APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Decedent’s spouse brought an action to recover HHL benefits for the death of her firefighter husband. The City of Memphis denied her claim and decedent’s spouse appealed to an ALJ. The ALJ, likewise, denied the claim for benefits finding that the City of Memphis had rebutted the statutory presumption of causation and that decedent’s spouse had then failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that decedent’s cardiac condition was caused by his employment. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ, and we affirm the decision of the chancery court.

The Petitioner, Donnell Levon Robinson, Jr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Timothy B. Lenarduzzi ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. In his plea agreement, he agreed to a sentencing range of "[e]ight to [t]welve years at one hundred percent on each count to run concurrent," leaving the length of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years for each aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction and eleven years for each sexual exploitation of a minor conviction, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the length of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Bedford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Alfonzo Marquis Sutton, of conspiracy to sell and deliver .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III persistent offender to thirteen years, forty-five percent of which he was to serve in confinement before being eligible for release. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that prosecutorial misconduct warranted a mistrial, and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial.

Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, and he was convicted as charged following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and submits the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Defendant’s person, his truck, and his tractor trailer as a result of Defendant’s initial encounter with police Sgt. Postiglione, which Defendant asserts was a seizure not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Defendant’s statements to police officers; (3) whether Defendant’s statements to a fellow inmate should have been suppressed; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Defendant solicited another person to kill three potential witnesses; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to exclude portions of Defendant’s phone calls recorded while Defendant was incarcerated; (6) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to present testimony from a ballistics expert at trial; (7) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence items recovered from Defendant’s truck; (8) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence photographs of the victim’s body; (9) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; and (10) whether the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentence to run consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Cynthia Denise Gray, of one count of the promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433 (2010). The trial court sentenced her to serve three years and six months in prison as a Range I standard offender. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of the sentence, as well as the trial court’s refusal to impose an alternative sentence. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that there was no error in sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Donald A. Rogers, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original three-year sentence in the Department  of Correction. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering full confinement, rather than imposing split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal by the father of three minor children challenging the termination of his parental rights. Mother’s parental rights were terminated in 2009 and are not at issue. In the first appeal, this Court found the Department of Children’s Services failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father and therefore reversed the termination of Father’sparental rights.In re Keisheal,N.E.,No.M2009-02527-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 2176104, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010). Following the first appeal, a new petition was filed. After the second trial, the trial court found the petitioners established the ground listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i) that: “[t]he parent . . . is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s . . . mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent . . . will be able to assume the care and responsibility for the child in the near future. . . .” The trial court further found the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal involves a tort suit filed after a workplace injury. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was a statutory employer within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113, and therefore, it was immune from the tort claim asserted on behalf of the injured worker. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The Mt. Juliet Beer Board suspended the beer permit of a restaurant, and the restaurant owner appealed the suspension to the chancery court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The City did not file an answer within the requisite time period because it did not believe Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-108, which governs appeals of beer board decisions, required this. The City actively participated in the case in other ways by filing a motion to set the case for trial, filing a comprehensive pre-trial brief, and responding to discovery requests. The restaurant owner moved for default judgment based on the City’s failure to answer the petition, after which the City filed an answer. On the day set for trial, the trial court awarded the restaurant owner a default judgment based on the City’s failure to file an answer in a timely fashion and its failure to seek leave to file a late answer. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, April Nicole Cromwell, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $10,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years with one year to serve and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to sentence her to community corrections or probation and (2) denying her request for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell and struck his head in March of 2000 in the course and scope of his employment, resulting in a complex scalp laceration, post-concussion syndrome and dysfunction of the trigeminal nerve. He filed this workers’ compensation action in February of 2001, seeking temporary total disability and permanent disability benefits and medical expenses. After many delays the case was heard in September of 2011. The employee’s medical expert testified that he had a 21% permanent impairment and was temporarily disabled until 2009. The employer’s expert testified that he had a 5% impairment, had reached maximum medical improvement and was able to work at the time of his examination in 2007. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits from 2000 to 2007, a total of 369.98 weeks, and awarded 60% permanent partial disability, a total of 240 weeks, for a grand total of 609.98 weeks. The employer has appealed, contending that the court erred in awarding more than a total of 400 weeks, in awarding temporary total disability benefits without proper medical proof of inability to work and in awarding 60% permanent partial disability without defining the specific anatomical impairment rating. We reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part.

