APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument.

The Petitioner, Carlos C. Beasley, pro se, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1998 especially aggravated robbery conviction and resulting twenty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the indictment was defective. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Gerald Eugene White, of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and simple possession of oxycodone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) the State made an improper closing argument; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant as a career offender. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff is a truck driver. The co-defendants are two affiliated companies – a truckload hauling company and a leasing company. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the hauling company. The truck driver entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the leasing company to purchase the truck he drove in his work for the hauling company. His lease payments on the truck were made via weekly payroll deductions; the hauling company deducted the amount of the lease payments from the truck driver’s payroll and transferred those amounts to the leasing company on his behalf. If the driver earned less than the amount of the lease payment, the hauling company paid the lease payment anyway and the deficiency became a debt that the truck driver owed to the hauling company. At the end of the lease, the lease-purchase agreement required the truck driver to pay the residual value of the truck. He was allowed to pay this over the course of one year, also through weekly payroll deductions. After the final residual payment was made, the leasing company refused to give title of the truck to the plaintiff truck driver because he still owed money to the affiliated hauling company. The defendant leasing company then repossessed the truck and sold it. The plaintiff truck driver filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the truck driver on his breach-of-contract claim, and it conducted a bench trial on the breach-of- contract damages and the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the award of compensatory damages and reverse the award of punitive damages.

Father’s parental rights to his son were terminated on the ground that Father is confined in a correctional facility for more than ten years as a result of a criminal act and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of Father’s sentencing. Father contends that the trial court should have considered the possibility of his receiving parole in determining whether grounds for termination of his rights were present and whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the scope of the procedural due process rights of a public high school student facing discipline for an infraction of school rules of conduct. After injuring a younger student with his automobile on school property, the student was cited for an infraction of the student conduct rule proscribing reckless endangerment. The principal’s decision to suspend the student for ten days was upheld by a hearing board and a designee of the director of schools, and the school board declined to review the matter. Thereafter, the student and his family filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the disciplinary decision. Following a hearing during which the trial court  permitted the student and his family to present evidence regarding allegedly arbitrary, capricious, and illegal conduct by school officials that was not reflected in the record of the disciplinary proceedings, the trial court found that the school officials had violated the student’s procedural due process rights because one official had performed both prosecutorial and decision-making functions and because this official was biased against the student. The trial court also determined that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the student’s conduct amounted to reckless endangerment. Accordingly, the trial court directed the school system to expunge the student’s record and awarded the student and his family $371,845.25 in attorneys’ fees and $25,626.27 in costs. The Board of Education appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgments. Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. M2010-00237-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1744239 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 2011). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Defendant, Nickalos Boyce, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Clois Dean Asbury, of driving under the influence (DUI), seventh offense; leaving the scene of an accident involving injury; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. In addition, the trial court found that he violated the implied consent law. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement for the convictions. As a result of his violating the implied consent law, his driver’s license was suspended for one year. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting officer to testify as the State’s fourth witness, (2) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment or give a special jury instruction when the State lost evidence, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leslie Jacquinte Fetters, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery and agreed to allow the trial court to determine his sentence. The plea agreement was based upon the Defendant being sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years, at 30%, for each conviction and ordered that the sentences run concurrently as contemplated by the plea agreement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Aldrick D. Lillard, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court committed reversible errors by (1) refusing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition for postconviction relief during the evidentiary hearing; (2) finding that the post-conviction hearing testimony from the assistant district attorney regarding his discussions during trial with the Petitioner’s trial counsel was irrelevant; and (3) concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his trial attorneys were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court merged the Petitioner’s two conspiracy convictions but found that the Petitioner failed to prove any additional allegations in his petition for relief. Following our review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s ruling prohibiting the Petitioner from amending his petition during the evidentiary hearing.We also conclude that the post-conviction court’s finding that the prosecutor’s testimony was irrelevant was in error, albeit harmless. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue in this case is whether a warranty deed made by a 98-year-old uncle to his 85-year old niece should be set aside for lack of competence or undue influence. Following a bench trial, the court found that the uncle was competent and that the niece did not exert undue influence on him. The uncle’s children appeal. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant, an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal for review of disciplinary actions taken against him by the prison, and affirmed by the TDOC Commissioner. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-102. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant, Ian Michael Boone Parks, was charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault in Claiborne County. Appellant pled guilty, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a five-year sentence of confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not supported by the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that Appellant failed to include both the transcript of the guilty plea and the presentence report. These documents are necessary for an adequate review of the issues presented. Because we do not have these documents, we must conclude that the trial court’s sentences are supported by the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Willie Lewis, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) excluding relevant testimony regarding the victim’s tattoo, (2) not permitting the Defendant to refer to the victim’s tattoo during closing argument, and (3) issuing a flight instruction that was not supported by the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Edward Watts, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for attempted theft of property. We determine that sufficient evidence exists to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and affirm that judgment. We conclude, however, that the trial court’s order concerning the vandalism count is inconsistent with the trial court’s ruling at the motion for new trial hearing. Therefore, we remand as to that count for entry of a corrected order properly effectuating the intent of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the following charges against the Defendant, Jimmy Joyner: driving under the influence ("DUI"), third offense; violation of the open container law; and failure to maintain a traffic lane. The trial court dismissed the charges finding that the State had not commenced prosecution before the expiration of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed the charges because the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and agreed to allow the case to be bound over to the grand jury before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the indictments against the Defendant.

