APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff Loring Justice brought this health care liability action against Thomas Hanaway, Ph.D. (“Defendant”), a psychologist who provided family counseling and therapy to Plaintiff’s minor child and the child’s mother, Kim Nelson (“Mother”). Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that he was entitled to immunity as a court-appointed psychologist and testifying witness. Defendant provided therapy as a result of an order by the Roane County Juvenile Court in long-running litigation between Plaintiff and Mother. The Juvenile Court’s order stated that “there will be a transition from the current therapist, Dr. Nancy Brown, to a new therapist to be selected by the Mother.” The issue is whether the trial court correctly deemed Defendant to be a court-appointed therapist and granted Defendant summary judgment on grounds of immunity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Vernon Gouge, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child,
one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The
trial court imposed an effective sentence of ninety-nine years. On appeal, the Defendant
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of aggravated
sexual battery in count four and his conviction of rape of a child in count five.1 He also
argues that his effective sentence of ninety-nine years is excessive. We respectfully
disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Uniform Commercial Code provides a mechanism for secured creditors to give notice to the world of their security interest in debtors’ property as collateral for debt by filling out a form for a financing statement and posting it on the website for Tennessee’s Secretary of State. In this case, that system was weaponized. Collectively, the defendants filed over a hundred bogus financing statements on the Secretary of State’s website regarding over forty Tennessee residents, including judges, mayors, public officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and ex-spouses. The online financing statements falsely claimed liens for the defendants’ alleged security interest in the victims’ property as collateral for millions of dollars in fictitious debt. All were done for the apparent purpose of vexing and harassing the victims. All of the defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis, a Class E felony, and forgery of at least $250,000, a Class A felony. We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the forgery convictions. We hold that the defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the apparent value associated with the fraudulent financing statements was over $250,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Michael Marcell Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate robbery;
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and attempt to perpetrate
aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently
amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-12-103(a) (conspiracy) (2018); 39-13-402(a)
(2018) (aggravated robbery); 39-12-101(a) (2018) (criminal attempt). The trial court
sentenced the Defendant to life for first degree murder and to six years for each of the two
remaining convictions. The court imposed the sentences concurrently to each other but
consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in another case. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (3) the court erred in
excluding hearsay evidence, (4) the court erred in admitting a photograph exhibit because
it was not properly authenticated, and (5) the cumulative effect of multiple trial errors
requires relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves enforcement of an arbitration award arising from a defaulted promissory note. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for breach of contract and enforcement of a promissory note. Ultimately, the parties participated in binding arbitration per the terms of their agreement. The plaintiff obtained an award in arbitration against the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion in the trial court to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion, and the defendant now appeals. Having reviewed the record, we determine that the defendant has waived his argument on appeal and affirm the trial court’s order.

In August of 2018, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) secured an
ex parte order placing B.B.,1 the minor daughter of Wendy Dawn Hancock, Defendant, in
the custody of DCS after a referral prompted an investigation. During the span of several
days, Defendant and B.B. stayed at both a hotel in Lebanon and Defendant’s attorney’s,
Connie Reguli’s (“Ms. Reguli’s”) home in Brentwood without ever being formally served
with the ex parte order. Police eventually located B.B. and Defendant in Brentwood.
Defendant was indicted for one count of custodial interference, in violation of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-13-306. Ms. Reguli was also charged with several offenses for
her actions. Defendant sought a dismissal of the indictment before trial. The trial court
denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of custodial interference.
She was sentenced to two years on supervised probation. The trial court denied the motion
for new trial; Defendant appealed. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the indictment
should be dismissed because it fails to allege all of the elements of custodial interference;
(2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of custodial interference;
(3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the ex parte custody order was “valid
and enforceable”; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; and (5)
Tennessee should adopt an advice of counsel defense for specific intent crimes. Because
the trial court improperly instructed the jury essentially removing one of the elements of
the offense and lowering the burden of proof, we reverse the judgment of the trial court
and vacate Defendant’s conviction. We remand the case to the trial court for any further
proceedings that may be necessary.

The Defendant, Jeremiah Sweet, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s
revocation of his probation and execution of his four-year sentence for aggravated statutory
rape, simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, and theft of property valued
at $1000 or less. Although the Defendant admits to violating the terms of his probation,
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of
his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm.

A mother appeals the chancery court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on
the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support and severe child abuse. The
mother also challenges the chancery court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The petitioners
challenge the chancery court’s dismissal of persistence of conditions ground for
termination. We reverse the court’s decision to terminate based on abandonment by failure
to visit and support, but we affirm the court’s decision in all other aspects.

The defendant, Philip Mainer, appeals his conviction of aggravated cruelty to animals that
he received following a bench trial before the Sullivan County Criminal Court. On appeal,
the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for common law writ of certiorari in which the petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals a disciplinary conviction for “unauthorized financial transactions activity” by the Disciplinary Board at the Turney Center Industrial Complex. The respondents, the State of Tennessee and several governmental officials, filed a joint motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petition was not properly verified as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-104 and the petitioner failed to pay the mandatory initial filing fee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807. The chancery court granted the motion and dismissed the petition with prejudice on the grounds “the statutory requirements of T.C.A. § 27-8-104 and § 41-21-807 are mandatory and have not been met in this case, and failure to comply results in a defective filing by the Petitioner[.]” This appeal followed. We reverse the decision to dismiss based on the filing fee requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807. Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal of the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the petitioner’s failure to file a petition that complied with the verification requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-104 within 60 days of the entry of the judgment of which the petitioner seeks review.

