APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This application for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal concerns how an appealing party may use a trial court’s recording of a hearing. We grant the appellant’s Rule 10 application.¹ Furthermore, we reverse the chancellor’s June 5, 2009 order and remand the matter for the chancellor to rule on appellee’s objections and resolve the parties’ differences as to the content of the transcript or statement of the evidence.

The petitioner, Michael Lebron Anderson, was convicted of burglary of a building other than a habitation and was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a claim of tortious inducement to breach a non-compete covenant in an employment agreement. The plaintiff staffing agency employed the defendant therapists at a State residential care facility for severely disabled persons. The plaintiff agency staffed the facility under an exclusive contract which was set to expire by its own terms in June 2003. The therapists had executed restrictive covenants in their employment agreements with the plaintiff staffing agency under which they were prohibited from working at the State facility for one year after the termination of their employment with the plaintiff. The State requested bids to staff the facility under a new contract. Through the bidding process, the defendant staffing agency was awarded the contract. The defendant agency then met with the defendant therapists (who were incumbent employees), staffed through the plaintiff agency, and offered to hire them to continue working at the facility. The defendant staffing agency was aware of the non-compete covenants and agreed to indemnify the defendant therapists if the plaintiff staffing agency tried to enforce the covenants. The defendant therapists accepted positions with the defendant agency and continued working at the facility. The plaintiff agency filed this lawsuit against the individual defendant therapists and the defendant agency. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the non-compete covenants were enforceable, that the defendant therapists had breached their covenants, and that the defendant staffing agency had tortiously induced the individual defendant therapists to breach their employment contracts. The defendants now appeal. We reverse, concluding that, while the plaintiff agency had a legitimate protectable business interest, the non-compete covenants are not enforceable in light of the hardship to the defendant therapists and the adverse impact on the public interest.

The petitioner, Jerome Dance, appeals the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted of two counts of sale of cocaine over .5 grams, Class B felonies, and one count of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. Subsequently, he was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to an effective term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He specifically argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) object to an insufficient Notice of Enhancement Factors filed by the State; (2) file a motion for recusal of the trial judge; (3) adequately prepare for the sentencing hearing; (4) inform the petitioner of a plea offer and to adequately advise him that he would not be sentenced as a Range I offender if he proceeded to trial; and (5) pursue a Rule 11 application to appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court or to properly withdraw. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Dock Walker, proceeding pro se, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is currently an inmate in the West Tennessee State Prison as a result of his conviction for assault with the intent to commit murder, for which he was sentenced to a term of sixty years. On appeal, he argues that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing the petition because his sixty-year sentence is illegal, as it was not authorized by statute and is in violation of ex post facto provisions. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her work as an aesthetician. She was referred to an orthopaedic surgeon, who concluded that her condition was not related to her employment. She had surgery on both arms. An evaluating physician testified that her condition was caused by her employment. The trial court ruled that she failed to sustain her burden of proof with regards to causation. On appeal, she contends that the evidence preponderates against that finding. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Timothy Ray Azbill, was convicted of aggravated burglary, rape of a child, and especially aggravated kidnapping. For his conviction of aggravated burglary, the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. For his convictions of rape of a child and especially aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction. The court ordered that the sentences were to run concurrently but consecutively to the sentence on a prior conviction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but determined that the trial court had erroneously begun at the midpoint of the statutory range and remanded the case for resentencing for rape of a child and especially aggravated kidnapping. On remand, the trial court again sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for each conviction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to consider mitigating evidence offered by the defendant and summarily imposed the sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, William R. Cook, was charged with driving under the influence (first offense)(“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-403. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop that led to the charges against him. The Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved for our consideration a certified question of law regarding the constitutionality of the traffic stop supporting the charge against him. After our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. The indictment charging the Defendant with DUI is dismissed.

Employee was a passenger in an automobile, which was involved in a collision. It is undisputed that the accident arose from and occurred in the course of his employment. The trial court awarded future medical benefits but declined to award permanent disability benefits. We affirm the judgment.1

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Charles Nash, of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. The defendant asserts that he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel before the statement began, thus rendering the statement violative of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court, but we remand the case for correction of the judgments.

