APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this malpractice action, the plaintiff failed to attach proof of service of the statutory notice and the required affidavit with the complaint. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.

In this malpractice action, the plaintiff failed to attach proof of service of the statutory notice and the required affidavit with the complaint. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.

This case requires us to decide whether Tennessee’s appellate courts possess subject matter jurisdiction to review a trial court’s order that vacates an arbitration award and remands the dispute to a new arbitration panel without expressly declining to confirm the award. An investor pursued a claim against an investment company over losses he incurred due to the failure of some of the company’s bond funds. After a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration panel ruled in the investor’s favor, the investment company petitioned the Chancery Court for Shelby County to vacate the award based on its belief that two members of the arbitration panel were biased. The trial court, without expressly declining to confirm the award, vacated the award and remanded the case for a second arbitration before a new panel. The investor appealed. The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, No.W2010-01339-COA-R3-CV,2011 WL 5517036, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2011). We granted the investor’s application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the trial court’s order is, in fact, an appealable order “denying confirmation of an award” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5319(a)(3) (2012).

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, Edy Chavez Pantaleon, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. In addition, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal sought under Tenn. R. App. P. 3 is from an Order to Register Foreign Decree entered by the trial court on December 14, 2012, which order gave “full faith and credit for enforcement and modification purposes” to the parties’ New Jersey divorce judgment and subsequent consent orders entered by the New Jersey court on the issue of child custody. Subsequent to the entry of the December 14, 2012 order, the appellee (“Father”) filed a petition to modify the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and consent orders. The trial court entered an emergency order on January 9, 2013, temporarily modifying the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and orders to change custody of the parties’ minor children from the appellant (“Mother”) to Father. Pursuant to Rule 10 of Tenn. R. App. P., Mother then sought and was granted an extraordinary appeal from the January 9, 2013 order. See order in Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic, No. E2013-00238-COA-R10-CV, (Tenn. Ct. App., Knoxville, Feb. 5, 2013). That case is now pending in this Court. She also sought this Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal as to the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012. Since the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012, is not a final order, we have no jurisdiction to consider her Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal.

Father of adult child with spina bifida and other impairments challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to continue to pay child support. We have concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We further find no error in the trial court’s determination that the adult child is severely disabled, in its calculation of child support, or in its determination of the amount owed by Father for past uncovered medical expenses.

An employee fell while working for her employer and sustained a shoulder fracture. The employer contends that the injury did not arise out of her employment and was an idiopathic fall. The trial court held that the employee sustained the burden of proving that her injury arose out of her employment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The parents of three minor children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court found the Department of Children’s Services established two grounds for termination: 1) severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4); and 2) persistence of  conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3). In a previous dependency and neglect proceeding, the Franklin County Circuit Court found that Father severely abused the children’s half-sister and that Mother knew of the abuse but did nothing to protect her child. Neither parent appealed that judgment; as a consequence, the severe abuse findings are res judicata. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1113(g)(4), a court may terminate parental rights when the parent is found to have committed severe child abuse under any prior order of a court against any sibling or half-sibling. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests. We therefore affirm.

The order from which the appellant, Charlie D., seeks to appeal was entered on November 30, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed on January 4, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 30, 2012 order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

I respectfully disagree with the Court’s decision to affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Marta Vandall sustained a compensable work-related injury.
 

This case involves a claimant’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. After initially being awarded such benefits, claimant was denied benefits based upon a finding that she had refused to return to her former position after being medically released to do so. The chancery court, however, reinstated her benefits concluding that her due process rights had been violated when a telephone hearing–as opposed to a face-to-face hearing–was conducted. We reverse the chancery court’s conclusion that the telephonic hearing violated claimant’s due process rights and we dismiss the case.

Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed.

Arthur T. Rogers ("the Defendant") was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to two concurrent terms of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal arises from a dispute over a parenting plan. Shantha Grace Pandian (“Mother”) sued Juan Francisco Rodriguez (“Father”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The case then proceeded to focus on a parenting plan for the parties’ two children, Christopher and Ethan (collectively, “the Children”), both boys with different special needs. Father requested equal time with the Children on a weekly alternating basis. Mother, on the other hand, wanted to have the Children most of the time, and argued that Father’s plan would be too disruptive for the Children. The Trial Court entered a parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent and granting her most of the time with the Children. Father appeals, arguing that the Trial Court should have adopted his proposal for equal custodial time with the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Husband and wife entered into a post-nuptial agreement detailing the division of their marital estate. Upon Husband’s subsequent filing of a complaint for divorce, wife moved for a declaratory judgment that the post-nuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Husband appeals the trial court’s holding that the agreement is enforceable and implementing its provisions. We affirm, holding the post-nuptial agreement is sufficiently definite to be enforced and that the agreement is fair and equitable.