The Defendant, Candice Stinson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of fourteen counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202 (2010). For each count, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in jail, and a $200 fine, all to be served concurrently. The court also ordered her to pay $4824 in restitution to the City of Memphis Animal Services and prohibited her from owning animals for ten years and from owning animals for commercial purposes for life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her full probation and requiring her to serve seventy-five percent of her sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Lavonta Laver Churchwell, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted by a petit jury of two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court merged Defendant’s convictions for criminally negligent homicide into his felony murder convictions. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective life sentence with all sentences running concurrently. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; 2) the State failed to establish the corpus delicti because the State offered no corroborating evidence of the testimony of the jailhouse informants; 3) Defendant’s admissions to the jailhouse informants were elicited in violation of Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964); and 4) the trial court erred by allowing testimony that Defendant threatened a jailhouse informant. The State responds that Defendant has waived all issues save that of sufficiency of the evidence by failing to file a timely motion for new trial. We conclude that Defendant’s motion for new trial was timely filed and review the merits of each issue. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Harry Coleman, of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions and the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of a clerical error on two of the judgments.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jackson Martin, of attempted second degree murder and two counts of carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the carjacking convictions and sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by commenting to the jury about his failure to present alibi witnesses; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury an alibi instruction; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

 A Shelby County grand jury indicted petitioner, Ronald Woods, for three counts of assault. Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of assault, and the State agreed to dismiss the two remaining counts. During the plea hearing, petitioner also pleaded guilty to several offenses in an unrelated case that was pending in the criminal court. He received an agreed-upon effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days for both cases. Petitioner requested post-conviction relief, alleging: (1) that the State engaged in vindictive prosecution; (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) that his guilty plea was involuntary; and (4) that he was denied due process of law. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother petitioned for criminal contempt against Father due to his alleged failure to pay child support as required and she further sought reimbursement for one-half of the children’s optical and dental expenses. Father counter-petitioned for contempt against Mother. The trial court found Father in criminal contempt, but it declined to impose incarceration. However, the trial court denied Mother’s request for optical and dental reimbursement, finding Father was under no obligation to pay such. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.
 

The petitioner, Shawn Blair, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions for simple possession of marijuana and resulting consecutive sentences of eleven-months, twenty-nine days. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was not advised by trial counsel or the trial court about the immigration consequences of his pleas. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on three minor children (“the Children”). The defendants are Russell C. (“Father”) and Brandy C. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in January 2008 because of repeated injuries sustained by the oldest child. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents in April 2010, alleging numerous grounds for termination. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father and Mother were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and that the conditions leading to removal still persisted. However, the trial court found that severe child abuse was not proven. The court did find, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part. Termination of the parents’ parental rights is affirmed.

Petitioner, Demetrius Byrd, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from felony drug convictions in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case to determine that Petitioner’s co-defendant, Dominic Jones, pled guilty to the cocaine offense under a separate indictment and accepted full responsibility for the offense; and (2) trial counsel insisted that he plead guilty to avoid federal prosecution. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Nelson Buford, III, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police because he invoked his right to remain silent; (3) his prior bad acts were inadmissible; (4) the trial court should have given the jury a requested instruction; and (5) his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the appellant’s statement into evidence because the appellant invoked his right to remain silent but that the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure of their claims for conspiracy, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from an alleged wrongful foreclosure.We affirm the trial court in all respects.

A Warren County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Samuel Moore, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the State’s failure to provide him with a verbatim transcript of the suppression hearing, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the sentences imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case regarding title insurance company’s duty to seller of real property, the trial court found no factual dispute regarding the escrow agent’s apparent agency and granted summary judgment to title insurance company against seller of real property. Discerning no error, we affirm.