In an opinion released today, the Tennessee Supreme Court settled a split of authority in the Court of Appeals about the interpretation of a Tennessee statute authorizing termination of parental rights. The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizes termination of parental rights upon clear and convincing proof that a parent or guardian failed to manifest, by act or omission, either an ability or willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for a child and that placing the child in the parent’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.
In the case before the Court, the child, Neveah, was born while her mother was participating in a court-ordered inpatient drug treatment program. Mother completed the program but relapsed to drug use and lost physical custody when Neveah was sixteen months old. Mother then failed several drug screens and failed to enter a drug treatment program. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition for dependency and neglect. The juvenile court ruled that Neveah was dependent and neglected; granted legal custody of Neveah to the foster parents; determined that mother had lost her superior parental rights, but awarded mother up to four hours of visitation per month.
After the juvenile court hearing, which mother failed to attend, mother visited with Neveah sporadically for several months but also continued using drugs. She became pregnant again, and when she gave birth to her son in June 2016, mother and the new baby tested positive for drugs. DCS required mother to enter the inpatient drug treatment program again.
Two months later, foster parents filed a petition in circuit court to adopt Neveah and to terminate mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the circuit court terminated mother’s parental rights and granted the foster parents’ adoption petition. The circuit court held that mother had “failed to manifest an ability” to assume custody of Neveah and that placing Neveah in mother’s care would “pose a severe risk of physical and psychological harm to [the child].”
Mother appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The intermediate appellate court held that mother’s rights should not have been terminated under the statute without a clear and convincing proof that she was not only unable but that she was also unwilling to assume custody Neveah. The Court of Appeals recognized that other court decisions had interpreted the law as permitting termination of parental rights upon clear and convincing proof that a parent failed to manifest either the ability or the willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of a child.
The foster parents applied for permission to appeal and asked the Supreme Court to resolve the split of authority in the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted the application, ruled that the statute is ambiguous, and considered the legislative history of the statute to determine its proper interpretation. The Supreme Court pointed out that in testimony before a legislative committee a lawyer who participated in drafting the statute stated that the intent of the legislation was to permit termination of parental rights upon clear and convincing proof that a parent failed to manifest either the ability or the willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for a child.
The Supreme Court therefore construed the statute consistently with this expressed intent and overruled any Court of Appeals’ holding that the required proof of both inability and unwillingness. As a result, the Supreme Court overruled all prior Court of Appeals’ decisions construing the statute as requiring proof of both inability and unwillingness, including the decision of the Court of Appeals in Neveah’s case. The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court, which granted the foster parents’ petition seeking to terminate mother’s parental rights and to adopt Neveah.
To read the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in In re Neveah M., authored by Justice Cornelia A. Clark, go to the opinions section of TNCourts.gov.