APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, William Benton Pamplin, pled guilty to burglary of an automobile, vandalism, burning of personal property, and possession of a weapon by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to a six-year sentence, which was to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant, alleging the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation by filing a false police report. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns the administration of an estate. Decedent died testate, leaving all of his non-marital property to his surviving spouse and appointing his daughter as executrix. Executrix and Beneficiary initially agreed that administration of the estate was unnecessary. After Beneficiary suffered an injury and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, Executrix attempted to parcel out the property to Beneficiary’s intended heirs. Shortly thereafter, Beneficiary sought administration of the estate. The trial court admitted the estate and following lengthy hearings regarding which items belonged in the estate, directed Executrix to pay the expenses and close the estate. Beneficiary did not appeal. Over Beneficiary’s objection, Executrix organized an auction of the items held in the estate to satisfy the expenses. Following the auction, Beneficiary filed a petition in which she alleged that Executrix breached her fiduciary duty to the estate by organizing an auction that resulted in waste and mismanagement of estate funds. The trial court denied the petition. Beneficiary appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Sheila W. (“Mother”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W., and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for McMinn County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer K. (“Mother”) to the minor children Selena V. and Liliana V. (“the Children”), born in 2007 and 2008 respectively. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Mother to the Children after finding that the ground of persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The Defendant, Cleo D. Gadson, entered a best interest guilty plea to attempted second degree murder, agreeing to allow the trial court to determine his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years, to be served at 30%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it improperly considered written statements of persons other than the victim. He further contends that the manner of the service of his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that there is no error. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee alleged that her work as a bookkeeper caused a compensable aggravation of her pre-existing rheumatoid arthritis. Her employer denied her claim. The trial court awarded benefits to the employee, and her employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife and Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement whereby Husband agreed to pay Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years. Husband terminated these payments and filed a petition to modify when Wife remarried and her employment situation improved. Wife filed motion for summary judgment on the issue asserting that the alimony payments could not be modified or terminated. The trial court ruled the alimony payments could not be modified because they were contractual in nature and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Husband appealed both the court’s ruling as well as the award of fees. We reverse the trial court’s judgment that the rehabilitative alimony payments are unmodifiable because the applicable statute expressly provides that a court may modify this type of alimony upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the language of the parties’ agreement providing for the award of these fees.

Appellant, Roy Brian Avans, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his effective ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering service of the entire sentence without properly considering other available options. We discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeremy Stevenson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and twenty years. On appeal, Stevenson argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of these offenses. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. His employer denied his workers’ compensation claim. At trial, the employee failed to present expert medical testimony. At the conclusion of the employee’s case, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) because the employee did not present any expert medical testimony. The employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rodney Watkins, appeals from his conviction by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). The Defendant is serving a twenty-five-year sentence as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence about rumors regarding the victim’s disappearance, and (3) the trial court erred in ruling that the defense could not cross-examine a witness about the witness’s prior assault of his stepfather. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lesergio Duran Wilson, petitions this Court for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to recuse. After a thorough review of the petition, this Court concludes that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion for recusal. The order of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves injuries allegedly sustained by an employee as a result of her employment. The heirs of the deceased employee filed this lawsuit asserting numerous common law tort claims against the deceased employee’s employers. The employers filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that the exclusive remedy for the alleged injuries was pursuant to the workers’ compensation law, and that the plaintiffs’ common law tort claims were barred. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The defendant, David Edmond Rogers, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft over $500, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to fifteen years at sixty percent for the aggravated burglary conviction and six years at sixty percent for the theft conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively to his sentences for prior Georgia convictions. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his traffic stop and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Brian Edward Owen, has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Floyd Rodriquez Johnson, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective twenty-five year sentence in the Department of Correction following his guilty pleas to multiple drug charges. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends trial counsel was ineffective by failing to ensure that the petitioner understood the terms of the plea agreement and the resulting sentencing consequences if the petitioner failed to complete a drug rehabilitation furlough. Following review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly determined that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily. The denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

