APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff in this action is Bradley County (“the County”). The sole defendant is the City of Cleveland (“the City”). The County’s complaint seeks a determination that the proceeds of a 2009 local option county sales tax increase, enacted shortly after an identical increase by the City, is to be distributed between the parties according to a contract (“the Contract”) the parties signed in 1967 as opposed to a statutory provision for distribution based on the site of collection of the tax. The City filed a counterclaim which, as amended, seeks a determination that the Contract is void; that the Contract does not control distribution of the proceeds of a 1982 tax increase; that the Contract does not control distribution of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase; and that, by statute, the City is entitled to all of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase on sales made inside the city limits through the City’s 2010 fiscal year. The trial court upheld the validity of the Contract and further held that the Contract, as amended twice, i.e., in 1972 and in 1980, controls distribution between the parties of the proceeds of the County’s 1982 tax increase. The court held that the applicable statute, rather than the Contract, controls distribution of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase; this latter holding is not at issue in this appeal. The court further held that the City’s statutory right to the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase on sales in the City ended June 30, 2009, which equates with the City’s 2009 fiscal year. The City appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment upholding the validity of the Contract and that part applying the Contract to the distribution of the 1982 tax increase. We reverse that part of the judgment that held the City’s statutory right to proceeds from the 2009 tax increase ended June 30, 2009. We hold that the City is entitled to the 2009 tax increase on sales in the city through the City’s 2010 fiscal year.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, David L. Brummitt, of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and reckless aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-four, six, and four years, respectively. The trial court ordered that the appellant serve the six- and four-year sentences concurrently on probation but consecutively to the sentence of twenty-four years in confinement. On direct appeal, this court modified the appellant’s especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated robbery and remanded the case for sentencing as to that offense. State v. David L. Brummitt, No. E2009-01358-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 875, at *2 (Knoxville, Oct. 14, 2011), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2011). On remand, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court also ordered that the appellant serve the six- and four-year sentences in confinement, consecutively to each other, and consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that his twelve-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction is excessive and that the trial court’s resentencing him for the aggravated burglary and reckless aggravated assault convictions exceeded the scope of this court’s direct appeal opinion. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the appellant for the aggravated robbery conviction but that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to resentence the appellant for the remaining convictions. Therefore, the appellant’s original sentences for aggravated burglary and reckless aggravated assault remain in effect.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of the first degree (premeditated) murder of her spouse and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant raises numerous challenges to her conviction, claiming that: (1) the evidence used to convict her was insufficient, (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress certain evidence found by the police during a warrantless search of the residence that she formerly shared with the victim, (3) the trial court erred by admitting certain expert testimony, (4) the trial court erred by failing to suppress certain statements she made to police,(5) the trial court erred by admitting evidence relating to a prior domestic disturbance between the defendant and the victim, and (6) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Romilla Jones (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to two years, suspended to community corrections after service of six months in the county jail. The Defendant appealed, arguing that she should not have been sentenced to any period of confinement. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Because the judgment order contains a clerical error, this matter is remanded for the entry of a corrected judgment order.

Barry Singleton (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his counsel at trial failed to convey a plea offer to him that he would have accepted instead of proceeding to trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mulugeta Abebe , Eshetu Yalemwossen, and Girma Ejegu (“Plaintiffs”) sued Solomon Haile Birhane and Frehiwot Tesfagzi (“Defendants”) seeking, in part, a declaration of the parties’ rights with regard to a Raceway Service Station (“the Raceway Store”) located in Hermitage, Tennessee. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Order on October 18, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs and Defendants are partners in the Raceway Store with each one of the five partners holding a 20% interest in the partnership, and that the parties had an agreement that once overhead was met the Raceway Store would repay Plaintiffs their capital contribution. Defendants appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Dallas Wyley (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, one count of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. For these offenses, the Petitioner was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-one years. The incarcerated Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, pro se, which the postconviction court dismissed summarily as untimely. The Petitioner adduced proof that his petition was filed timely pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28. The State concedes that the Petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether his petition was filed timely. We hold that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the Petitioner’s claim for relief as untimely. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for a hearing to determine whether the petition for post-conviction relief was filed timely and for such other proceedings as may be necessary.

