The death sentence Gerald Powers received for killing a Memphis woman in1996 was affirmed Monday in a 3-2 decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court, with justices divided over whether trial testimony by the defendant’s wife should have been allowed.
In an opinion written by Justice Janice M. Holder, and joined by Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota and Justice E. Riley Anderson, the majority concluded that the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s wife, Sharon Powers, to testify against her husband about statements he made to her admitting his guilt.
A jury convicted Powers of first degree murder for killing Shannon Sanderson. Powers also was convicted of aggravated robbery for stealing money the victim had won gambling in Tunica, MS, and jewelry she was wearing at the time he abducted and killed her. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that three statutorily defined aggravating factors, including prior convictions for violent crimes, outweighed mitigating evidence presented by the defense, qualifying Powers for a death sentence.
Powers was in the same casino as the victim and saw her win $5,000 playing blackjack. He followed her back to Memphis, kidnapped her from a driveway and drove her to an abandoned house in Mississippi where he shot her to death. She also suffered at least one blow to her face resulting in a fractured jaw and other injuries.
He later confessed to his wife that he had kidnapped, robbed and killed Sanderson and said he had buried the stolen money in the back yard. He also told her where he had hidden the victim’s jewelry. In his appeal, Powers said his wife’s testimony concerning his disclosures to her should have been excluded under a state law providing that “confidential communications between married persons are privileged and inadmissible if either spouse objects.”
In the majority opinion, Holder reviewed the history of spousal disqualification from testifying and confidential marital communications and explained that a 1978 Court of Criminal Appeals case, Adams v. State, limited the confidential marital communications privilege to situations where the communications originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; the element
of confidentiality is essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; the relationship is one which, in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered; and the injury to the relationship by disclosure of the communications would be greater than the benefit gained by the disclosure for the correct disposal of litigation.
In a 1993 case, State v. Hurley, the Tennessee Supreme Court “endorsed the application of the four Adams factors to determine whether a marital communication is privileged,” Holder wrote. Two years after Hurley, the general assembly amended state law to specifically prohibit testimony concerning confidential communications if either spouse objects, but the 1995 amendment did not mention the four Adams factors. Powers claimed that the Adams factors were abolished by the 1995 law and that his wife should not have been allowed to testify concerning his statements to her about the crime.
Writing for the majority, Holder rejected this argument, stating that the “best expression of the legislative purpose and intent is the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature within the four corners of the statute.” Holder said that the language used in the 1995 amendment does not indicate that the legislature intended to abolish the Adams factors. Holder also noted that in 2000, the legislature again amended the law to specifically include the four conditions spelled out in Adams and endorsed in Hurley. Holder concluded that the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s wife to testify because the communications were not privileged when the Adams factors were applied.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William M. Barker wrote that the evidence against Powers was overwhelming, even without his wife’s testimony. However, Barker said he is “unwilling to affirm a criminal conviction based upon a flawed interpretation of the marital communication privilege” as it was in the 1995 law. Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., concurred in the dissenting opinion.
“The plain language of the 1995 statute does not require the defendant to satisfy any particular elements to invoke the privilege, other than to object to a spouse testifying to confidential communications,” Barker wrote. “. . . Without some language to this effect, I do not believe that we can reasonably presume that the legislature intended for these particular Adams/Hurley elements to be embodied in the 1995 statute.”
He described the language in the 1995 law as “straightforward” and said the legislature did not intend to incorporate the four conditions required under Adams and Hurley for spousal privilege.
“In my view, the 2000 amendments represent not only ?material changes’ to the statute, but they are so completely different from the 1995 version of the statute that I am at a loss to understand how the majority views the 2000 amendments as mere ?clarifications’ to the 1995 statute,” he wrote.
Because Barker and Birch concluded the testimony of Powers’ wife would have been barred under the 1995 law, they would reverse his convictions and order a new trial.
“Although there was other evidence linking the defendant to the crime, the key direct evidence . . . were the incriminating statements made by Mrs. Powers,” Barker wrote. “This evidence was overwhelming and warrants a reversal of the defendant’s convictions and a new trial.”
However, the majority said none of the issues raised by Powers warrant relief and “the evidence supports the jury’s finding” that he was eligible to receive a death sentence. Also, Holder wrote, the sentence was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed for similar crimes in Tennessee. The majority opinion affirms a Court of Criminal Appeals decision in the case.