APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An employee suffered multiple injuries in a work-related accident in November 2006 when a fan located in a boiler in which he was working suddenly deployed, causing him to lose his footing and fall. After providing medical treatment, the employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and the employee sought additional medical treatment. The trial court found the claim to be compensable and awarded the employee permanent total disability benefits. The trial court imposed no liability on the Second Injury Fund. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Cheatham County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Eugene M. Hogbin, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges both the length and the alignment of the trial court’s sentencing determination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Frances G. Rodgers, as next friend of minors Julia Amber Noll and Joshua Aidan Noll (“Plaintiff”) sued John Adam Noll (“Defendant”) for the alleged wrongful death of their mother, Lori Bible Noll (“Deceased”). During discovery, Defendant filed multiple motions alleging discovery violations. After a hearing the Trial Court entered its order on April 25, 2012, which, among other things, imposed sanctions for certain discovery violations and then dismissed Plaintiff’s case due to discovery violations. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that dismissal was too severe a sanction for the discovery violations found. We reverse the dismissal; remand to the Trial Court for a more appropriate award of sanctions; and affirm the remaining specific sanctions awarded by the Trial Court and the remainder of the Trial Court’s April 25, 2012 order.

The Petitioner, Lance Vogel, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of over half a gram of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and habitual traffic offender, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Elgene Porter ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range I, violent offender to an effective sentence of forty-two years’ incarceration at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce appeal, Husband appeals the trial court’s imputation of income to him for the purpose of setting his alimony and child support obligations, the determination of parenting time, and the award of a retirement account to Wife. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
 

The defendant, Gretchen Rochowiak, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her convictions of conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution and introduction of buprenorphine into a penal institution. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shelton Hall, appeals the revocation of his Rutherford County Circuit Court community corrections sentence. Following his revocation hearing, Hall was ordered to serve consecutive sentences of eight years for his two convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and twelve years for his convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Hall argues that (1) his probation officer wrongfully violated his community corrections sentence without just cause, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to appoint counsel, in determining that he had waived his issues, and in failing to consider his "Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment Orders" and "Motion for Modification of Judgment Orders." Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jose L. Hidalgo, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. Thereafter, the aggravated child neglect conviction was merged with the aggravated child abuse conviction. The Defendant received sentences of four years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure, twenty years for the aggravated rape conviction, and ten years for the aggravated child abuse conviction. The trial court ordered each of the four-year sentences to run concurrently with one another but consecutive to the remaining sentences of twenty and ten years, which were likewise to be served consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify in rebuttal as to when the victim reported the sexual abuse to her; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his aggravated child neglect conviction; and (3) whether partial consecutive sentences were appropriate. Following our review, we affirm the jury’s verdicts of guilt for each offense and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment of conviction forms to properly reflect the counts as numbered in the amended indictment and the merger of the aggravated child neglect conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction. The judgments are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Father seeks additional time with the children, alleging that a failed attempted reconciliation created a material change in circumstances. The trial judge found no material change in circumstances. We affirm.
 

Petitioner in a proceeding to modify child support filed a motion for recusal with the trial judge alleging that the judge was a personal friend and had a business relationship with the father of one of the parties. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion for recusal.
 

