APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that we affirm the lower court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or his sentences illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The plaintiff ballplayer was hit by a baseball while sitting outside the dugout during a school baseball game. He sued the schools and the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”) for failing to enforce the rules against his conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment to the TSSAA because the umpires were not agents of the TSSAA. The plaintiff appealed and we affirm.

The plaintiffs/appellants in this lawsuit, an adult cabaret and three female employees of adult entertainment businesses and cabarets, filed a defamation suit against a county commissioner for a statement allegedly quoted in The Commercial Appeal and repeated at other venues.¹ The county commissioner raised several defenses to the plaintiffs’ claim in a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On consideration of the motion to dismiss, the trial court found as a matter of law that the plaintiffs could not prove their claim and dismissed their complaint. We affirm.

This appeal involves insurance coverage. The plaintiffs purchased an undeveloped parcel of real property and hired a contractor to build a house on it. After the house was constructed, the plaintiffs discovered that cleared timber was buried underneath the land on which the house stood. Thereafter, the house developed structural problems, such as foundation cracks and non-alignment of doors and windows. The plaintiffs made a claim for coverage under their homeowners insurance policy; however, the insurer denied the claim, citing an exclusion of coverage for damages resulting from settling. The plaintiffs filed suit against inter alia the insurer alleging breach of contract and bad faith, and the plaintiffs and the insurer filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After conducting a hearing on the matter and considering expert testimony that the damage was caused by settling, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the settlement in this case is so excessive as to remove it from the ordinary meaning of the term “settling.” We affirm.

The Defendant, Donald Ragland, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. He was sentenced to life, with the possibility of parole, in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he made to police; (2) the trial court erred in excluding a certified copy of a traffic citation received by the Defendant’s alibi witness; and (3) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Monolito B. Cooper, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his 1999 and 2002 sentences have expired due to the application of certain pretrial jail credits. The trial court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Insurer filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to provide coverage to insured in lawsuit filed against insured; insured filed a counter-complaint against insurer. At the close of all proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of insured on insurer’s declaratory judgment action and directed a verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s counterclaims of misrepresentation, bad faith, estoppel, and punitive damages. Insured’s two remaining counterclaims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of insured for Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and breach of contract claims. Trial court subsequently awarded insured double damages and attorney’s fees under the TCPA. On appeal, both parties raise numerous issues with the judgment of the trial court, some of which are without merit or as to which no relief can be granted; such issues are dismissed. We reverse the award of double damages, vacate the award of counsel fees to the insured and remand for further consideration. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jessica Patton Parks, pled guilty to aggravated domestic assault in exchange for a three-year suspended sentence to be served on supervised probation. Following the filing of a revocation warrant and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the conditions of her probation and ordered her to serve her sentence in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to express the views (1) that the statutes proscribing child abuse and child neglect are needlessly complex and (2) that our controlling case law does not invite helpful application of the child abuse statute by applying the “knowing” scienter to “treating a child in an abusive manner.” (Emphasis added.)

The pro se petitioner, Cedric Jeffries, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Bernard Braswell, of second degree murder and aggravated child abuse, both Class A felonies. The Defendant appeals, arguing that  (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) he was prejudiced by the manner in which a transcript of one of the Defendant’s interviews with police—a transcript which was admitted into evidence for identification only—was redacted. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case. When the plaintiff employee was hired as a department manager for the defendant employer, his employment contract provided that he would receive a bonus based on the net profit of the department. During the plaintiff’s term of employment, he received bonus payments; however, the parties had disagreements about how the department’s profit was calculated and thus about the amount of the bonus. After the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, the employee filed this lawsuit against the employer, alleging that the employer breached the contract by failing to pay the proper bonus amounts. The employer denied the allegation and asserted a counterclaim for excess amounts allegedly paid to the employee. The trial court referred issues on the plaintiff’s claim and the employer’s counterclaim to a special master. After conducting a hearing, the special master found that neither party carried its burden of proof and recommended that both the complaint and the counterclaim be dismissed. After considering the employee’s objection to the special master’s report, the trial court adopted the special master’s recommendations and dismissed the claims. The employee now appeals. We affirm, finding that there is material evidence to support the trial court’s concurrence.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant common carrier, finding that Defendant had no notice that Decedent was mentally incapacitated and holding that Defendant had no duty to assess or probe Decedent in order to discover a latent or non-apparent psychological condition. We affirm.

