the area was comprehensively zoned for residential, agricultural and flood plain uses, not commercial or industrial, and that “TDOT acted within its statutory authority in denying the petitioner’s application for permits,” and thus the court dismissed the petition. We affirm the decision to deny the permits based upon federal and state law.

A police officer who was terminated for violating chain of command and insubordination filed suit for retaliatory discharge pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, alleging that he had been terminated for reporting illegal activities of the Police Chief to the Mayor. Following a trial, the court held that the evidence did not establish that the officer had been terminated solely for his refusal to remain silent about the illegal activities. Finding that the reasons given for the officer’s termination were pretextual within the meaning of the applicable statute, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.