The Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld the death sentence inmate Stephen Lynn Hugueley received for stabbing a correctional officer 36 times, stopping only when the handle broke on a sharpened piece of metal he had devised as a weapon.
Hugueley, who said he had no remorse for the murder, was an inmate in the Hardeman County Correctional Facility in 2002 when he attacked 57-year-old Delbert Steed.
“Defendant killed the victim because he felt the victim had ‘disrespected’ him,” Justice Cornelia A. Clark wrote for the court. “… Prior to the instant murder, defendant had killed two other persons and attempted to kill a third person.”
After reviewing issues raised by Hugueley in his automatic appeal, Clark said the court concluded they did not warrant relief. The court set an execution date of Aug.15, 2006, for Hugueley, who has state and federal appeals remaining.
Clark was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice William M. Barker and Justices E. Riley Anderson and Janice M. Holder. In a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., said he also would affirm the conviction, but differed with the majority “as to the sentence of death.”
Birch said he continues to disagree with the method the court uses to ensure that a death sentence is not disproportionate when compared to penalties imposed for similar crimes. The court is required by state law to conduct a “comparative proportionality review” in capital cases.
In Hugueley’s case, Clark said the majority found that his sentence was not imposed arbitrarily and was not excessive or disproportionate considering the nature of the crime and the defendant.
Issues raised by Hugueley included a claim that the prosecution rejected jurors based on their race or gender, a practice deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. The jury selected to hear the case included five minority members and six women, Clark wrote.
“In this case, defense counsel objected at trial to the state’s peremptory challenge of five potential jurors …,” Clark wrote. “The record indicates that all of these persons are African-American; Defendant is Caucasian.”
Most of the potential jurors cited in the appeal had expressed moral or religious opposition to the death penalty, but said during questioning they could impose it because it is the law. Another juror was rejected by the prosecutor because she had tears in her eyes and shook her head during the jury selection process.
“… The sole indication of purposeful impermissible discrimination by the state in this case is the fact that each of the peremptory challenges used by the state was employed against an African-American …,” Clark wrote. “A close examination of the record convinces us, however, that the prosecution’s exercise of these challenges was for race-neutral reasons.”
She said the trial court judge also had determined that Hugueley’s attorney “failed to establish purposeful discrimination.”
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Birch said he had “extreme concern with the fact that of the eight peremptory strikes used by the state to remove potential jurors, all eight were used to remove African-American jurors.” He and the majority cited the trial court judge’s failure to make specific findings on the claim that prospective jurors were excused based on race.
“What is apparent from the record is that seven of the African-American jurors removed … had indicated on their jury questionnaires that they had personal reservations about the death penalty,” Birch wrote. “I understand the prosecutor’s reluctance to seat these jurors, although I also note that during questioning each of them indicated a willingness to follow the law despite their personal beliefs. “
Birch said he would caution trial court judges and defense attorneys dealing with issues relating to potentially race-based exemption of jurors “to take care to develop the facts for the record.” In Hugueley’s case, he said in spite of his “misgivings about the prosecution’s motives” he did not find actionable error and would agree with the majority that the murder conviction should be affirmed.