The Petitioner,Antwain TapaigeSales,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to satisfy the threshold burden to warrant an additional hearing regarding whether the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his mental incompetence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Gerald Farrar (“the Claimant”) submitted a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house was badly damaged by fire. His insurer, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“the Company”) denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action. The Company alleged that the Claimant had made a misrepresentation on his application – one that increased the Company’s risk of loss. The Claimant filed a counterclaim in which he alleged that the Company’s agent, Michael E. Dyer (“the Agent”), misled him about the meaning of question 13 on the application, the answer to which contains the alleged misrepresentation. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the Company and dismissed the Claimant’s counterclaim predicated on the Claimant’s failure to carry the burden of proof. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farrar, 337 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Farrar I”). The Claimant then filed this action against the Agent alleging that the Agent made a misrepresentation about the meaning of question 13 that caused him to give an incorrect answer on the application. The complaint also named the Company as a defendant “principal” responsible for the Agent’s actions. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, holding that Farrar is a bar to this second action. The Claimant appeals. We affirm.

This direct appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Chattanooga lawyer arising out of his representation of two clients. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for forty-five days. Following the lawyer’s appeal to the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, the trial court upheld the lawyer’s forty-five-day suspension after finding that the record supported the hearing panel’s findings that the lawyer had attempted to bill one client twice, had breached his ethical obligations to another client, and had failed to cooperate with the Board of Professional Responsibility during its extended investigation into his conduct. On this appeal, the lawyer insists (1) that the evidence does not support the hearing panel’s findings, (2) that the hearing panel erred by receiving into evidence a videotaped deposition given by one of his clients, (3) that the hearing panel failed to properly apply the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and (4) that the hearing panel failed to consider the discipline imposed on other lawyers for similar infractions. Based on our review of the record, we, like the trial court, affirm the hearing panel’s decision to suspend the lawyer’s license to practice law for forty-five days.

The Defendant, Dennis Marshall, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to sixteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court committed plain error (2) by denying him an open and public trial; (3) by admitting hearsay statements into evidence; (4) by admitting evidence of other investigations; (5) by admitting evidence of the utility account holder at the home in which the drugs were found; (6) by admitting evidence about his having money but no job; (7) by admitting nonexpert testimony about the value of the cocaine found at the crime scene; (8) by admitting evidence about the recovery of a razor blade at the scene; and (9) by admitting evidence of his personal relationship with a minor female. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement.

The petitioner, Ricardo Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his 2004 guilty plea for sale of a controlled substance based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), in which the Court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would result in deportation amounted to deficient representation. In this case, the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period specified by the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and it was dismissed by the post-conviction court based on the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-102(a). The petitioner contends that Padilla should be retroactively applied and that his claim falls into an exception to the statute of limitations for new constitutional rules with retrospective application. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2006). Alternatively, the petitioner claims that due process tolls the statute of limitations or that the rule is an old rule with retroactive application. The petitioner also challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and brings a habeas corpus challenge based on his incomplete knowledge of English. We conclude that, because Padilla does not warrant retroactive application and because due process does not require the statute of limitations to be tolled, the petition was time-barred. We further conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief on the petitioner’s remaining claims and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.