APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On November 8, 2007, a Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Charles Hall, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole as a repeat violent offender. On appeal, the defendant submits that the trial court erred in (1) admitting prior convictions for aggravated robbery for impeachment purposes and (2) denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

This is a negligence case filed by a student’s mother against the city, as operator of the city school system, due to an alleged assault on the student by another student. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding the assault unforeseeable as a matter of law. The mother appeals. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and  conclusions of law. Employee injured her ankle as a result of a fall. At the time the injury occurred, she was between two portions of a split work shift. She had undertaken a personal errand at a building adjacent to her workplace, and intended to return to an employee break room at her workplace to await the second half of her shift. The fall occurred on property owned by her employer, but the property was leased to an unrelated third party. The trial court held that the injury was compensable. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by finding that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of the employee’s employment. We agree with Employer, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the Court’s decision but write separately to clarify my view of the evidence as it relates to S.R. I believe that the evidence would support a finding by the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that any visitation with Father would result in harm to S.R. However, because the trial court did not make the required finding of harm, I agree with the decision to remand the case on the issue of visitation.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant based on the statute of limitations in this will contest action. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph B. Thompson, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping, Class B felonies. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range II, violent offender to twenty years at one hundred percent for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, which were to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief in the Lake County Circuit Court, which was dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgments are void because his sentences exceed the statutory minimum, thereby violating Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Appellants granted a sewer line easement to the City. The City hired a sub-contractor to install the sewer line and to restore the property following construction. Appellants, who were dissatisfied with the sub-contractor’s restoration, filed suit against the City and the sub-contractor. The sub-contractor subsequently went out of business, and the trial court entered a judgment against the City for $13,070.00, representing the value of Appellants’ land plus the cost to repair a fence. Appellants appeal, claiming the proper measure of damages is the cost to restore their property–$137,779.62. On appeal, the City contends that Appellants may not sue the City, that Appellants breached the contract by refusing the sub-contractor access to their property, and that the trial court’s award should be reduced by $132.00. The proper measure of damages in this case is the lesser of the cost to restore Appellants’ property or the difference in reasonable market value of the premises immediately prior to and immediately after the injury. Although neither party presented evidence regarding the property’s diminished value, we find that the trial court considered the appropriate factors in setting the amount of damages. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur in the Court’s decision but write separately to clarify my view of the evidence as it relates to S.R. I believe that the evidence would support a finding by the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that any visitation with Father would result in harm to S.R. However, because the trial court did not make the required finding of harm, I agree with the decision to remand the case on the issue of visitation.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee had several compensable work injuries, the last of which was carpal tunnel syndrome. The trial court awarded benefits for permanent total disability (“PTD”). Liability was apportioned 90% to the Second Injury Fund (“The Fund”) and 10% to the employer. The Fund has appealed, contending, inter alia, that Employee’s claims as to it are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly.

This action involves a variety of claims arising from the construction of a residence in Williamson County. A homeowner, James Laughlin, entered into a cost plus contract with Forrest Construction Company, LLC to construct a home for he and his wife. Prior to the home being completed, Forrest Construction stopped work, filed a lien on the residence, and thereafter filed a breach of contract action against Mr. Laughlin and an action to recover damages based on the doctrine of quantum meruit against Mrs. Laughlin. Forrest Construction claimed that Mr. Laughlin was in breach of the contract for failure to pay according to the contract. Mr. and Mrs. Laughlin filed a counter-claim for negligent construction, gross negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Mr. Laughlin had materially breached the contract by failing to pay according to the terms of the contract, and awarded damages to Forrest Construction. Conversely, the trial court found for the Laughlins on their claim of negligent construction and awarded damages against Forrest Construction. Both parties appeal. Forrest Construction contends that the trial court erred in holding it liable for alleged defects because Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and failed to give Forrest Construction notice and the opportunity to cure the alleged defects. Mr. Laughlin contends the trial court erred in finding that he committed the first material breach. The Laughlins also contend the trial court erred in reducing the cost of the repairs to their residence and in failing to pierce the corporate veil. We find that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract by submitting requests for draws that were not properly supported by records of its costs and expenses as required by the contract, including submitting draws which erroneously included charges for work done on its other projects, and by failing to complete construction of the home. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s determination that Mr. Laughlin committed the first material breach and hold that Forrest Construction was the first to materially breach the contract. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the Laughlins were excused from the duty to give notice of the alleged defects and an opportunity to cure; thus, the Laughlins are entitled to recover damages due to the negligent construction by Forrest. As for the trial court’s substantial reduction of the damages requested by the Laughlins for the cost to repair the yet unrepaired defects to their home, we are unable to determine whether the trial court considered or overlooked $55,000 of the estimated cost to repair the defects; therefore, we remand this issue to afford the trial court the opportunity to either restate its previous ruling or to increase the award of damages, if it so determines, based on the evidence presently in the record. As for the issue of piercing the corporate veil, we remand that issue for further proceedings.

