APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this breach of implied warranty of good workmanship and materials case, the trial court awarded Appellee $77,494.36 in damages. Although the parties agree that the proper measure of damages is the cost to repair the defects, the parties dispute the method of repair and its cost. In determining Appellee’s damages, the trial court relied on testimony from Appellee’s expert contractor. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. The parties’ respective requests for appellate attorney’s fees are denied.

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a beneficiary of a trust seeking an accounting and removal of the trustee. The trustee asserted the affirmative defense that the beneficiary violated the no-contest clause in the settlor’s trust. The trustee served the beneficiary with requests for admissions, to which the beneficiary responded with objections to the majority of the requests. After the trial court granted his motion for the requests for admissions to be admitted, the trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the no-contest clauses in the trust and will of the settlor. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the beneficiary’s petition with prejudice. The beneficiary appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action filed in circuit court by a conservator
on behalf of a ward. After a three-week jury trial resulted in a mistrial, the conservator
took a nonsuit. The conservator refiled the complaint against only one defendant hospital,
asserting that it was vicariously liable for the actions of a doctor based on a theory of
apparent agency. The defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the conservator had entered into a consent agreement agreeing not to sue the doctor in the
refiled suit if the doctor agreed to withdraw his motion for discretionary costs. According
to the defendant hospital, this agreement releasing the alleged agent from liability
extinguished the conservator’s right to pursue a vicarious liability claim against the
principal. In response, the conservator took the position that the consent agreement was
not binding because it was never approved by the probate court that appointed her. The
circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant hospital, finding that the order
appointing the conservator authorized her to dispose of property, execute instruments, enter
into contracts, pursue legal causes of action, and manage money, thereby authorizing her
to enter into the consent agreement. The circuit court found nothing in the order of
appointment, the relevant statutes, or caselaw that would impose a mandatory requirement
for approval of the settlement by the probate court. Because the conservator had released
the alleged agent from liability, the circuit court found that the conservator could not pursue
vicarious liability claims against the defendant hospital. The conservator filed a motion to
alter or amend, asking the circuit court to consider an “Advisory Opinion” of the probate
court on the matter. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that it respectfully
disagreed with the Advisory Opinion of the probate court. The conservator appeals. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Courts in both Florida and Ohio denied petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights in favor of the Prospective Adoptive Parents.  While Florida courts were still exercising jurisdiction over the transition of the child from his Prospective Adoptive Parents to his Mother and Father, the Prospective Adoptive Parents sought for the third time to have a court terminate Father’s parental rights, asserting willful failure to support in Tennessee.  The juvenile court dismissed the petition, finding that Father’s failure to support was not willful because the failure to support was tied to the Prospective Adoptive Parents’ representations that they would no longer pursue custody, to Father’s financial outlays related to preparing his home for a transition of custody, and to the complex, multi-jurisdictional nature of the litigation, in which Florida courts were expressly exercising jurisdiction for many months after the filing of the Tennessee petition and during the entirety of the period of non-payment.  The Prospective Adoptive Parents appeal, asserting that the ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest, and that the court erred in assessing fees for the guardian ad litem.  We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

I concur in the result reached by the Court and in its analysis in all but one respect.  In considering whether the father of Preston H., Christopher W. (“Father”), established an affirmative defense to the claim that he abandoned his child by failure to support, the Court reasons that it is unnecessary to determine “whether willfulness [of Father’s failure to support] presents a question of law, fact, or a mixed question of fact and law.”  In my view, the outcome of the appeal depends on that determination.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action following the death of Ashley Denson
from a cardiac event she suffered after being treated and released from Methodist Medical
Center. Ms. Denson was unmarried and had two minor children at the time of her death.
The statutorily-required pre-suit notice listed Ms. Denson’s mother, Bobbie J. Denson, as
the claimant authorizing notice. The minor children were not identified anywhere in the
notice. The subsequent complaint was filed by “ASHLEY DENSON, Deceased, by and
through her Next Friend and Mother BOBBIE JO DENSON, and BOBBIE JO DENSON,
Individually.” The body of the complaint lists, for the first time, Ashley Denson’s children,
and states that Bobbie Denson “brings this action individually, and on behalf of Plaintiff,
decedent’s surviving minor children … as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.” The
defendants filed motions to dismiss, challenging Bobbie Denson’s standing to bring the
action and contending that the pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of the
Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.1

