APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case. Edward Shirer Umstot (Husband) appeals the order of the trial court awarding a divorce, alimony in solido, and child support to Mary Ann Umstot (Wife). 1 At the time of the divorce, one of the children was eighteen years old and the other child was fifteen years old. 2 Wife’s expert, who valued the plan, testified that a defined benefit plan is a plan in which a benefit is accumulated during one’s working years or tenure with a particular employer that will ultimately be paid out upon retirement or the attainment of so many years of service or a certain age. 3 The trial court accepted the lower value because the parties testified that the property occasionally floods. 2 The parties were married on August 16, 1977 and had two children during the marriage.1 At the time of the divorce, Wife was 52 years old, and Husband was 53 years old. Husband is in good health, but Wife was recently diagnosed with malignant melanoma. She testified that she has a 40% chance of living another five years.

This appeal involves a suit for wrongful death based on negligence under the Tennessee governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. § 29-20-101 et seq. (1980) and for wrongful death based on the creation of a special relationship and a nuisance. Defendant, the City of Memphis, 2 appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff, William J. Chase, as Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Betty Lou Stidham. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found that plaintiff’s damages totaled $1,897,713.03, and that the City’s negligence caused 40 percent of those damages. However, because of the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (hereinafter the Act), the court limited plaintiff’s recovery to $130,000.00, and entered a judgment in that amount.

This case involves a complaint for an accounting and injunctive relief. Plaintiff, Dorothy R. W. Barham, appeals the order of the trial court affirming the report of the Special Master in favor of defendant, Diane W. Cooper.

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority's opinion which concludes that the trial court's award of alimony in solido was excessive. As noted by the majority, the trial court's order awarded 58% of the marital estate to the wife and 42% percent of the marital estate to the husband. This court's ruling, in its attempt to achieve “a more equitable division," awards 51% of the marital estate to the wife and 49% percent to the husband.

This appeal concerns a suit for partition and sale of real property. In June 1989, Myrtle Mae Daly Brown, Willie Myrle Daly Cruse, Mary Elizabeth Daly Wolfe and T. J. Ward filed suit against Norma Jean Belton Daly, Appellee, claiming that they each own an undivided one-fifth interest in property, identified as 700 Reed Hooker Road, as the children and surviving heirs of Earl J. Daly (hereinafter “Father”) who died on August 7, 1966.1 They further asserted that Appellee is the rightful owner of the remaining one-fifth interest as the widow and will beneficiary of Earl W. Daly (hereinafter “Son”), their brother, who died in August 1988. Appellee filed a counter-claim contending that Son solely owned the property at the time of his death and that as the land passed to her under the terms of his will, she is the lawful owner in fee simple. Appellee asserted that Son acquired the entire property either by prescription or by transfer of equitable title from Father to Son based on a contract to purchase. Appellee also relied upon the defense of laches.

In this automobile accident case, Roland Hayes (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against John Doe (“Doe”) for damages sustained when Plaintiff was forced to drive off the road into a tree in order to avoid a head-on collision with Doe’s vehicle. Plaintiff filed a second suit against Shelter Insurance Company (“Defendant”) for Defendant’s alleged bad faith failure to pay Plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim under the insurance contract existing between Plaintiff and Defendant. The trial court later consolidated Plaintiff’s negligence suit against Doe with Plaintiff’s bad faith suit against the Defendant. After the parties stipulated that the Defendant paid Plaintiff $11,262.89 prior to trial and after the jury returned a verdict of $2,337 in  favor of Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Doe, the trial court held that Plaintiff should recover nothing from the Defendant in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff appeals the judgment of the trial court  arguing that the trial court erred in consolidating Plaintiff’s negligence action against Doe with Plaintiff’s bad faith action against the Defendant and in refusing to grant Plaintiff an additur or a new trial. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.