The Tennessee Supreme Court today upheld eleven convictions stemming from a string of robberies that occurred in Nashville over the course of a month. However, the Court reversed a twelfth conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding that the trial court erred in denying a motion to sever the offenses.
David Wayne Eady was charged with committing a series of robberies in Nashville during November 2017 to obtain money to satisfy his heroin addiction. Mr. Eady was no stranger to committing robberies, having been convicted of offenses on multiple prior occasions that qualified him as a repeat violent offender for sentencing purposes. On one of the prior occasions, in 1989, Mr. Eady’s defense counsel was current Davidson County District Attorney Glenn Funk. With the assistance of counsel, Mr. Eady pleaded guilty on that occasion and served his sentence. After he was indicted in the present case, Mr. Eady moved to disqualify the Davidson County District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting the case because General Funk had represented him on the 1989 case.
Additionally, Mr. Eady moved to sever the offenses for trial. In the indictment, Mr. Eady was charged with twelve offenses arising from eleven separate incidents. Mr. Eady sought separate trials for all charges except the two that arose from the same incident.
The trial court denied both motions. Upon appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to disqualify. In accordance with the positions of the parties, the court assumed that General Funk had an actual conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the court held that the conflict did not require disqualification of the District Attorney’s Office. In addition, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to sever. The majority held that severance was not required, concluding that the separate offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan to procure money to purchase heroin. However, one judge dissented, concluding that the robberies were opportunistic acts born of a shared motivation rather than the product of a preconceived plan.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals with respect to the motion to disqualify, albeit for a different reason than the court below. The Court recognized that professional ethical rules specify that a lawyer, having represented one person, cannot thereafter represent another with materially adverse interests in the same or a substantially related matter. However, the Court concluded that the present case was not the same matter as the 1989 case, nor was it substantially related. To the contrary, the only relationship between the 1989 case and the present case was the mere fact of conviction in 1989, which formed part of the basis for qualifying Mr. Eady as a repeat violent offender for sentencing purposes in the present case. That simple fact was public record rather than confidential factual information from the prior representation. Thus, General Funk had no actual conflict of interest from which to impute disqualification to the District Attorney’s Office. In addition, the Court rejected Mr. Eady’s argument that, separate and apart from the requirements of the professional ethical rules, disqualification was proper based on an alleged appearance of impropriety. The Court noted that although the rules clearly impose ethical obligations on government lawyers, they did not require disqualification of the District Attorney’s Office in this case.
With respect to the motion to sever, however, the Court unanimously reversed the decision of the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court concluded that the proof did not support the existence of a larger, continuing plan among the offenses that would justify conducting a single trial. Instead of showing that the offenses were committed in furtherance of a plan with a relatively specific ultimate goal or purpose, the evidence revealed simply a string of similar robberies with a general shared motivation. Thus, the Court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever. However, the Court further held that the error was harmless with respect to eleven of Mr. Eady’s convictions because he admitted responsibility for those offenses. The same could not be said for the single offense for which Mr. Eady did not admit guilt. Accordingly, the Court reversed that conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge.
To read the Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. David Wayne Eady, authored by Justice Jeff Bivins, visit the opinions section of TNCourts.gov.