I agree with the majority’s secondary conclusion that Grandmother held standing to
file suit on behalf of the minor children. I write separately to address the majority’s
dispositive holding that failure to identify the minor children in the pre-suit notice defeats
this cause of action, thereby precluding their claim for health care liability for judicial
review on its merits.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court denied the husband’s petition for contempt upon
finding that the wife had satisfied a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution
agreement allowing for the husband to retrieve items of personal property from a home
awarded to the wife. The court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the wife, pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), for her successful defense against the petition.
Upon the husband’s motion to alter or amend and following a hearing and supplemental
briefing, the trial court concluded that the statute did not provide for attorney’s fees in an
action involving enforcement of the distribution of property in a divorce. The trial court
granted the husband’s motion to alter or amend, denying the wife’s request for attorney’s
fees. The wife has appealed. Upon consideration, we hold that Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-5-103(c) provides for attorney’s fees solely in matters involving alimony,
child support, permanent parenting plan provisions, and custody of children. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves an accident between a motor vehicle and a school bus that occurred on
Highway 11E on a foggy December morning in Jefferson County, Tennessee. The
automobile was traveling eastbound on Highway 11E when it struck the bus, which was
stopped across the two eastbound lanes of Highway 11E positioned to make a left turn onto
the westbound lanes. The driver of the car, Jacob Cook, sustained serious injuries as a
result of the impact. Mr. Cook, together with his grandfather, Rickey Macari, who owned
the vehicle, brought an action in tort seeking damages against Jefferson County, the
Jefferson County Board of Education, and the driver of the school bus, Harold Moody. In
their complaint, Mr. Cook and Mr. Macari alleged that Mr. Moody's negligence in stopping
the school bus across the eastbound lanes was the proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries.
The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that Mr. Cook's negligence, and not Mr.
Moody's, was the proximate cause of the accident because Mr. Cook had been speeding
when the accident occurred. During a bench trial, the defendants' expert witness, an
accident reconstructionist, opined that Mr. Cook had been speeding at the time of the
accident but that Mr. Cook's car would have collided with the stopped school bus even had
he been following the speed limit. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found
that Mr. Cook was indeed speeding at the time of the accident, but that Mr. Moody should
not have attempted to turn left across the eastbound lanes given the traffic and weather
conditions. Accordingly, the trial court determined that Mr. Moody's actions were the
proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries and allocated 80% of the fault for the accident to
Mr. Moody, with 20% of the fault assigned to Mr. Cook. The defendants timely appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment with one modification:
we direct the trial court to dismiss Jefferson County as a defendant because the Jefferson
County Board of Education, as the owner of the school bus, is undisputedly the proper
defendant in this action.

This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property and its award of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to wife as alimony in solido based on the lack of findings in the trial court’s order. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The case is remanded for findings on the issue of whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under the factors prescribed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121 and, if so, whether the amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition for contempt. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order failed to resolve all the issues before the court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

I concur in the majority’s thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, but I write separately to reflect a variance of view with the majority’s determination as to the appropriate four-month statutory time period for assessing the ground for termination for abandonment by failure to support. In assessing abandonment, the General Assembly has directed Tennessee courts to consider “a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to terminate the parental rights . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (West July 1, 2021 to May 8, 2022). The majority concludes that the correct four-month period to examine for the ground of abandonment by failure to support in this case is the four months prior to the granting of the motion to amend, running from July 18, 2021, to November 17, 2021, rather than the four months prior to the time the amended petition was filed on September 24, 2021. I do not necessarily disagree with the majority on this point. Where I respectfully diverge is that I do not think it is necessary to decide between these two time periods in this case and would reserve doing so for a more appropriate case.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Step-grandparents Joe K. and Lois K. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Vernetta G. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Skylith F., Zelda F., and Celeste G. (“the Children”). After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit, and persistent conditions. Mother appeals. Mother argues, among other things, that she was thwarted by Petitioners from visiting the Children more often than she did. We find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that Petitioners proved three grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal is the latest development in a protracted custody and visitation dispute between
Loring Justice and Kim Nelson. After the Juvenile Court for Roane County (“the Juvenile
Court”) entered a judgment awarding Ms. Nelson custody and severely restricting Mr.
Justice’s parenting time, Mr. Justice filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County
(“the Trial Court”). He alleged various claims against Ms. Nelson and the lawyers and law
firms that represented her in the Juvenile Court. Ms. Nelson and her attorneys filed motions
for sanctions, alleging that Mr. Justice’s complaint violated Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. Months later, Mr. Justice filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. After
entering an order of dismissal, the Trial Court granted Ms. Nelson and her attorneys their
Rule 11 motions and ordered Mr. Justice to pay their attorney’s fees and expenses. Mr.
Justice has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment
in all respects.