Appellant inmate filed a petition for Declaratory Judgment in the Davidson County
Chancery Court, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-501(i) is
unconstitutional as applied to life sentences with the possibility of parole. The Appellee
Department of Correction filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Appellant’s failure to
seek a Declaratory Order from the Department of Correction constituted the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Discerning
no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Fred Allen Owens, pro se, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2003 conviction for second degree murder and his resulting thirty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief from his conviction and sentence because the State failed to file notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment, violating his due process and equal protection rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the petitioner was found guilty of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of dihydrocodeinone, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to seventeen years for possession of cocaine and to a consecutive eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of dihydrocodeinone, for a total effective sentence of almost eighteen years. His convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied all claims for relief. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion for recusal and erred in ruling that the petitioner had not received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action arises out of a dispute between the parties on issues arising out of an employment contract. The parties have been before this Court previously on this contract, and we ruled that they were required to arbitrate the issues, and remanded the case. Plaintiff employer filed a declaratory judgment action as a dispute arose over the selection of arbitrators. The employer had selected its arbitrator, and the Trial Judge ruled that its selection was appropriate and that the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the selected arbitrator was proper under the American Health Lawyers Association rules of procedure for arbitration. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Johnny Leon Hatcher, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humphreys County Circuit Court following the revocation of his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to six counts of manufacturing, delivery, sale, or possession of methamphetamine and received an effective six-year sentence, one year to be served in confinement and the balance on community corrections. A violation report was filed and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s sentence and ordered the balance of the original sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the trial court’s revocation but argues that the court erred in ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. After review, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The plaintiff, a probationer, charged Washington County with negligent oversight and supervision, after she was sexually assaulted and raped by a private entity’s probation officer. The trial court ruled in favor of the county, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of simple possession of marijuana, reserving a certified question of law concerning the legality of her detention and warrantless search by police. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the defendant has failed to clearly outline the scope and limits of the question presented at the trial court level and thus has failed to properly preserve her certified question. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.

The Petitioner, Jeffery C. Grissom, appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from one of his two attorneys at trial and from appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a petition for contempt related to an underlying divorce judgment. Philip Wayne Hamby (“Hamby”) and Myra Renee Wheeler (“Wheeler”) were divorced by decree of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). As part of the terms of the divorce, Hamby was required to turn over to Wheeler a publishing company (“the Business”) the two then owned. Wheeler later filed a motion for contempt alleging that Hamby had failed to pay certain necessary taxes on the Business and should be responsible for that tax debt. Wheeler also alleged that, because of the resulting tax lien, the Business was encumbered and Hamby, therefore, owed alimony arrears pursuant to the Trial Court’s divorce judgment. The Trial Court held Hamby responsible for the IRS tax debt, and also ordered him to pay back alimony. Hamby appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

The defendant, Ngoc Dien Nguyen, pled guilty to theft over $1,000 and attempted theft over $1,000 and was sentenced as a Range I offender to an effective term of six years in the Department of Correction. The court ordered that the six-year sentence be served consecutively to a Robertson County sentence and a California sentence and that the defendant pay $9,462 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, the defendant challenges the award of restitution. After review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for a new hearing as to restitution.

The Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The lower court treated this motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and summarily dismissed it. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that his sentence is void because it is in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-111(b). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, the Knox County Criminal Court sentenced appellant, Christopher Lee Gibson, to an effective four-year sentence for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed appellant on probation. The court subsequently issued a probation violation warrant alleging that appellant violated the terms of his probation by committing the new offense of possessing a handgun after having been convicted of a felony. Appellant pled guilty, without a recommended sentence, to committing the new offense and stipulated that he had violated the terms of his probation. Following a combined hearing to determine his sentence for the handgun charge and the outcome of his probation violation, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the four-year sentence in confinement. The trial court also ordered appellant to serve a sentence of two years for unlawful possession of a handgun concurrently with his original four-year sentence. Appellant contests the trial court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the original four-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A  Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Elmi Abdi, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and his status as a Range III offender on direct appeal. State v. Elmi Abdi, No. M2009-01614CCA-R3-CD,2010 WL 2977892 (Tenn.Crim.App.,at Nashville,July29,2010),perm.app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and during his sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

Petitioner, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, alleging that DNA testing of clothing he was wearing at the time of the murder to which he pleaded guilty and testing of the murder weapon would have supported his position of self-defense. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Perceiving no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Martin J. McMurray, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of driving a lawnmower while under the influence (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor; violation of an habitual traffic offender order (“HMVO”), a Class E felony; driving under the influence with a blood-alcohol concentration over .08% (“DUI per se”), a Class A misdemeanor; and DUI, sixth offense, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the DUI and DUI per se convictions into the DUI, sixth offense, conviction and sentenced the defendant to three years on that conviction. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years for the HMVO conviction, to be served consecutively to the DUI, sixth offense, conviction for an effective sentence of six years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court further ordered that the sentences be served concurrently with a violation of probation in another case. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for DUI; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and at the motion for new trial; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance; (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for recusal. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se defendant, John S. Crandall, was convicted in a Wayne County bench trial of failure to have a valid driver’s license, failure to wear a safety belt, failure to stop at a stop sign, violation of the financial responsibility law, and driving with an expired registration. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee statutes requiring him to wear a safety belt, purchase automobile insurance, and obtain a Tennessee driver’s license when his driver’s license from his former state of residence was not expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a negligence claim under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. The decedent was involved in a serious vehicular accident. A witness called the defendant municipality’s 911 emergency communications center for help. The 911 responders went to the accident scene and transported the decedent to a local hospital, where he died. The decedent’s mother filed this lawsuit against the municipality, alleging that the 911 operator was negligent in failing to summon emergency personnel from a neighboring county, because those responders were closer to the scene of the accident and could have provided aid to the decedent sooner. The municipality filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing inter alia that it owed no duty to summon aid outside of its jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.