This is a claim for unemployment benefits. The claimant was denied unemployment benefits based on a finding that she falsified company records and therefore was discharged for misconduct connected with her employment. The claimant appealed the administrative decision to the Chancery Court. The Chancery Court reversed the administrative decision, finding that there was not substantial and material evidence to support the decision. Upon reviewing the record, we find that the administrative record contains substantial and material evidence to support the finding that the claimant falsified company records. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for possession of contraband. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the administrative record and the parties’ briefs, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the decision of the administrative disciplinary board was not illegal or arbitrary, and that it was supported by substantial and material evidence and had a rational basis. The petitioner prisoner now appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, George Timmons, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of two counts of rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of assault, and one count of aggravated domestic assault. The Defendant received an effective sentence of life without parole as a multiple rapist. In this appeal as of right, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him to life without parole as a multiple rapist and in enhancing his other sentences beyond the presumptive minimum. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendants, Derrell F. Nunn, Sr. and Jamila Nunn, appeal from their convictions by a jury in the Criminal Court for Hamilton County for aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years to be served at one hundred percent for each Defendant. On appeal, the Defendants contend that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict them and that the trial court erred in not granting their motions for judgment of acquittal. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

This appeal involves competing class action lawsuits. The plaintiff/appellant filed a lawsuit in Tennessee on behalf of similarly situated consumers in Tennessee, asserting antitrust claims against various urethane manufacturers. Meanwhile, a separate class action was filed in Florida against some of the same manufacturers, asserting similar misconduct throughout the United States. The class in the Florida lawsuit included consumers in twenty-five states, including Tennessee. The Florida litigation settled, and the Florida court approved a plan to provide notice of the pending settlement to all class members. The notice plan did not include individual notice to the Tennessee plaintiff. The Florida notice plan was implemented. The Florida court then entered an order approving the settlement, finding that the notice plan satisfied the requirements of due process and gave class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances. Subsequently, in the instant Tennessee proceedings, the manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the doctrine of res judicata prohibited relitigation of the matters settled in the Florida case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturers. The plaintiff/appellant appeals, arguing that the Florida notice was insufficient because he did not receive individual actual notice. We affirm, finding that the Tennessee lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights. Finding that the termination was contested and that the trial court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Everett Daniel Meador, III, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant appeals, contending that because the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his arrest. The Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial, which was based upon the results of his breathalyzer test, that were submitted to the jury after the trial court ruled that the results were inadmissible. After determining that a mistrial should have been declared, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case for a new trial.

The petitioner, Bernardo Lane, appeals the denial of relief from his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He was convicted of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and four counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that he has received newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit signed by a codefendant, which purports to exonerate the petitioner from all wrongdoing. After careful review, we affirm the denial of error coram nobis relief.

This zoning appeal involves Tennessee’s Open Meetings Act. A municipal legislative body began considering legislation to implement a conservation zoning overlay in a neighborhood within the municipality. The ordinance adopting the zoning change passed on the first and second reading. Prior to the final meeting on the subject, members of the legislative body sent numerous emails to each other discussing the proposed zoning change. In addition, prior to the final meeting, some members viewed information on the zoning issue in a non-public conference room in the legislative body’s office. The legislative body then adopted the zoning change at a public meeting. Thereafter, residents of the neighborhood who opposed the zoning change filed the instant lawsuit seeking a writ of certiorari to review the adoption of the ordinance. The petitioner residents argued, inter alia, that the email correspondence and the non-public meeting violated the Open Meetings Act, that the enabling statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, and that the enactment of the ordinance violated due process and was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court determined that the legislative body’s actions did not violate the Open Meetings Act, and rejected the other challenges to the zoning overlay ordinance. The neighborhood residents appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part, finding among other things that while the email correspondence constitutes a violation of the Open Meetings Act, the legislative body engaged in a “new and substantial reconsideration” of the issues in the final meeting so as to cure the violation.

Wife filed a divorce complaint in Judge Robilio’s court, which she later voluntarily dismissed. Wife then filed a complaint in the Court of the Judiciary against Judge Robilio. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the matter was set in Judge Robilio’s court. Wife filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process of Husband’s divorce complaint, which was denied after the process server identified Wife as the person he had served.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendants, David Anthony Avery and Frederick Alexander
(“Alex”) Avery , of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced David Avery to a forty-nine year effective sentence and Frederick Avery, a violent offender, to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, David Avery contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentences; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered his sentences run consecutively. On appeal, Frederick Avery contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a violent offender. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.