The appellant applied for a special exception permit allowing it to operate a liquor store in
a location designated as a C-2 Convenience Commercial Zone. The appellee, City Council
for the City of Chattanooga, denied the application based upon a councilmember’s
statements that “the City is turning that area around to meet some different purposes.” The
appellant sought review from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, which upheld the
decision of City Council. Following careful review, we reverse.

A plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendant’s negligence caused her to sustain personal injuries in an automobile accident. The plaintiff filed the complaint within one year of the accident, but she failed to have process issued within one year from the filing of the complaint. Thus, the defendant sought summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense. In response, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because the parties had agreed that issuance of process was unnecessary. The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s estoppel argument and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by the plaintiff, Michael Halliburton, seeking to recuse the trial
judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Halliburton,
and finding no error, we affirm.

The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against several healthcare providers
following the death of her husband. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the
defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion for a protective order
to prohibit further inquiry into a meeting held between the defendant hospital and the
decedent’s family. We affirm the trial court.

The father of two children learned that the mother eventually planned to relocate to Florida. The father opposed the relocation and applied for a temporary restraining order to disallow the mother from leaving the state. He further requested modification of the permanent parenting plan entered at the time of the divorce (a default judgment). In response, the mother filed a counter-petition requesting permission to relocate out-of-state. The paternal grandparents filed a petition to intervene in the action to establish visitation. The court conducted a best interest analysis to determine whether it was in the children’s best interest to relocate with the mother. Concluding that it was in the children’s best interest to relocate, the court entered a modified parenting plan, which provided a period of co-parenting time for the father to be supervised by the grandparents and set forth a parenting schedule reflective of the distance between the parties upon the mother’s relocation. The father and the grandparents appealed. We affirm the judgment allowing the relocation. The trial court’s order regarding the grandparents’ visitation petition, however, is unclear. Accordingly, we vacate the modified parenting plan and remand this matter for specific findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-307 and for a ruling whether the visitation by the grandparents will be separate from or derivative of the father’s time.

This appeal involves a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to set aside the attorney's fee provision contained within a final divorce decree. The trial court denied the motion without hearing evidence from the parties or stating the basis for its decision.  Because we are unable to adequately review the matter due to the trial court's lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law and the lack of evidence in the appellate record, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings. 

A temporary injunction restrained a former employee of an accounting firm from committing acts of harassment against the firm or any of its principals, employees, or agents. An Internet news article reported the former employee’s perspective on his history with the firm. The former employee posted a link to the article on his Facebook page and circulated the article to clients of the firm and others. The firm filed a petition for criminal contempt, alleging that the former employee violated the restraint on acts of harassment against the firm. The trial court held the former employee in criminal contempt for willfully disobeying the injunction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This case involves an appeal from the trial court’s appointment of a permanent conservator to oversee the person and property of the appellant, Tara Young. Ms. Young’s brother, Daniel Wood, petitioned for a conservatorship after he discovered that Ms. Young had been admitted to the Vanderbilt Adult Psychiatric Hospital following a car accident. After several months of proceedings and a two-day trial, the trial court concluded that a conservatorship was warranted and appointed a conservator for the person and property of Ms. Young. The trial court further determined that medical decisions should remain vested with Ms. Young. Ms. Young timely appealed. On appeal, Mr. Wood did not file a brief in response to Ms. Young’s appellate brief. Upon review, we conclude that Ms. Young’s brief lacks a statement of the issues presented for review and therefore does not comport with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(4). Inasmuch as Ms. Young has not presented any issues on appeal as required by Rule 27, we dismiss this appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce after a very brief marriage. The parties had one young son at the time of the divorce. The trial court declared the parties divorced, named the mother primary residential parent, largely adopted her proposed parenting plan, and calculated child support after imputing income to the mother based on a finding of voluntary underemployment. The father appealed and raises three issues, primarily arguing that he should be named primary residential parent or at least have additional parenting time. The mother raises a host of issues regarding various other provisions of the parenting plan. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court as modified.

The appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. At issue is whether the trial court
erred by quashing the appellant’s subpoena of the conservator’s records on the basis of res
judicata, rendering the document subpoena moot as a matter of law. We have determined
that a final judgment had not been rendered on the merits concerning the services rendered
by the conservator; thus, res judicata was not applicable. Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.