A detective with the City of Cleveland filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari with the Circuit Court, seeking review of the City Manager’s ruling affirming the City’s decision to terminate his employment. At the hearing before the trial court, the petitioner proffered new and additional evidence that was not presented to the City Manager. The trial court sustained the City’s relevancy objection and allowed the petitioner to make an extensive offer of proof. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the new and additional evidence, that there is material evidence supporting the City Manager’s decision, and that the City Manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding to uphold the City’s decision to fire the petitioner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The dispositive jurisdictional issue in this case is whether the underlying juvenile court proceeding was merely a custody action or a part of a dependency and neglect proceeding wherein custody was also at issue. The pleading that was tried in the juvenile court was Father’s Amended Petition for Custody and to Determine Parenting Plan and, in the Alternative, Petition for Dependent and Neglect. Following the trial on the amended petition, the juvenile court judge found the evidence insufficient to prove dependency and neglect; however, the juvenile court awarded custody of the parties’ child to Father on a best interest determination. Mother appealed the judgment of the juvenile court to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal on the motion of Father, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the juvenile court did not find the child dependent and neglected. The appeal was then transferred to this court. Although the juvenile court did not find the child dependent and neglected, the juvenile court awarded custody to Father following a trial which was part of a dependency and neglect proceeding. Therefore, as In re D.Y.H., 226 S.W.3d 327 (Tenn. 2007), instructs, the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal because the juvenile court’s custody decision arose from and was part of a dependency and neglect proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this appeal to the circuit court for a de novo hearing.

Defendants appeal from an order of the trial court enjoining them from operating a wrecker service in Davidson County without a license. The trial court found that the ordinances at issue applied to Defendants’ wrecker services and that Defendants violated the provisions of the Metropolitan Code of Laws by their operation of a wrecker service without a license in Davidson County. The trial court also rejected Defendants’ arguments that the ordinances were preempted by federal law and violated the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The trial court then enjoined Defendants from operating a wrecker service in Davidson County. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Landen P. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Kevin P. (“Father”) and Ciera P. (“Mother”). The Child was born in 2007, while the parents were residing in Florida. In 2008, Mother left Father and the Child and moved to Utah. Thereafter, she maintained sporadic contact with the Child only by telephone. Father subsequently moved with the Child to Cleveland, Tennessee in 2009. In 2011, Father’s mother and stepfather, Judy and Todd R., obtained custody of the Child through proceedings in the Bradley County Juvenile Court. Judy and Todd R. filed the instant petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 1, 2011, for the purpose of adopting the Child. Having been arrested in May 2011, Father was incarcerated at the time of trial. Father consented to the adoption, and his parental rights were terminated on February 24, 2012. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to visit and support her during the relevant four-month time period and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

The Departmentof Safety, acting pursuant toTennesseeCode Annotated § 39-17-1352(a)(1), revoked Petitioner’s handgun carry permit based upon the Department’s independent determination that Petitioner had been convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33). The revocation arises out of an incident in which Petitioner was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, one count that pertained to his ex-wife and one count that pertained to her male companion. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to one count of simple assault under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-101. When Petitioner received notice that his handgun permit had been administratively revoked, he filed an appeal in the general sessions court, which reversed the Department’s decision and ordered reinstatement of Petitioner’s permit. The Department then appealed to the circuit court, which also ordered reinstatement of the handgun permit. This appeal followed. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), requires a use of force and a domestic relationship. In the underlying criminal case, Petitioner was charged with assaulting two people, Petitioner’s ex-wife and her male friend. Petitioner pled guilty to only one count of misdemeanor assault and the record does not establish whether Petitioner pled guilty to assaulting his ex-wife or her male companion. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” includes an offense “committed by” a person who had a specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an element of the crime and, pursuant to United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), the victim’s domestic relationship with the defendant must be established beyond a reasonable doubt for the offense to constitute a crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The record in this case does not establish that the victim of the count of simple assault to which Petitioner pled guilty was his ex-wife. Therefore, the record does not support the Department’s determination that Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Accordingly, we affirm.

This appeal involves the child support obligation of a man who is not the biological father of the children at issue. The wife gave birth to two children during the parties’ marriage. The husband filed for divorce, and subsequent DNA tests confirmed that the husband was not the father of either child. The trial court held that the husband had no legal obligation to pay child support. The wife now appeals, arguing that the husband should be required to pay child support because he is the children’s “legal father.” Discerning no error, we affirm.

Police utilized a confidential informant to arrange a drug buy from a co-defendant. At the scheduled time and location, the co-defendant arrived in his truck with the defendant and another passenger. A police takedown resulted in the arrest of the three men. A consensual search of the truck yielded approximately 153 grams of cocaine and 8.6 grams of marijuana in close proximity to where the defendant had been seated. A subsequent consensual search of the co-defendant’s residence, located several miles away, yielded an additional 293.5 grams of cocaine and various items of drug paraphernalia. The State consolidated the weight of the cocaine and charged the defendant with possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, a Class A felony; possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury convicted the defendant of possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. We hold that although the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant constructively possessed the cocaine in the co-defendant’s truck, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he constructively possessed either the cocaine or the drug paraphernalia in the co-defendant’s residence. Accordingly, we reduce the conviction for possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine to possession with intent to sell 26 to 299 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and we vacate the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. The case is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing on the reduced offense.