APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a condemnation case. The appellee county for many years had possession of a small strip of land owned by the appellant family. The county filed a petition for condemnation of the strip of land. A consent order was entered granting the county ownership and possession of the subject parcel, and a hearing was scheduled to determine the amount of compensation due. A week before the hearing, the county gave notice of voluntary dismissal. The family objected to voluntary dismissal, citing Anderson v. Smith, 521 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court permitted the county to voluntarily dismiss its petition. The family appeals. We reverse, finding that voluntary dismissal is precluded where the trial court grants the condemnor right of possession and only the issue of compensation is left to be resolved.

This is a negligence action resulting from a slip and fall by a customer at a Kroger grocery store. The plaintiff slipped on a pool of water created by one of several leaks in the roof of the grocery store. The plaintiff filed suit against three defendants, The Kroger Company, Roof Management, Inc., a roofing consultant responsible for facilitating necessary repairs to the roof of the grocery store, and Village Roofing Company, Inc., the roofing contractor which made repairs to the roof when called upon to do so. Village Roofing and Roof Management each filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Village Roofing and Roof Management finding they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff and if they did owe a duty that their acts and omissions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. We have determined there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a determination of whether Village Roofing or Roof Management owed a duty of care to the plaintiff or whether their actions were or were not the legal cause of Ms. Burks’ injuries. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Village Roofing and Roof Management and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Sherman Clark, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment.

This is a child support case. The mother filed a petition to increase the father’s child support obligation, alleging that he had misrepresented his gross income. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court judge entered an order finding that the father’s testimony was not credible and that he earned significantly more income than he previously represented. The order increased the father’s monthly child support obligation, retroactive to the date of the filing of the mother’s petition. It also required the father to pay for the child’s private school tuition, and awarded the mother her attorney’s fees. The father appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in not using evidence such as his tax returns to determine his income, in not finding the mother voluntarily underemployed because she worked part-time, and in requiring him to pay private school tuition. We affirm.

The pro se defendant, Randy White, appeals the trial court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from a post-divorce motion to modify child support to include payment of the minor children’s private school tuition. Because Appellant/Father’s brief fails to comport with Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Rule 6 of the Court of Appeals, and because Appellant/Father has failed to comply with this Court’s order to supplement the appellate record with necessary documents, we dismiss the appeal. Mother/Appellee has requested attorney’s fees accrued in defense of this appeal. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, we exercise our discretion and award Ms. Chiozza her fees, and remand for the determination of the amount of those fees. Dismissed and remanded.

The appellant, George R. Arnold, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to one count of attempting to obtain a controlled substance by forgery, and he received a sentence of three years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Weakley County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Howard Keith Sallee, for one count of fraudulently obtaining a controlled substance. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense as charged. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to ten years as a Range III, persistent offender. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently because he attempted to commit suicide a few days before entering his guilty plea. He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to order a mental evaluation. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the postconviction court concluded that Petitioner had been unable to prove his assertions. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief.

A Hardin County jury convicted Petitioner of several drug-related crimes. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed these convictions. State v. Oliver Higgins, Jr., No. 5, 1991 WL 153021, (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 14, 1991), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 30, 1991). These convictions were later used to enhance his sentence in the Federal courts. Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief to attack these convictions. The post-conviction court treated the petition as a motion to reopen a prior petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition. We conclude that the appeal is not properly before this Court because Petitioner is required by statute to file an application for permission to appeal as opposed to a notice of appeal as filed. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

Father in Nebraska allowed his child’s caregiver to take the child to Tennessee. A strange series of events led to DCS’s being given custody of the child by the Dickson County Juvenile Court and the placement of the child in a foster home. Meanwhile, Father ran afoul of the law (again) and became an involuntary guest of the federal penal system under a fifteen-year sentence. The foster parents petitioned for termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment and sought adoption of the child. Father’s mother intervened. Mother did not defend and her rights were terminated. Father defended. The trial court found Father had not abandoned the child, but that the parties had tried by consent the issue of Father’s being sentenced to prison for a term of ten years or more when the child is younger than eight years of age, circumstances which present a ground for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant t Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). The trial court then granted the adoption. Father filed a motion to alter or amend, presenting to the trial court a document showing that Father’s sentence had been reduced to seven and one-half years. The motion was denied. Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the issue was tried by consent of the parties. Our decision necessitates that the adoption order be vacated and the child be returned to the legal custody of DCS.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee alleged that she injured her back and neck as a result of an accident at work. Her authorized treating physician released her with no impairment. Employee’s examining physician assigned 10% impairment. The parties invoked the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process. The MIR physician assigned to Employee found 0% impairment. The trial court awarded benefits based upon the rating of Employee’s physician. The trial court did not explain how the opinion of Employee’s physician rebutted the MIR physician’s opinion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not accepting the impairment as determined by the MIR doctor. The judgment for permanent partial disability benefits is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings.