In this direct appeal, the issue presented is whether the trial court properly affirmed a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel’s denial of a suspended attorney’s petition for reinstatement of his law license. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision that the attorney failed to present sufficient proof of his moral qualifications to practice law in this state and that his reinstatement will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive to the public interest. After reviewing the entire record, we hold that the attorney failed to present sufficient evidence that he has the moral qualifications to practice law in this state and that his reinstatement will be not detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive to the public interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying the petition for reinstatement is affirmed.

The defendant, Vario Tally, was convicted of aggravated robbery and carjacking, both Class B felonies, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years and twenty years, respectively. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years. On appeal, he argues that the proof was insufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.

The defendant, Pierre Terry, also known as Pierre Walker, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to three years, ten years, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The court ordered that the felony sentences be served consecutively to each other and the misdemeanor sentence be served concurrently for an effective term of thirteen years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court on his felony convictions. After review, we modify the defendant’s sentence for aggravated robbery to eight years and affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court in all other respects.

This case involves a subpoena issued by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, on behalf of the Davidson County Assessor of Property, which required the appellant to provide information regarding its business operations. When the appellant did not comply with the subpoena, Metro filed a complaint seeking to enforce it. The trial court ruled that the appellant must provide the requested information. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On August 14, 2007, the defendant, Jeffery Thomas, pleaded guilty to one count of DUI second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, in exchange for serving forty-five days in the workhouse followed by ten months and fourteen days of probation. Subsequently, the defendant moved the court to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant argued that his guilty plea resulted in a manifest injustice because he entered the plea due to fear and ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment below.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Nathaniel Banks, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender, to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction at one hundred percent. On appeal, he presents two issues for review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I applaud the majority’s willingness to decide this case in an expeditious manner. I disagree,
however, that this case presents the appropriate opportunity to suspend the rules of appellate
procedure to do so. Moreover, I disagree that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the
conflicting statements of evidence. The Court of Appeals identified a statement made by the trial
court that was dispositive of the issue and that was not in dispute. Based on this statement, the Court of Appeals correctly remanded this case for a new trial.

The Defendant-Appellant, Andra Guy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Guy as a mitigated offender to 7.2 years in the county workhouse with a release eligibility of twenty percent. On appeal, Guy argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal or a motion for new trial based on allegedly exculpatory polygraph evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Applicants, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., and Paul Ludovissie (“Cracker Barrel” and
“Mr. Ludovissie”), have filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon consideration of the application and the record
before us, we hereby grant the application, summarily vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and
remand the case to the Court of Appeals. Further, the Court of Appeals shall direct the trial court to
resolve the conflicts in the parties’ statements of the proceedings and certify and transmit a
supplemental record to the Court of Appeals. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c), (e).1
Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Vacated; Case Remanded to the
Court of Appeals
 

This is an appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis, upholding the decision to terminate Appellant, Jason Morris’ employment with the Memphis Police Department. We find that the Civil Service Commission failed to make the required findings of fact and conclusions therefrom. Accordingly, it is impossible for this Court to review the case based on the record before it. Therefore, we vacate the order of the Chancery Court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

This cause was heard upon the record on appeal from the trial court and the application of
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. and Paul Ludovissie for permission to appeal and the answer of Julie A. Bellamy. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeals’ judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to order the Chancery Court to resolve the conflicts in the parties’ statements of the proceedings and to certify and transmit a proper supplemental record to the Court of Appeals for resolution of the issues. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(e).

The Defendant-Appellant, Ronald Lester Brooks, pleaded guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; possession of less than point five (.5) grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class C felony; felony evading arrest, a Class E felony; and a third offense of driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering Brooks to serve his felony sentences consecutively.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tycorrian Chandler, was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I agree with the procedural analysis in the majority opinion, I respectfully disagree with the result. The facts of this case reveal a young Defendant who, while driving in excess of eighty miles per hour, lost control of his vehicle and struck another car, which was stopped at an intersection. The two passengers in the Defendant’s car and all three occupants of the stopped car were injured. A passenger in the stopped car died at the scene, and one of the passengers in the Defendant’s car was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit for several days.