APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Owners of an insured vehicle that was damaged by fire filed suit against their insurance company for breach of contract, failure to pay insurance claim in good faith, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Insurer filed a counter-complaint alleging that one of the insureds had no right of recovery under the policy because she had no insurable interest in the vehicle and that the other insured was barred from seeking recovery under the policy because the insured failed to answer questions under oath when asked by the insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Donald Mays, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner has previously been granted a remand to the post-conviction court for consideration of the issues that he now appeals: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allege in his motion for new trial that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery; and (2) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal that it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct on robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post conviction court.

Defendant, Glenn Eugene Armes, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to arson and simple possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years for arson and eleven months and twenty-nine days for simple possession to be served consecutively. As a condition of his guilty plea, defendant properly reserved a certified question of law as to whether he was subjected to an unconstitutional traffic stop. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, John Brunner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and domestic assault. He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent terms of twenty-three years, six months and eleven months, twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s eviction letter to the defendant into evidence; (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (4) the trial court erred by failing to merge the domestic assault conviction with the second degree murder conviction; and (5) cumulative error entitles him to relief. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Raymond Carlton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, premeditated first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing questions concerning his prior convictions and arrests, and he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bert Newby, was convicted of one count of first degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life for the first degree murder charge and three years for the aggravated assault. The defendant raises three issues for appeal: 1) whether the late-filed notice of appeal should be waived in the interest of justice and judicial economy; 2) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; and 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his murder conviction. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and second degree murder for shooting a man to death during an attempted robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction, for which the defendant received a life sentence. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for a sequestered jury; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves competing adoption petitions filed by a child’s maternal and paternal grandparents after the child’s father was sentenced to death for killing the child’s mother. The trial court simply compared the relative fitness of the two sets of grandparents and granted the adoption petition of the paternal grandparents. We conclude that the trial court erred in giving equal weight to both petitions because the paternal grandparents did not meet the requirements set forth in Tennessee’s adoption statutes. We also conclude that the maternal grandparents were fit persons to have the care and custody of the child, that they are financially able to provide for the child, and that adoption is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for entry of an order granting the adoption petition filed by the maternal grandparents.

The Defendant, Phillip Gray Stewart, was convicted in the Franklin County Circuit Court of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served in the county jail. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant-defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment and the modification and enforcement of his non-competition agreement with appellee-plaintiff. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant-defendant’s motion for summary judgment; we affirm the trial court’s ruling modifying the territorial restrictions in the non-compete agreement; we further modify the terms of the non-competition agreement in order to be consistent with Tennessee’s public policy; and we reverse the trial court’s institution of a permanent injunction against the appellantdefendant.

The defendant, Marlos Shields, was indicted on charges of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the charged offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction and six years for the aggravated burglary conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Carlos Cooper, appeals from the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of eight years. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the court.

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

At issue in this appeal are the respective rights of three parties concerning charitable gifts of 101 pieces of art given, subject to conditions, to Fisk University in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The collection has an estimated present value in excess of $60 million. Four of the pieces, including the painting Radiator Building - Night, New York, were the property of Georgia O’Keeffe and given to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe. The other ninety-seven pieces were part of a much larger collection formerly owned by Alfred Stieglitz, Georgia O’Keeffe’s late husband. The ninety-seven pieces were gifted to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe as executrix of the estate and/or as the owner of a life estate in the ninety-seven pieces. All 101 pieces were charitable, conditional gifts that were subject to several restrictions, two of which are at issue here; the pieces could not be sold and the various pieces of art were to be displayed at Fisk University as one collection.

The Defendant, William Harold Jones, appeals the revocation of his enhanced probation sentences in the Criminal Court for Knox County. He pled guilty to two charges of theft, a Class D felony, for which he received two consecutive, suspended sentences of four years; theft, a Class E felony, for which he received a consecutive suspended sentence of three years; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, for which he received a suspended sentence of two years, with a total effective sentence of eleven years of enhanced probation as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Taurus Merriweather (“Merriweather”), was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and was subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years in confinement. Merriweather’s sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the shooter in this case. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, William M. Putman, challenges the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Johnny L. Burns, was originally tried and convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony. Due to an error in jury instructions, this Court reversed and remanded his case for a new trial. See State v. Johnny L. Burns, No. M2005-01945-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 595632, (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 26, 2007). The Defendant was retried and again convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred because it: (1) denied his request for supplementary police reports that he claims contain exculpatory information; (2) refused to admit into evidence a photograph used by the defense in cross-examination; (3) denied his motion for a mistrial due to improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; and (4) failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensatiom Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court ordered Employer to provide pain management treatment to Employee. Employer has appealed, contending that the proposed treatment was made necessary by a pre-existing condition, an independent intervening cause, or both, rather than Employee’s work injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jesse Wade Glover, was indicted in count one for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine by beginning the extraction of an immediate methamphetamine precursor from a chemical product, a Class B felony, in count two for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture by possessing more than 9 grams of an immediate methamphetamine precursor with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony; in count three for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture by acquiring a chemical and an ingredient that could be used to produce methamphetamine knowing that it would be used to produce methamphetamine, a Class D felony; and in count four for possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was tried jointly with co-defendant, Britt Alan Ferguson. Co-defendant Ferguson’s case is not part of this appeal. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of the charges in counts one, two, and four, and guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class E felony, in count three. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of facilitation of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court held that Employee suffered a compensable injury to her left shoulder; that she did not make a meaningful return to work and the statutory cap therefore did not apply; and awarded her benefits based upon a vocational disability of 35% to the body as a whole. Employer and its insurance company appealed. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pivotal question in this case is straightforward. Did the law enforcement officers who came upon Marcus Richards and his three associates sitting at a picnic table on which residue of powder cocaine was in plain view have probable cause to search Mr. Richards incident to arresting him for the simple possession of the cocaine on the table? The Court has concluded that they did not. I respectfully disagree. Based on the essentially undisputed facts, I would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the warrantless search incident to Mr. Richards’s arrest was valid.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The appellant mother of four children has a history of mental illness and substance abuse. The children were taken into state custody based on the mother’s lack of safe and stable housing and her drug abuse. The children were then placed together in the home of their maternal grandmother and ultimately stayed in State custody for over eight years. For the first several years, the children’s permanency plans required the mother to obtain drug treatment, attend parenting classes, seek treatment for her mental health issues, and provide a stable home for the children. At various times, these goals were accomplished, but at other times they were not. In 2006, the state petitioned the trial court to permit the mother to regain custody of the children, indicating that the mother had fulfilled her responsibilities. Around the same time, however, the mother tested positive for illegal drugs. Soon thereafter, the state filed the instant petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition for termination based on the ground of persistent conditions, finding that the State had made reasonable efforts to assist the mother and that the children’s best interest would be served by termination. The mother as well as the children’s guardian ad litem now appeal the termination. We reverse, finding that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to assist the mother, particularly with respect to her underlying mental illness, and dismiss the petition to terminate her parental rights.