APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a child custody case. Appellant/Mother appeals the denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to vacate the order granting Father/Appellee’s petition for custody of the minor child and for enrollment of a foreign decree on custody. Mother received, at most, three days notice before the hearing on Father’s petition in violation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.04. Because Mother did not receive adequate notice, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mother Rule 59 relief. Reversed and remanded.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the evidence of serious bodily injury to the victim was insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. After considering the evidence of serious bodily injury in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is my view that a rational trier of fact could have found that the victim suffered serious bodily injury at the hands of the Defendant, and therefore I would affirm the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction.

This is an appeal from an administrative decision on the termination of the employment of a municipal employee. The appellant employee was fired from her job with the appellee municipal health department for accessing patient medical records without authorization. The appellee civil service merit board of the municipality conducted an administrative hearing and upheld the termination of her employment. The employee filed a lawsuit in chancery court seeking judicial review of this decision. The trial court affirmed the decision of the civil service merit board and upheld the termination. The employee now appeals this decision, arguing that her due process rights were violated and that the decision of the civil service merit board was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We affirm.

This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. The chancery court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the defendant had not purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Tennessee and did not have sufficient contacts with Tennessee to be subjected to jurisdiction in this state. The plaintiff, a corporation that claims its principal place of business is in Tennessee, appeals. We find that the circumstances do not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant foreign corporation by a Tennessee court. Accordingly, we affirm.

Terrell Loverson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, misdemeanor assault, and obstructing arrest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s admission of a photograph of the victim; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside an order of dismissal for failure to state a claim. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

The Defendant, Theodore Locklin, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his six-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher L. Williams, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Colby Terrell Black, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by making insufficient findings at the revocation hearing, and the State agrees. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an appropriate written order that summarizes the evidence and clearly sets forth the reasons for the revocation of probation.

The Defendant, Lindsey Butler, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and two counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and ordering the remainder of his effective eight-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in revoking his probation and (2) failed to exercise “separate discretion” in determining his punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Salvatore Pisano, Jr., was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve eight years in prison for each count, all counts to be served concurrently. The petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition; the motion was denied. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Because the petitioner has not complied with the statutory requirements surrounding appeal of an application to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief, we are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Celso V. Melendez, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of facilitation to deliver over 300 grams of cocaine and resulting effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his guilty pleas were based upon trial counsel’s assurance that he would be eligible for the boot camp program. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Laderius Stephens (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and attempted second degree murder. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his petition for relief, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals, raising the same two issues. As his bases for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner contends that his counsel at trial: (1) failed to file the appropriate discovery motions; (2) failed to prepare adequately for trial; and (3) failed to hire an investigator in a timely manner. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in
February of 2009 seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kimberly M. (“Mother”) to the
minor children, Zacharias T.M., Isaiah K.M., Ashley M.M., Chelsea M.M., Sierra C.M., and
Brittany N.M. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental
rights of Mother to the Children after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and (g)(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) had been
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been
shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated.
Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Petitioner was convicted in 1998 of one count of first degree murder in Wilson County. He was sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. State v. Henry Dequan Rhodes, No. M1999-959-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 264327, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 10, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2000). On March 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in its dismissal of his petition. We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err because the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), did not create a new constitutional right that was required to be retroactively applied; Petitioner did not provide adequate support for his argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled based upon the violation of a due process right; and Petitioner did not meet the requirements set out to present a writ of error coram nobis to the court. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

This appeal arises from a dependency and neglect proceeding. The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition against Lisa M. S. (“Mother”) seeking to adjudicate her minor child Wyatt S. (“the Child”), born in March of 1998, dependent and neglected. The petition was rooted in the Child’s disclosures that Mother had sexually abused him. The juvenile court found the Child dependent and neglected. Mother appealed to the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for a de novo hearing. The Trial Court found the Child dependent and neglected by clear and convincing evidence. The Trial Court also specifically found severe child abuse in this case. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Curtis Dewayne Staggs, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence, and imposed a consecutive twelve-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial based upon a State witness recanting his testimony; (3) the trial court erred when it issued a material witness attachment; (4) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; and (5) the trial court erred when it did not grant his motion for a new trial based upon the prior knowledge of the case by a juror. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court committed no error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, Kristopher Colbert, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury in April of 2011 for driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, reckless endangerment, vehicular assault,and aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to reduce sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and/or Tennessee code Annotated section 40-35-212(d). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Appellant initiated this appeal to determine whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to reduce the sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Jody Lee Lindsey, pled guilty to one count of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) law, one count of third offense driving on a revoked license, and one count of felony failure to appear. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a Range III offender and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the HMVO conviction. It then sentenced the Defendant to five years for both the HMVO conviction and the felony failure to appear conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively based upon the Defendant’s extensive criminal history, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (2) his convictions were based upon an unlawfully induced guilty plea; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the counsel representing him at the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that (1) his indictment for attempted first degree murder is defective because it was amended improperly to include a factual basis for aggravated assault; (2) the judgment and sentence imposed for felony murder and attempted first degree murder are void; and (3) the felony murder conviction must be dismissed. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Jason Everett Nickell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of misdemeanor stalking, with no agreement as to his sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not consider two mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of Appellant/juvenile’s appeal of the juvenile court’s determination of delinquency to the circuit court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-159. While the appeal was pending, Appellant ran away from the group home, where he had been ordered to live. Appellee Department of Children’s Services filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court determined that the appeal should be dismissed based upon application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court further determined that Appellant had capacity, under the Rule of Sevens, to be held responsible for his actions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, a former Tennessee State Trooper appeals the chancery court’s judgment affirming the Tennessee Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate his employment. The Commission affirmed the initial order of the Administrative Law Judge, who upheld the Tennessee Department of Safety’s decision to terminate the trooper’s employment for violations of its policies and procedures and for the good of the service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-30-326. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this paternity case, Father appeals the Carroll County Juvenile Court’s rulings with regard to custody and parenting time with his minor child. The trial court’s ruling as to the paternity of the child is affirmed. However, because the trial court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to custody and the parenting schedule and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

An insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that mother and child were residents of the insured’s household, and therefore, that coverage for the death of the child was excluded bythe relevanthomeowner’s insurance policy. The chancery court found that mother and child were not residents of the insured’s household at the time of the child’s death, and we affirm.