APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder after a trial by jury. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by admitting three pieces of evidence: (1) an excerpt from a 911 call made by the victim several days before his death, in which the victim claimed to be "a little . . . concerned" about the defendant’s behavior; (2) testimony from one of the defendant’s friends to the effect that the friend did not believe that any affair had occurred between the defendant and the friend’s then-wife; and (3) testimony concerning various searches performed on the defendant’s computer involving the name "Missy." Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction concerning the destruction of evidence. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err with respect to the evidentiary and jury instruction claims raised by the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Patrick Pope, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective eleven-year sentence for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate possible alibi witnesses in preparing the case for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against petitioner, Mikel Hamrick. He entered guilty pleas to four of the counts, including aggravated 1 burglary, especially aggravated stalking, domestic assault, and theft of property less than $500, for which he received an effective four-year sentence. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his mental instability rendered his guilty pleas involuntary and that the infirmity was compounded by trial counsel’s failure to adequately advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Nathaniel Richardson (“the Petitioner”) entered a best interest plea to second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty years. The Petitioner subsequently filed for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Pamela J. Booker, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking her probation for her three convictions for violating a habitual traffic offender order and ordering her to serve her effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the court erred in ordering her to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James M. Watkins (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for burglary of a business, vandalism of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and possession of burglary tools. He received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range III, career offender. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contents found as a result of a stop and subsequent search of the Defendant and a bag in his possession. He also argues the following: that the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s objection to a jury instruction; that newly acquired evidence exists that would have affected the outcome of the trial; and that Officer Rogers’ testimony was perjury that prejudiced the Defendant. Lastly, the Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The defendant, Donnie Paul Boling, Jr., pled guilty to reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and to driving under the influence, possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, all Class A misdemeanors. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of one year. In this appeal, the defendant’s sole claim is that the trial court erred by denying him probation or an alternative sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Walter Ray Carter, pro se, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pleadings entitled “Motion of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Motion to Dismiss Indictment and/or Arrest Judgment” filed on July 18, 2011 in four separate cases. The motions sought relief from certain drug-related convictions entered in 1996 and in 2005. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to construe the pleadings as petitions for post-conviction relief which are now time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations. The summary dismissal is affirmed.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Scotty V. Nunn, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 convictions for fraudulent breach of trust and misapplication of contract payments and resulting sentence of fourteen years. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief because of an improper extradition from the Commonwealth of Virginia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ngoc Dien Nguyen, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his sentences of probation. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of writing or passing worthless checks over $1,000. He received a sentence of two years for each count, as a Range I standard offender, to be served concurrently on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed, which alleged that Defendant had violated his probation by committing new offenses, failing to report the new offenses to his probation officer, failing to notify his probation officer that he was back in Tennessee after serving a parole violation in California, and failing to provide proof of payment of court costs and fines. Following the hearing the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective two-year sentence in confinement, with credit for time served. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he injured his back at work on September 30, 2008, and is now totally and permanently disabled. The employer denied that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury, but alternativelyargued that the employee is not totallyand permanently disabled. The trial court concluded that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury and awarded 80% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable and that, even if the employee proved a compensable injury, the evidence preponderates against the award of 80% permanent partial disabilitybenefits. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Donald Keith Solomon, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for being untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2000, an affidavit of complaint was issued charging “John Doe” with an aggravated rape that had occurred in 1994. The affidavit, which included a detailed DNA profile of “John Doe,” led to the issuance of an arrest warrant. In 2008, police officers discovered that fingerprints taken from the scene of the crime matched those of the defendant. Later, police determined that the DNA profile was that of the defendant,and a superseding indictmentwas issued in his name. The defendant was tried and convicted of attempted aggravated rape, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. The Court  of Criminal  Appeals affirmed, holding that the “John Doe” warrant with the DNA profile was adequate to identify the defendant and commence prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations. Because the issue is one of first impression in this state, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that a criminal prosecution is commenced if, within the statute of limitations for a particular offense, a warrant is issued identifying the defendant by gender and his or her unique DNA profile. Furthermore, a superseding indictment in the defendant’s proper name provides the requisite notice of the charge. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted appellant, Benjamin Murrell, of criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Bureau of TennCare filed a petition to open Fred F. Crumley, Sr.’s estate in order to file a claim against the estate for medical assistance rendered. The court appointed an administrator, and the Bureau of TennCare filed a claim. Administrator argued that the statute of limitations barred recovery on any claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare. The trial court agreed with Administrator and dismissed the claim. The Bureau of TennCare appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Purchaser of condominium at delinquent tax sale sought excess funds remaining after taxes and court costs had been paid. Purchaser prepared a Quitclaim Deed that transferred Taxpayer’s title and redemption rights in property to Purchaser. Purchaser next prepared a Deed of Correction that corrected the spelling of Taxpayer’s name, but that also included a clause purporting to transfer to Purchaser Taxpayer’s right to the excess funds. Purchaser then prepared an Assignment of Excess Funds Payout that also purported to transfer Taxpayer’s right to the excess funds to Purchaser. Trial court awarded excess funds to Taxpayer rather than to Purchaser after finding there was no meeting of the minds and that Purchaser failed to carry his burden of proving he provided consideration for Taxpayer’s conveyance of the excess funds to him. Purchaser appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We conclude there was no consideration for the Assignment of Excess Funds Payoutand that the Deed of Correction is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person for a document titled Deed of Correction to transfer a right to receive $14,000 of excess funds to a purchaser of property.

This appeal involves an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The petitioner inmate was convicted of disciplinary offenses by the respondent prison disciplinary board. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the convictions for the disciplinary offenses. The trial court found that the inmate’s petition was not timely filed, and therefore that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Guardian, along with Custodial Parent, sought to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding that Father abandoned the Child by failing to visit and by failing to provide child support and a suitable home; that the conditions which led to removal persisted; and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The parents of two young children agreed to give the paternal grandparents custody of the children. The grandparents subsequently filed a petition for termination of their parental rights on the ground of abandonment, and for adoption. The father agreed to surrender his rights during the hearing on the termination petition, but the mother insisted that she had not abandoned her children. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay financial support in the four months prior to the filing of the petition for termination. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Mother appealed. She acknowledges that she failed to pay support during the relevant period, but she insists that her failure was not willful. We affirm the trial court.

Appellant corporation appeals the trial court’s rulings finding it liable for breach of contract damages, prejudgment interest, and damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Additionally, the corporation’s president appeals the trial court’s action in piercing the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for the contract damages. We reverse the trial court’s finding with regard to veil piercing, but affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This appeal involves claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and misappropriation of image. The plaintiff, a customer of the defendant store, brought clothing into the store’s dressing room to try it on. While in a state of undress in the dressing room, the customer noticed in the reflection of her dressing-room mirror a globe on the store ceiling that appeared to contain a surveillance camera. Store employees initially told the customer that the globe contained a camera, but a store manager later told the customer that the ceiling globe did not contain a camera. Eventually, the plaintiff customer filed this lawsuit against the defendant store, seeking damages for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and misappropriation of image. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant store. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing has not been met in this case.

An employee of NES married a co-worker’s daughter and was found by the NES civil service board to be in violation of the utility’s nepotism policy that precluded related employees from working in the same “section.” The employee sought judicial review, and the trial court reversed the administrative decision. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious.

I agree fully with the majority’s analysis in this case. I concur separately only to add a comment as to the portion of the opinion on the Fair Labor Standards Act.