The Petitioner, Timmy Charles McDaniel, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his convictions are void because (1) his indictment failed to state that the Grand Jurors issuing the indictment were from the county in which the offenses occurred, (2) his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy, and (3) his dual convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (2010). Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Madison County grand jury indicted appellant, Timothy Baxter, for one count of aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a persistent offender. Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault based on serious bodily injury. Specifically, he alleges that evidence of extreme physical pain did not support the determination of serious bodily injury by the jury. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-11-106(a)(34) (2010). He also contends that the statutory definition of serious bodily injury is unconstitutional because it is vague and thus violates due process. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Juan D. Hall, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession with intent to sell cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and coercion of a witness, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and carrying a handgun as a felon, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated assault and to a consecutive term of six years as a career offender for carrying the handgun as a felon. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, an adult child seeks an award of retroactive child support from his biological father. The adult child filed a petition to establish parentage, seeking retroactive child support and other child rearing costs. After genetic testing, the juvenile court found that the respondent is the petitioner’s biological father, but it declined to grant an award of retroactive child support. Both parties appealed. Eventually there were two appeals and two remands. After the last remand, the juvenile court determined that the adult child’s biological father was also his legal father, but held that the petitioner adult child could not receive an award of retroactive child support under the parentage statutes. The adult child then filed this third appeal. We reverse in part, holding that the parentage statutes provide for an award of retroactive child support to the adult child complainant. We vacate the finding as to the adult child’s legal father and remand the case for further proceedings on the award of relief against the biological father.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping and to a concurrent ten years for the aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial court erred by failing to sentence her to the minimum sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves alleged employment discrimination based on gender and pregnancy. The female plaintiff was employed as a police officer by the defendant city. While off duty, the plaintiff encountered an ex-boyfriend against whom she had procured an order of protection. Based on this encounter, she filed a criminal charge against the ex-boyfriend for violating the order of protection. The defendant’s police chief ordered an internal affairs investigation, and the ex-boyfriend filed criminal charges against the plaintiff for filing a false charge. The plaintiff was suspended with pay pending resolution of the criminal charges. Soon after that, the plaintiff informed the police chief that she was pregnant. After the ex-boyfriend’s criminal charges against the plaintiff were dropped, the police chief terminated the plaintiff’s employment based on the results of the internal affairs investigation. The termination was upheld by the city’s mayor and its board of aldermen. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the employer city, alleging discrimination based on gender and pregnancy pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The employer city filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff had no credible evidence that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer city. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Company and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company has not been met in this case.

Petitioner, Ricky Lee Nelson a/k/a Russell Wellington, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. Upon review, we conclude that petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal of the denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action against Shelby County and Correct Care Solutions, LLC, a health care provider contracted by the County to provide health care to inmates, for the failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated  29-26-121. We affirm dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Correct Care Solutions, reverse dismissal of his claim against Shelby County, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Erica Harris, appeals her Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and evidence of poor quality in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that admission of a map violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Craig U. Quevedo, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2002, the Petitioner pled guilty to numerous counts of rape and incest, and pled nolo contendere to multiple counts of rape, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery, as well as one count of aggravated rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2), -13-503(a)(1), -13-504(a)(4), -13-522(a), -15-302(a)(1). Following a sentencing hearing, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of ninety-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress a journal written by the Petitioner prior to the entry of his pleas; (2) that trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever certain offenses prior to the entry of his pleas; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of his journal into evidence and failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to the Petitioner’s first two issues. However, the post-conviction court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the Petitioner’s issues regarding his sentencing hearing. As such, the case is remanded for the post-conviction court to enter an order stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the sentencing hearing issues.

Employee of company providing services to an intellectually disabled adult appeals the finding that he committed abuse and neglect against the adult and the resulting placement of the provider’s name on the abuse registry maintained by the Tennessee Department of Health. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal involves the validity of a will executed in contravention of an earlier contract to make mutual wills. A husband and wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after the husband’s death, the wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following the wife’s death, her son of an earlier marriage sought to probate his mother’s last will in the Chancery Court for Knox County. In response, the children of the husband’s earlier marriage filed an action in the Chancery Court for Knox County asserting (1) that their stepmother’s last will had been procured by undue influence, (2) that this will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills, and (3) that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted to probate. The wife’s son asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his stepfather’s children’s claims and that the contract to make mutual wills was void for lack of consideration. Following a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for a summary judgment, the trial court determined (1) that the husband’s children had failed to prove that their stepmother’s will had been procured through undue influence, (2) that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by the husband’s children, (3) that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration, and, (4) that the wife’s last will, therefore, was null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re Estate of Brown, No. E2011-00179-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4552281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011). We affirm.

The Defendant, Justin Ellis, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. The aggravated assault conviction was merged with the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the successor judge erroneously determined that he was qualified to act as thirteenth juror in this case. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror and reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.