This case involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to three children who had been placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The mother had made some progress in complying with the permanency plan developed by the Department, but was still experiencing “instability.” Nearly two years after the mother relinquished control of the children, the Department petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court granted the petition, terminating the mother’s parental rights on the ground that the conditions that led to the children’s removal continued with little likelihood of remedy. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Scott Petty, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder and arson and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and five years, respectively. On appeal, Petty argues that the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that his statement to law enforcement was a confession rather than an admission against interest. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Derrick Sawyers, filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to T[enn.] R. Civ. P. Rule 60.02" in the Criminal Court for Davidson County, alleging that (1) his sentences were illegal and (2) the trial court violated his due process rights. The trial court treated the motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, it denied relief, and this appeal followed. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Roy L. McAlister ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of three years, to be suspended to supervised probation after service of 219 days in confinement. Upon the filing of a probation violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation violation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Based upon the record before us, we are compelled to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this action to the Robertson County Circuit Court for further findings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Rocky Joe Houston, was convicted on April 1, 2010, of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and evading arrest, a Class E felony, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months, twenty-nine days and one year, as a standard offender. In his notice of appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in denying the judgment of acquittal and asked that this court order the lawyer in his 2008 trial to return the sum of $65,000, which was a portion of the amount the defendant asserts he paid to the lawyer. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to quash Appellee’s hospital liens, which were filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-22-101 et seq. In each Appellant’s case, the hospital filed a lien and then recovered adjusted amounts for services rendered pursuant to the hospital’s agreements with the Appellant’s respective insurance providers. Despite having received payment, the hospital argues that it may return these adjusted payments to the insurance provider and may, instead, seek to recover its full, unadjusted bill from the Appellants’ third-party tortfeasors by foreclosing its liens. We conclude that: (1) a lien, under the HLA, presupposes the existence of a debt; (2) Appellants are third-party beneficiaries of their respective insurer’s service contract with the Appellee hospital; (3) having chosen to accept a price certain for services as “payment in full” and having, in fact, accepted payment from Appellants’ insurance providers, the underlying debt is extinguished; (4) in the absence of an underlying debt, the hospital may not maintain its lien; (5) the right to subrogate belongs to the insurance provider and a hospital lien does not create a subrogation right in the hospital. Reversed and remanded.

This case involves a post-trial dispute between one party to a personal injury case and their former counsel. After a jury verdict was entered in favor of Appellants, their former law firm filed an attorney lien and a motion to recover its attorney fees in the trial court. Appellants asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the former firm’s motion. The trial court disagreed and awarded the former firm its full requested fee. Appellants appeal both the award of attorney fees to its former law firm, and also the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ request to release funds held by the clerk. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post-trial dispute and reverse the award of attorneys fees in this case. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to release funds. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

This case involves monetary damages for contempt of court. The respondent owned a parcel of land as tenants in common with his brother. When the brother died, the deceased brother’s children inherited his interest in the property. The deceased brother’s daughters filed this petition against the respondent to partition the property. The trial court entered an order equitably dividing the property between the respondent and the two petitioner sisters and requiring the respondent to remove personal property, junk, and debris he had placed on the parcel awarded to the sisters. The respondent was found in contempt for failing to remove the debris, and again ordered to do so. Apparently unhappy with this order, the respondent proceeded to remove, damage, or destroy fixtures and structures on the property awarded to the sisters, including a pole barn, several sheds, and a garage with an apartment. He also failed to remove the junk and debris as specified in the trial court’s order. The petitioner sisters filed a second petition for contempt and sought contempt damages for the harm done to the buildings, fixtures, and structures. The trial court found the respondent in contempt a second time, based on his continued failure to remove the junk and debris. However, the trial court declined to award contempt damages to the petitioner sisters under T.C.A. § 29-9105 for the destruction of the structural improvements on the property, finding that it was not within the parameters of the trial court’s initial order. The petitioner sisters appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terrence Hill, of second degree murder. The trial court imposed an eighteen-year and six-month sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it discharged a prospective juror based upon her inability to be impartial. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err in discharging the prospective juror. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.