APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Nelson Buford, III, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police because he invoked his right to remain silent; (3) his prior bad acts were inadmissible; (4) the trial court should have given the jury a requested instruction; and (5) his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the appellant’s statement into evidence because the appellant invoked his right to remain silent but that the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure of their claims for conspiracy, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from an alleged wrongful foreclosure.We affirm the trial court in all respects.

A Warren County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Samuel Moore, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the State’s failure to provide him with a verbatim transcript of the suppression hearing, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the sentences imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case regarding title insurance company’s duty to seller of real property, the trial court found no factual dispute regarding the escrow agent’s apparent agency and granted summary judgment to title insurance company against seller of real property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A bank filed a complaint against husband and wife to recoup money owed on a credit agreement after a foreclosure sale failed to produce sufficient funds to repay the loan in full. The trial court entered a judgment against the couple, and the couple appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the bank relied on two different versions of a credit agreement, thereby failing to prove the existence of an enforceable contract with definite terms.

Claimant filed a claim against the estate of his first cousin, seeking repayment of $47,300 in loans he made to the Decedent in the months before his death. The trial court sustained the claim, and the administrator of the estate appeals. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Harold Dean McDaniel (“Husband”) sued Kimberly Ruth McDaniel (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After a long and contentious legal battle, including an earlier appeal to this Court and subsequent remand for a new trial, the Trial Court entered its supplemental final decree of divorce. Wife appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not adequately compute child support, and, therefore remand for its proper computation. We also modify the allocation of guardian ad litem fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, in part, and vacated, in part.

This is a declaratory judgment action wherein one insurance company, which provided general liability insurance coverage to the insured, asserts that another insurance company, which provided the same insured with automobile insurance coverage, had the primary duty to pay the cost of defending and to indemnify the insured in a third-party tort action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112. The plaintiff insurer asserts that the defendant insurer had the primary duty to provide and pay the cost of the defense in that action and to indemnify the insured pursuant to its automobile insurance policy because an additional insured was operating a “boom truck” owned by the insured that was listed under the defendant’s auto policy when the injury to the third-party plaintiff occurred.Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer holding that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for providing and paying the cost of the defense and for indemnifying the insured in the third-party tort action. We affirm.

Robin M.G. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor children, Daniel E.S. and Jacob A.G. (“the Children”). At separate times, the Children 1 were removed to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and were placed in foster care. DCS took custody of Daniel after he pleaded “true” to disorderly conduct and was adjudicated unruly. A year later, DCS petitioned the court to declare both Children dependent and neglected in Mother’s care and took Jacob into immediate protective custody. After the Children were adjudicated as being dependent and neglected, DCS implemented a permanency plan for each and worked with Mother for two years in a failed effort to reunify the family. DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained compensable injuries to both shoulders. His employer conceded the compensability of the right shoulder injury, but denied the left shoulder claim. An examination was done by a physician through the Medical Impairment Registry(“MIR”) regarding the right shoulder claim. The trial court found that the presumption of correctness of the MIR impairment opinion had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence as to the right shoulder injury. The trial court also concluded that the left shoulder injury was compensable and awarded benefits accordingly. The trial court also denied employer’s claim that it was entitled to an offset pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(b) for benefits paid under its accident and sickness policy. We hold and find that the trial court erred by failing to apply the offset sought by the employer, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

A townhome owner and her tenant challenge an amendment adopted by the owner’s townhome association prohibiting the owner from leasing her unit to a third party. The owner purchased her unit before there were any restrictions on leasing individual units. The amendment was adopted in accordance with the Horizontal Property Act and in accordance with the documents governing the units where she lives. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment enjoining the owner from renting her townhome to a third party and requiring the tenant to vacate the unit. On appeal we conclude the amendment is enforceable and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a case alleging negligence by defendant, Mountain States Health Alliance, which resulted in injury to a patient, Ruby Williams. Ms. Williams fell off a table while she was undergoing myocardial perfusion imaging, also known as a nuclear stress test. Mountain States Health Alliance asserted that Ms. Williams’s complaint sounded in medical malpractice instead of ordinary negligence, and asked for summary judgment because Ms. Williams had not complied with the filing requirements of the medical malpractice statute. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the case involved a medical malpractice claim rather than an ordinary negligence claim. Ms. Williams’s Estate appeals. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Juan A. Hill (“the Petitioner”) filed for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his judgment of conviction is void because it (1) is based on a defective indictment and (2) fails to reflect pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Fredrick Milan, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to convey a twenty-five year offer by the State; and (2) trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Nicole D. (“Mother”) and Terry D. (“Father”) to their minor children, Austin D. and Trinity D. (collectively “the Children”). Mother and Father separated after an incident of domestic violence; the Children remained with Mother. A drug raid at Mother’s house led the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) to remove the Children and take them into temporary protective custody. DCS filed a petition seeking temporary legal custody. Later, the Children’s maternal grandmother, Lisa D. V. (“Grandmother”), filed an intervening petition and was granted temporary custody. A year later, Grandmother filed a petition seeking to terminate both parents’ parental rights; she seeks to adopt the Children. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition based upon its findings, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. We vacate in part and affirm in part. As to the trial court’s decision that termination is appropriate, we affirm that ultimate conclusion.

