Supreme Court Defines ‘Abandonment’ in School Property Dispute

The Tennessee Supreme Court has set a legal standard for “abandonment” of property for school purposes in a case involving an attempt by heirs to reclaim land conveyed - with conditions attached - to Davidson County schools nearly 100 years ago.

In 1908, George E. and Sarah Haley sold the one-acre parcel of land to the school system for $1 with the conditions that it be used “for school purposes” and “devoted exclusively to the cause of education.” The deed said if the property were “abandoned” for the stated purposes, ownership would revert to the family. Lillian E. Griffis and other heirs of Mr. Haley contend that the Metro Nashville Board of Education violated terms of the 1908 deed when it closed Union Hill Elementary School in 2000.

In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III, the court vacated a Court of Appeals grant of summary judgment favoring the heirs and sent the case back to Chancery Court “to allow the parties the opportunity to litigate the case in accord with the legal standard adopted herein.”

“In April 2001, heirs of the grantors brought suit against Metro, claiming that the property had been abandoned for school purposes, thereby triggering reversion to them,” Drowota wrote.

The heirs claimed that terms of the deed were violated when Union Hill Elementary School was closed in 2000 because of declining enrollment. Since then, the property has been used solely to store surplus food service equipment.

Davidson County Chancellor Carol L. McCoy concluded there had been no abandonment and granted summary judgment in favor of Metro. Summary judgment is granted without a trial and requires that the party requesting it is entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals disagreed and concluded that terms of the deed would be satisfied “solely by classroom instruction.”

“We vacate the Court of Appeals holding that ‘school purposes’ and ‘the cause of education’ require classroom instruction alone,” the chief justice wrote. “We hold that these limitations permit any use that directly benefits and enhances the process of learning and instruction or that directly advances the objective of instructing, training and rearing” the youth of Nashville.

In setting a legal standard for “abandonment” of property conveyed strictly for a specific purpose, the Supreme Court held that the common law definition of abandonment applies. Under this standard, a court must look at all the circumstances of each case to determine whether there is an intent to “abandon” use according to the deed's requirements. The standard would not apply when “abandon” is defined in the deed.