APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jacob Andrew Reller, was convicted by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401(2012). He received an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence with all but ten days suspended. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the prosecutor failed to produce exculpatory evidence, and (3) the trial court erred in finding evidence of the Defendant’s alibi and Officer Wilder’s impeachment irrelevant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. With respect to the Defendant’s remaining issues, I concur with the majority’s decision.

This appeal arises from a divorce and child custody determination. After 18 years of marriage, Terri Ann Kelly (“Wife”) sued Willard Reed Kelly (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court, among other things, awarded Wife alimony and custody of the parties’ son, Will. Husband appeals, raising several issues. We reverse the Trial Court in its award of custody of Will to Wife. We modify the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate and its award of alimony to Wife. Finally, we affirm the Trial Court as to its award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm, in part, as modified, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Edward Warren Wise, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to a Range I sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who died prior to trial and also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Kermit Penley, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kyle Ronald Fencl, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of theft of property valued less than $500, one count of robbery, seven counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Kedrick Carwell, was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for the carjacking conviction and as a violent offender to ten years for the firearm conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Brent A. Blye, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony, possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of less that .05 ounces of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. Following the verdict, the parties reached an agreement on sentencing whereby the petitioner would serve twelve years as a Range II offender on the cocaine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the misdemeanors. As part of the same sentencing agreement, the petitioner entered guilty pleas and was sentenced in three unrelated cases at the same time. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to file a timely motion for new trial; and (2) failing to develop a theory of defense at trial arguing for a lesser-included offense when evidence was available to support such a defense. Following review of the record, we remand the case to the post-conviction for a determination of whether a delayed appeal is proper based upon deficient performance in trial counsel’s failing to file a motion for new trial. The denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed in all other aspects.

Consulting group that served as the agent of record for a trust established to provide insurance to employees of a county school system filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Act when a group of trustees met for lunch with one of the consulting group’s employees and later changed the school system’s agent of record when the employee formed a different association with another company. The trial court found that no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred at the lunch meeting because no decision was made during the lunch. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count for each victim; two counts of especially aggravated robbery, one count for each victim; and two counts of aggravated rape. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of 125 years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his identification in the photographic lineup presented to one of the victims, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the line-up results or imposing consecutive sentences. Further, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Patrick L. Maliani, for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever offenses; (3) the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum sentence within his range because it failed to apply one applicable mitigating factor. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgment of the trial court. As such, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, dismissing Appellant’s claims of: (1) slander/defamation; (2) false light invasion of privacy; (3) false imprisonment; (4) malicious harassment; (5) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; (6) negligent failure to affirm identification; (7) negligence; (8) assault and battery; and (9) civil conspiracy. Appellant also raises issues concerning the scope of cross-examination and the admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion concerning either the scope of the cross-examination, or by excluding certain evidence. We further conclude that Appellant failed to put forth sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case for any of the foregoing claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict. Affirmed and remanded.

Petitioner, Danny Pendergrass, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case. Petitioner was charged in a 22-count presentment with multiple counts of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated statutory rape against the same victim. Petitioner entered best interests pleas to all counts and received an effective sentence of 25 years in confinement to be served at 100 percent. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Larry Hunt, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape and resulting effective sentence of thirty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, because the post-conviction court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law in its denial of the petition, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Andre Benson, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in July of 2009 with aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses as charged in the indictment. He was sentenced as a Range II, Multiple Offender to fifteen years in incarceration for the aggravated robbery conviction and thirty-five years as a Violent Offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years at 100 percent. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his kidnapping conviction as a result of the holding in State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); (2) whether the trial court violated Appellant’s right to confront witnesses by admitting preliminary hearing testimony of the victim at trial after it was determined the victim was incompetent to testify at trial; (3) whether the trial court improperly admitted excited utterances of the victim; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting expert witness testimony about the victim’s mental state; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (6) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant; and (7) whether cumulative error affected Appellant’s constitutional due process rights. After a review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we determine: (1) the trial court properly determined that the victim was unavailable at trial such that the State could utilize her preliminary hearing testimony; (2) the trial court properly admitted excited utterances of the victim; (3) Appellant waived any issue with regard to hearsay admitted during the testimony of Jarian Henry based on the failure to object to the evidence; (5) Appellant is entitled to relief from his aggravated kidnapping conviction based on White because the issue has been fairly raised and we conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery; and (7) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, Appellant’s aggravated robbery conviction is affirmed, but a new trial is required on the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Therefore, this case is remanded for further proceedings as set out in this opinion.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent paternity testing.  Discerning no error, we affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.

The defendant, Luis Guillen, was found guilty after a trial by jury of one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for the aggravated rape and to a consecutive ten years for the aggravated kidnapping, for a total effective sentence of thirtyfive years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1996, Petitioner, Tony Von Carruthers, was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death on each count by a Shelby County Jury. See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Tenn. 2000). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief for, inter alia, ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel for failing to retain an expert in the field of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) analysis. See Tony Carruthers v. State, No. W2006-00376-CCA-R3-PD, 2007 WL 4355481, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 12, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 27, 2008). After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Id. In December of 2011, Petitioner sought to have DNA analysis performed on a vaginal swab and a blanket pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The Shelby County Criminal Court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied relief. Because Petitioner did not establish the criteria for ordering DNA analysis under the Act, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Carletha Jefferson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of six years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated assault and that the trial court erred in denying her requests for judicial diversion and probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmy Ray Massey, Jr., pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to felony failure to appear, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years at 60% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, James Ray Walker, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury in January of 2011 for one count of official misconduct and one count of theft of property valued at less than $500. The events that gave rise to the indictments occurred in May of 2010 while Appellant was employed by the United States Postal Service in Jackson, Tennessee. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of both offenses. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years for the conviction for official misconduct. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve 90 days of the sentence in incarceration and the balance of the sentence on probation. Appellant was sentenced to thirty days for the theft of property conviction, to be served concurrently with the sentence for official misconduct. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant presents various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, he asks this Court to determine if the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and whether his sentence was “unfair.” After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant has waived any issues with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to support the issues with argument, citations to the record, or citations to authority. Moreover, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Kelly Ruth Osteen, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft of property valued under $500.00, fraudulent use of a credit card or debit card, and illegal possession of a credit card or debit card. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of three years, to be served on supervised probation. This sentence was to run concurrently with another sentence, number II-CR084354. After each of two subsequent arrests for additional criminal offenses in case number II-CR065737 and case number II-CR085803, a probation violation warrant was issued. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation , ordering her to serve seventy days and then return to supervised probation with an additional condition that she successfully complete the 21^st Judicial District Drug Court program. Thereafter, another probation violation warrant was issued for the Defendant’s failure to complete the drug court program, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke her sentence and seeks jail credit for time she spent participating in the drug court program. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Martin Dean "Cub" Meeks, was convicted by a Grundy County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty as thirteenth juror; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to establish premeditation; and (3) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012).