APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant appeals his conviction for attempted first degree murder. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a claim that the jury venire was unconstitutionally empaneled by failing to include adequate representation of African-Americans. The defendant failed to prove a prima facie case, and the conviction is affirmed.

A jury found the Defendant, Carl Creason, guilty of driving on a revoked driver's license. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to six months in the county jail. The Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing him to serve his sentence on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for entry of a uniform judgment document.

Defendant, Michael A. Prechtel, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. On September 6, 2001, Defendant pled guilty in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court to possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days with all but two days suspended and placed on supervised probation. Following three separate probation revocation proceedings in the general sessions court, defendant's probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve his sentence in the Cumberland County jail. Defendant appealed to the Cumberland County Criminal Court. Following a de novo hearing, the criminal court affirmed the general sessions court's decision to revoke defendant's probation and ordered him to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the Cumberland County Criminal Court.

The defendant, Stefanie M. Henson, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a sentence of four years for the offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered that she serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Garry Lynn Vernon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Gibson County of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Leslie E. Raymond, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The motion is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Don Allen Coleman petitioned the Hickman County Circuit Court for habeas corpus relief, contending that the two rape of a child judgments against him impose illegal sentences. We agree that the sentences are illegal and we vacate them, thereby reviving the two indictments and pleas for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Eric T. Davis, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to six years probation. The petitioner subsequently pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years probation, to be served consecutively to his prior sentence. The petitioner's probation was revoked in both cases. He appealed the trial court's order revoking his probationary sentences, and this court affirmed the revocation of his probation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, among other things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding the petitioner failed to assert a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The defendant, after entry of a plea of guilty, appeals from the imposition of consecutive sentences, the denial of alternative sentencing, and the requiring of restitution to be paid to an entity not named as a victim in the indictment. Upon careful review, we affirm the respective sentences and the denial of alternative sentencing, but reverse the imposition of consecutive sentencing. The cause is remanded for additional hearing for determination of Automotive Financing Corporation’s victim status and if so established, the amount of restitution. We further direct that the recipient of the restitution for sales tax and clerk fees be changed from the State of Tennessee to the individuals named in the indictments who paid the sales tax and clerk fees.

I concur in the named victims’ receiving restitution. However, I seriously question whether a person or entity situated as AFC was in this case could be viewed as a “victim” for restitution purposes. The persons buying the vehicles are the named victims–and victims in fact–relative to the theft offenses charged in the indictment. The defendant took their money. AFC, with the titles, could have repossessed the vehicles. However, it voluntarily chose to relinquish the titles to the named victims, thereby essentially removing their loss from their purchases.

The appellant, Harry G. Sturgill, was convicted by a jury of eight counts of rape of a child and two counts of statutory rape. As a result, he received a twenty-five year sentence for each of his eight child rape convictions and a two-year sentence for each of his statutory rape convictions. Two of the child rape convictions were ordered to be served consecutively. All of the other sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective fifty-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to his child rape convictions and the length and consecutive nature of the sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant appeals from the judgments of the trial court denying him habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petitions, finding that they failed to state cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, David Lee Bellamy, plead guilty to violation of an habitual traffic offender order, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, four counts of reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, driving under the influence, fourth offense, improper passing, and driving left of center, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. Unsatisfied with the denial of alternative sentencing, the appellant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, William Hackworth, pled guilty to four counts of incest and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek DNA testing in order to establish the paternity of the child borne of the victim in this case. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction DNA analysis. Petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dewayne Cathey, petitioned the Hardeman County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his sentence in his 1993 Shelby County, guilty-pleaded conviction of first degree murder. The lower court summarily dismissed the petition, and on appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing. Upon our review of the record, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order. Furthermore, we order the lower court to grant habeas corpus relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ydale Banks, of first-degree felony murder, first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracies to commit both modes of first-degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated assault. The defendant now claims on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the convictions for first-degree murder; (4) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence in the sentencing phase of trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting victim-impact evidence during the sentence phase; (6) the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) relative to the use of victim-impact evidence are unconstitutional; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (8) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the definition of "knowingly." We reverse the judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit felony murder but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved of the order to serve 90 days of his two-year sexual battery sentence in confinement, the defendant, Michael K. Miller, appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Allen Michaels, pled guilty to two counts of robbery, both Class C felonies. Defendant was originally indicted on charges of aggravated robbery. For his convictions, Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years and three years as a Range I standard offender, to be served consecutively. The length of the sentences imposed was agreed upon in the negotiated plea agreement. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of probation. After reviewing the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Harry M. Nimmons, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to three counts of possessing with the intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine and resulting effective sixteen-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because he would have gone to trial if his attorneys had explained evidentiary issues to him. We affirm the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the appellant, Bernard E. Roller, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an eleven month, twenty-nine-day sentence and suspended all of the sentence except for fifteen days, which the appellant was ordered to serve in the workhouse. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging: (1) his sentence as excessive; (2) the trial court's decision to exclude evidence about the tachograph in the police officer's car; (3) comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument; (4) the trial court's failure to take corrective action following the prosecutor's prejudicial comments; and (5) the trial court's failure to question the appellant in accordance with Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). Although we conclude that issues (1), (2), (3), and (4) are without merit, the record is devoid of evidence to allow this Court to determine whether the appellant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the appellant's right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the appellant's right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The petitioner's judgment forms entered May 29, 1996, reflect that he pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, committed on November 18, 1994, and possession of cocaine greater than one-half gram with intent to sell, a Class B felony, committed on October 3, 1994. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years on the murder conviction and twelve years on the cocaine conviction. The judgments ordered the sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to sentences for other convictions listed on the judgment forms. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief claiming that his sentences are void because they are in direct contravention of statutory law requiring them to be served consecutively rather than concurrently. The trial court granted habeas corpus relief, and the State appealed. We hold that the testimony presented by this petitioner was outside the record of the underlying convictions and proceedings and therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. We reverse and remand this case for a determination as to whether the record of the underlying convictions and proceedings constitutes satisfactory proof that the petitioner was on bail for the Class B cocaine offense when the second degree murder was committed.

The Appellant, David Scott Akers, was indicted for the crimes of robbery and attempted robbery and, following a jury trial, was convicted of theft under $500 and attempted robbery. The trial court consolidated the sentencing hearing for these convictions with Akers’ two pending probation revocation hearings. Following this hearing, Akers received an effective ten-year sentence for his two jury convictions and two one-year sentences from the revocation of his sentences for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act. On appeal, Akers raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Akers’ three prior MVHO convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and at sentencing; and (3) whether the trial court erred in conducting the revocation hearing without proper notice. Finding no error, the judgments of the Dyer County Circuit Court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Michael Douglas, appeals a 1 s of right from the judgment of the Shelby County
Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Douglas was convicted in 2000 of
attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Douglas contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to seek suppression of a photo array because the photograph used was obtained following an unlawful arrest and (2) failure to adequately cross-examine a witness as to whether an agreement existed between the witness and the State. After review of the issues presented, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Dennis Christopher Lowery, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that he had received for his convictions upon guilty pleas to theft and misdemeanor evading arrest. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.