One of many heirs to certain property in Rutherford County opposed the partition by sale of the property. The property was sold and the proceeds distributed. The heir appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we affirm the trial court.

This is a post-divorce petition for contempt. In the divorce decree, the mother was designated the primary residential parent of the three children; the father had standard alternate parenting time and was ordered to pay child support. After the divorce decree was entered, however, the parties and the children continued to cohabit for about five years. During this period of cohabitation, the father did not pay the mother the court-ordered child support, but instead provided necessities for the family. When the father moved out of the home, he began to pay some child support but did not pay the full amount due under the divorce decree...

The petitioner, Robert Wayne McClanahan, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He entered guilty pleas to three charges: burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony, and two counts of burglary of a building other than a habitation, both Class D felonies. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year for the Class E felony in case number 3691, and to two years in case number 3693 for the Class D felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years for the Class D felony in case number 3795. These sentences were to run consecutively for an effective sentence of nine years. The petitioner claims he is on a suspended sentence and is being held improperly. We conclude that the judgments from which he appeals neither are void nor has his sentence expired. The record reveals that the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on whether he violated the provisions of drug court, thereby violating his conditions of probation. The judgment dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief is affirmed, but we remand to the trial court for a hearing on the petitioner’s violation of probation in case number 3795.

Plaintiff sued defendant, his attorney, in Sessions Court to recover an attorney fee in the amount of $1,000.00 paid to defendant for legal representation. His theories for recovery were for malpractice and breach of contract. The Sessions Judge entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court found that the contract which provided for a fee for certain legal services in the amount of $1,000.00 was unconscionable and entered Judgment for plaintiff for $1,000.00 plus other expenses. Defendant appealed to this Court. We hold on the evidence before us that the contract entered was not unconscionable, but upon the facts and law the amount of the fee was not reasonable and we reduce the fee to $500.00 and Judgment will be entered in favor of plaintiff for $500.00 upon remand.

This is a post-divorce child support modification case. The trial court relied upon the parties’ private agreement to modify child support, but failed to determine if the amount agreed to be paid complied with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. Vacated and remanded.

In two separate indictments, the defendant, Jeremy Garrett, was charged with aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; first degree felony murder; and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s motion to consolidate the two indictments without conducting a hearing, and, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years, life, and fifteen years for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to consolidate the two indictments without conducting a hearing; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for first degree felony murder. Following review of the record, we conclude that, although the trial court did err in failing to conduct a hearing on the motion to consolidate, the error was harmless. Further, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Tammie Haake, sustained compensable injuries which required her to have surgery on both wrists. After the first procedure, she was able to return to work, although with modified duties. While she was temporarily disabled from the second surgery, her employer, Saturn Corporation, offered its workers an early retirement incentive program. She accepted the offer, and, as a result, did not return to work. The trial court found that her retirement was reasonably related to her work injuries, and therefore did not apply the “cap” of one and one-half times impairment contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) Employer has appealed from that decision. We affirm the judgment. 1

The petitioner, John Biaselli, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale and one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for delivery, both Class B felonies. The trial court merged the two counts and sentenced the petitioner to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction at thirty percent. The petitioner appealed his sentence to this court, which affirmed the trial court. The petitioner now appeals the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he

The plaintiff/appellee, Jonathan Parker (“Mr. Parker”), was shot once in the right shoulder by Officer David Stanhope (“Ofc. Stanhope”) of the Lexington Police Department during the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Parker’s residence. The trial court held the City of Lexington (“the City”) liable for the injury that Mr. Parker suffered. The court determined that Sergeant Jeff Middleton (“Sgt. Middleton”) was negligent in failing to properly supervise Ofc. Stanhope during the operation and that Ofc. Stanhope negligently created the dangerous situation leading to the use of deadly force. The court awarded $40,000 in damages to Mr. Parker, which accounted for his fault in failing to immediately respond to police commands. We affirm.

The defendant, Ronnie Cortez Akins, was convicted of first degree felony murder, a Class A felony; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and to twenty years on the robbery conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress a gun found during a protective sweep of his room and his statement to the authorities. After careful review, we affirm the convictions from the trial court.

This case arises out of a prisoner’s claims for medical malpractice, negligence, and violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. The claims commission, in two separate orders, wholly resolved the prisoner’s claims in favor of the State of Tennessee. Because the prisoner has not argued or otherwise provided any basis for this Court to determine the alleged errors in the judgment of the claims commission, we affirm.

The defendant, Jairo Jesus Canales Garcia, was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder; first degree (felony) murder, burglary, a Class D felony; attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and theft of property, a Class D felony. He received an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the jury was selected improperly; and the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The appellant entered pleas of nolo contendere to two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and he pled guilty to one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years for each conviction and ordered that two of the sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of six years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in changing the minor child’s surname. Finding no error, we affirm.