After a trial by jury, the Petitioner, Jordan Hill, was convicted of criminal attempt: aggravated robbery and convicted felon in possession of a handgun by a Shelby County jury. He now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief claiming “[t]he post-conviction court erred when it denied the Appellant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and effectively placed its imprimatur on trial counsel’s performance as effective although the proof irrefutably showed that trial counsel had not meaningfully conferred with the Defendant prior to trial[.]” Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, George Scott Mason, appeals the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Petitioner, Joe Ervin Hunter, pled guilty to possession of less than .5 gram of a controlled substance with intent to sell. In March 2008, Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus which was summarily dismissed by the habeas corpus court. On appeal, he argues that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his application. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner did not comply with the procedural requirements as set out by statute and that he did not base his plea for habeas corpus relief upon a cognizable claim. Therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal of his application.

Respondent/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights based on abandonment. We affirm.

Petitioner, Demorris Marcel Childress, pled guilty in Bedford County to two counts of possession of a Schedule II substance for resale, both Class B felonies, on two separate dates. Subsequently, Petitioner filed two petitions for post-conviction relief, in which he argued that he had ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. The post-conviction court dismissed the petitions after a hearing. We determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty pleas were entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The parties to a nursing home Admission Agreement dispute the enforceability of its arbitration provision. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The nursing home appealed. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration.

The defendant, Danny Ray Anderson, pled guilty on January 31, 2008, to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of life without parole. On February 5, 2008, he filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty based upon his claims that the pleas were the result of fear and misunderstanding and were not knowingly, understandingly, or voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty.

The pro se defendant, David A. Ferrell, was convicted of failure to display a license, violation of the seatbelt law, and two violations of the vehicle registration law. The convictions arose from two indictments separated by five months. He was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail for his first violation of the registration law and for failure to display a license and to twenty days for his second violation of the registration law. Additionally, a $20.00 fine was imposed for his seatbelt law violation. His sentences were ordered to run consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his cases. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trialcourt.

The Petitioner, Bruce A. Smiley, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to one count of rape of a child and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a total effective sentence of twenty-three years. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Christopher Franklin, appeals from his Bedford County Circuit Court jury conviction
of filing a false report, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years’ incarceration as a Range II, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee was injured when lifting a can of paint at work. Employee’s treating physicians
recommended surgery, but Employee refused surgical treatment. The trial court found that
Employee had sustained a 60% permanent partial disability (“PPD”). The court also found that the date of maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) was January 26, 2007, and that Employee was entitled to temporary total disability (“TTD”) until that date. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of the date of MMI and that the award of PPD is excessive. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings concerning the impairment rating and vocational disability. We reverse the trial court’s finding as to the date of maximum medical improvement.1

The defendant, Steven Watson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced to a term of six years. He was ordered to serve six months in the Shelby County Correctional Center, with the balance of his sentence on probation. The defendant was also ordered to pay $8800 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, the defendant has raised five issues for review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to be questioned regarding a sixteen-year-old prior conviction; (3) whether the court erred in its application and weighing of enhancing and mitigating factors; (4) whether the court erred in denying the defendant’s request for full probation; and (5) whether the court erred by ordering restitution in the amount of $8800 be paid to the victim without proof of his medical bills or lost wages. Because of an untimely filed motion for new trial, the defendant has waived review of his evidentiary issue regarding the prior conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the sentence imposed, with regard to length and manner of service, is proper. With regard to the order of restitution, we conclude that, while the amount of restitution ordered was properly established, remand is necessary for a determination of the defendant’s ability to pay as required by statute. The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed in all other respects.

The petitioner, Reginald Almo, appeals pro se the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court from his conviction for second degree murder, a Class A felony. The petitioner alleged that: counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; his guilty plea was entered unknowingly and unintelligently; and he was sentenced outside of his range. The habeas corpus court determined that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not cognizable claims for relief in a habeas corpus proceeding and that his sentencing issue had previously been determined. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

Employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his wrist. There was conflicting medical evidence concerning causation and impairment. The trial court ruled that Employee had sustained a compensable injury and assigned 10% permanent partial disability to the right arm. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Employee’s medical expert and by finding that Employee sustained a compensable injury and permanent disability. We affirm the judgment.1