A Sevier County jury convicted Defendant, Gabriel Enrique Turcios, of first-degree
premeditated murder. At sentencing, the jury found that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death, and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. On appeal, he claims the evidence is insufficient to support the application of
the aggravating circumstance for the sentence. After a thorough review of the record and
the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the approval of a site plan.  William Foehring, Janice Foehring, William Best, Mary Beth Best, Ron Terrill, and Sandra Terrill (“Petitioners”) filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari against the Monteagle Regional Planning Commission (“the Commission”) and RBT Enterprises, LLC (“RBT”) (collectively, “Respondents”) in the Chancery Court for Marion County (“the Trial Court”).  Petitioners alleged that the Commission acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously in approving the site plan at issue because the underlying zoning for one of the parcels is invalid.  The Trial Court ruled in favor of Respondents.  Petitioners appeal.  In a parallel declaratory judgment action case arising out of the same facts, we determined that the underlying zoning is valid, which is dispositive of this appeal.  We affirm the Trial Court.

Anthony D. Martin, Petitioner, was convicted of rape of a child and sentenced to 40 years
in incarceration. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v.
Anthony Martin, Alias, No. E2018-01066-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2714379, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 28, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2019). Petitioner sought
post-conviction relief based on several alleged instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition after a hearing.
This appeal followed. After a review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Robertson County jury convicted Kemontea Dovon McKinney (“Defendant”), a juvenile at the time of the offenses, of aggravated robbery, premeditated first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and theft of property valued at over $10,000. The trial court merged the murder convictions and merged the theft conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder conviction and eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction. This appeal concerns whether Defendant’s pretrial statement to detectives was voluntary, whether Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and admitted Defendant’s pretrial statement into evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the intermediate court erred when it stated that an involuntary confession claim is “inextricably linked” to a Miranda-waiver claim, such that the two inquiries can be considered together. We also granted the State’s application to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in determining that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred with respect to the issues raised by the State. We reiterate that the voluntariness test is distinct from the test for Miranda waiver, despite similarities between the analyses. After separately considering both questions, we conclude that Defendant’s overall statement was voluntary and his Miranda waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgments.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on five grounds: (1) abandonment by
failure to visit the children; (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the children;
(3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of conditions;
and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal arising from allegations of fraud and breach of contract in a dispute
surrounding a stock transfer agreement that, among other things, provided for the transfer
of controlling interest in a law firm from attorney Robert Hill to attorney Ricky Boren.
Whereas many claims were resolved at summary judgment, others were tried before a jury
and resolved in the Plaintiffs’ favor. The parties present a plethora of issues for our
consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This appeal concerns whether a municipality must have a general plan for development before it can exercise its zoning power. William Foehring, Janice Foehring, William Best, Mary Beth Best, Ron Terrill, and Sandra Terrill (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued the Town of Monteagle, Tennessee (“the Town”) and RBT Enterprises, LLC (“RBT”)1 (collectively, “Defendants”) for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Marion County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs challenged the rezoning of a certain parcel which allowed for the development of a truck stop near their homes. Plaintiffs argued that the zoning ordinances at issue, 05-21 and 12-21, were invalid because the Town had no comprehensive or general plan in effect. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold, inter alia, that no comprehensive or general plan was required before the Town could exercise its zoning powers. It was sufficient that the Monteagle Regional Planning Commission (“the Commission”) transmitted to the Town Board of Mayor and Aldermen (“the Board”), the Town’s chief legislative body, the text of a zoning ordinance and zoning maps, which comprised the zoning plan. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Michael Wojnarek, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court erred by considering evidence found in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal involving the termination of parental rights.  The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother and the fathers of the children on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children.  Only the mother appeals. We affirm.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Miron D. Johnson, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of evading arrest,
a Class D felony; misdemeanor evading arrest; felony reckless endangerment; and driving
on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony evading arrest and felony reckless
endangerment. Relative to his felony evading arrest conviction, the Defendant specifically
argues that his conduct did not create a risk of death or injury to others. For his felony
reckless endangerment conviction, the Defendant argues that his vehicle was not used as a
deadly weapon and that the threat of death or serious bodily injury was not imminent. The
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing fines without making
findings regarding the Defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Charles Rutledge, was convicted of second-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-eight years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Appellant presents two issues for review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction, and 2) whether the State failed to disclose witness information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Upon our review, we affirm.

This is an administrative property tax appeal concerning the classification of real property
for ad valorem tax purposes. This action originated with a taxpayer appeal of the property
valuation by the Sevier County property assessor. On appeal, the administrative law judge
re-classified the property as commercial, resulting in a tax assessment of 40% of the fair
market property value. The Assessment Appeals Commission reversed the classification.
The trial court affirmed the reversal. We now reinstate the commercial classification.

The Petitioner, Eric Foster, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for one count of aggravated rape,
two counts of rape, one count of statutory rape, and one count of exhibition of harmful
material to a minor. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred
by dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner argues that
he is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations because he pursued his
rights diligently and there were extraordinary circumstances preventing his timely filing.
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-conviction appeal, the Petitioner-Appellant, Gregg Merrilees, seeks relief from his original convictions of aggravated robbery and robbery in concert with two or more persons, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied by the postconviction court. The Petitioner now appeals and raises a stand-alone challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, the Petitioner argues four grounds in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) trial counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence based on the lack of accomplice corroboration in a motion for judgment of acquittal or on direct appeal; (2) trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on accomplice corroboration; (3) trial counsel’s failure to object based on speculation to the hotel clerk-victim’s accusation that the Petitioner was involved in the offenses based on the hotel clerk-victim’s “gut”; and (4) trial counsel’s failure to object to “the unconstitutional show-up” identification of the Petitioner by the hotel clerk-victim at trial. Upon our review, we affirm.