Brandon Neal (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to attempted carjacking and aggravated assault, alleging that the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) violated his due process rights by miscalculating his sentences and that TDOC’s actions have rendered his pleas constitutionally infirm. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Antonio Starks, of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify about his previous abuse of the victim; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the victim’s mother about a prior conviction; (4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a police officer testified that the victim had been sexually abused; (5) the trial court should have given a curative instruction when the State made an improper comment during closing arguments; and (6) the trial court should have granted a new trial because the State failed to disclose that the victim’s mother received favorable treatment in return for her testimony. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was convicted of three counts and acquitted of two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-102, -12-107, -13-202. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for each conviction and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever two of the counts; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to a fellow inmate turned police informant; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress numerous letters the Defendant had sent from jail; (5) that the trial court erred by admitting redacted portions from numerous letters the Defendant had sent from jail and from several telephone conversations the Defendant had while in jail; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of another crime as "contextual background evidence;" (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; and (8) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences.Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this worker’s compensation action, the widow of the decedent sought workers’ compensation benefits for her husband’s death. She filed suit twice but voluntarily non-suited each of those actions. She filed suit a third time, and her husband’s employer moved to dismiss, contending that the third action was barred by the statute of limitations and by Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 41.01(2). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the widow has appealed, contending that her third action was timely filed. We reverse the decision of the trial court.
 

Tellico Village Property Owners Association, Inc. (“TVPOA”) sued Health Solutions, LLC; Tellico Senior Living, LLC; Citizens National Bancorp, Inc. d/b/a Citizens National Bank of Tennessee; Home Federal Bank Corporation d/b/a Home Federal Bank; and NBN Corporation d/b/a National Bank of Tennessee (“National Bank”) with regard to a failed development project. TVPOA asked the Trial Court to declare that TVPOA’s option agreement concerning real estate in the development project had priority over certain recorded deeds of trust. National Bank appeals the Trial Court’s grant of partial summary judgment to TVPOA raising issues about whether the Memorandum of Agreement and Development Agreement between TVPOA and the Developer and the Developer Company violated the statute of frauds, and the Trial Court’s grant of TVPOA’s motion in limine to exclude evidence on National Bank’s claim of unjust enrichment. We find and hold that National Bank was not a party to the Memorandum of Agreement or the Development Agreement and, therefore, may not raise a statute of frauds defense. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in excluding evidence on National Bank’s claim of unjust enrichment.

This case involves the issue of retroactive child support and whether the trial court appropriately denied Wife’s request. Husband’s divorce petition was pending for more than three years before Wife answered. During that time the parties were separated, and Husband made monthly car payments on Wife’s vehicle in an amount that exceeded what would have been his child support obligation. We conclude that Husband satisfied his child support obligations based on the unique facts of this case and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff motorist was seriously injured when a padlock was hurled from beneath a lawn mower operated by a City of Memphis Parks Services employee and through the window of her vehicle, striking her in the head and resulting in the loss of her left eye. The motorist and her husband filed an action for damages against the City, which was adjudicated pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and the City appeals. We affirm.

Fred V. Wilson and his wife, Anna R. Wilson, were the initial plaintiffs. They filed suit against Monroe County and the City of Sweetwater alleging that the amputation of Mrs. Wilson’s left leg was proximately caused by the negligence of those responding to an emergency call to her home. Mrs. Wilson died before trial and the case proceeded with her husband as the sole plaintiff, individually and in a representative capacity. At a bench trial, the court found that the injury to Mrs. Wilson’s left foot occurred during the ambulance ride from the Wilsons’ home to the hospital emergency room. It further found that the injury, which did not heal, necessitated the amputation of her leg. The court entered judgment against Monroe County. The claims against Sweetwater were dismissed. Monroe County appeals. The plaintiff, by way of a separate issue, challenges the sufficiency of the court’s award of damages. We affirm.

Appellant, Elder Mark Anthony Thornton,was convicted in Davidson County General Sessions Court of eighty counts of criminal contempt after violating an order of protection. He appealed those convictions to the Davidson County Criminal Court and, following a bench trial, was found guilty of criminal contempt for 180 separate violations of the order of protection. Appellant was pro se at trial. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten calendar days per incident consecutively, for a total of 1800 days of incarceration. Appellant, still proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the original and the supplemented record, we determine that ten of the convictions and sentences are proper and, thus, are affirmed. However, the balance of the convictions, 170 in total, which were not listed in the charging notice can not stand, as proper notice was not given to Appellant. As such, those convictions are reversed, and the resulting sentences are vacated.

Plaintiff filed this action against the instructor of a motorcycle safety course and his employer for injuries she sustained when she drove off of the designated course site and collided with a parked pickup truck.The trial court found that the plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred because she signed a valid written waiver/release from liability document prior to starting the course. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s gross negligence claims, finding there was nothing in the record which would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant exercised a conscious neglect of duty or a callous indifference to consequences. We affirm.