APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Eddie Medlock, was convicted after a trial by jury of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, class A felonies. The Appellant, a Range III persistent offender, was sentenced to sixty years on each count. The Criminal Court of Shelby County ordered the rape counts to run concurrent, the kidnapping counts to run concurrent, and the rape and kidnapping counts to run consecutively to each other, for an effective one-hundred and twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Medlock argues that: (1) his multiple punishments for especially aggravated kidnapping and multiple punishments for aggravated rape violated double jeopardy principles; (2) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping violated due process principles of State v. Anthony; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (4) the trial court failed to articulate its findings of applicable enhancing factors at sentencing; and (5) consecutive sentencing was improper. After review, we find Medlock's multiple convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping constitute double jeopardy. Accordingly, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed and dismissed; the sentences and convictions for the remaining two counts of aggravated rape and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping are affirmed.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea proceedings. Initially, we dismissed his appeal. The supreme court granted the defendant's application to appeal and reversed the dismissal, remanding the matter to this Court for a determination of the merits of the appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Mario Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole. On appeal, Johnson argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

On May 3, 1999, the Defendant, Gregory L. Hollingsworth, pled guilty to aggravated assault, vehicular assault, driving after being declared an habitual motor vehicle offender, and two counts of criminal impersonation. The convictions were obtained in Madison County, Tennessee. The Defendant apparently did not appeal, but filed pro se for post-conviction relief in Carter County, Tennessee, where he was incarcerated. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for improper venue. The Defendant refiled his petition on May 25, 2000, in Madison County, Tennessee. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as barred by the one year statute of limitations. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Chad Davis, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to DUI, second offense, and driving on a revoked license. At the sentencing hearing, Davis requested that he be permitted to serve on work release the imposed forty-five day mandatory jail sentence for DUI, second offense, and the consecutive two-day jail sentence for driving on a revoked license. The trial court found Davis was ineligible for work release because he was self-employed. Davis now appeals
this ruling. In response, the State asserts that the trial court was without authority under the provisions of the work release statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-2-128, to grant work release to Davis or any other person convicted of DUI, second offense, prior to expiration of the minimum period of confinement. After review, we find the trial court’s ruling misplaced. Nonetheless, we conclude that Davis was not entitled to “work release,” as only the general sessions court has the authority to grant work release under the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-2-128.

The Defendant, Cornelius Michael Hyde, was convicted of aggravated child abuse of a child under seven years old and appealed as of right on numerous grounds, including the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault and assault. Judge Welles held that the trial court's failure to so charge the jury was error, but harmless under State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tenn. 1998). Judge Wedemeyer concurred, finding the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; Judge Tipton dissented, finding that the State failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the trial court's error in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Cornelius Michael Hyde, No. E2000-00042-CC-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1877490, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Dec. 28, 2000). Our supreme court subsequently granted the Defendant's application to appeal this case for the purpose of remanding it to us for reconsideration in light of that court's opinions in State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2001) and State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001). We now conclude that the trial court's error in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault is reversible error, and therefore remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

Defendant, Terrance Rogers, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. Defendant contends that the court erred by revoking his sentence for failing to report a new arrest, and for the alleged possession of cocaine. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Marcus Fitzgerald, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of resisting arrest, aggravated rape, and rape. Defendant appeals his convictions and presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the State's motion to consolidate; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress a pre-trial identification; (3) whether the trial court erred by offering an advisory opinion on a stipulation; (4) whether Defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's comments to the jury after extraneous contact with a third party; and (5) whether the trial court erred by admitting mug shots of Defendant taken a few days after his arrest. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Allen Moore, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to the minimum sentence of eight years on each count. The trial court ran the sentences concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a sentence the Defendant had received in another county. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darrell M. Scales, was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated robbery and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to nine years on each of the robberies and to nine years on each of the sexual batteries. The court ordered the sentences to be run partially consecutive, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following five issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress identification testimony; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to require the State to elect from two separate incidents of aggravated sexual battery against one of the victims; (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on lesser-included offenses of aggravated sexual battery; and (5) whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentences. We hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to require the State to elect offenses, and that it committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses of aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for retrial the Defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery. In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On February 5, 2001, the Defendant, Jeffery K. Shaw, entered a plea of guilty to felony weapon possession. Pursuant to Rule 37 (b)(1)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law to be reviewed by this Court. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained as a result of the Defendant's arrest in the home of a third party. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Perdido Cook, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Cook to serve 25 years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, 8 years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and 3 years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. All sentences were to be served concurrently. On appeal, Cook raises the following issues for our review: (1) Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the imposition of the maximum sentence of 25 years for especially aggravated robbery is justified in view of the trial court's misapplication of certain enhancement factors. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gregory W. Clements, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of second degree murder and was sentenced as a Range II offender to thirty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his sentence is illegal. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Alfonzo E. Anderson appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that the indictment charging him with first degree felony murder is insufficient to allege the offense because it does not allege a factual basis for the underlying felony, attempted aggravated robbery. Because we agree with the lower court that the indictment sufficiently alleges the crime of first degree felony murder, we affirm.

Defendant, Livergest Mickens, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary, and theft of property under five hundred dollars in value. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder for a killing that occurred in 1985, and was unsuccessful both in a direct appeal of his conviction and a petition for post-conviction relief. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the denial of which is the basis for this appeal. In that petition, he claimed, as he had in his earlier petition for post-conviction relief, that his conviction should be reversed because the jurors were allowed to separate during the trial. Based upon our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. The trial court found that the petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his guilty plea was not voluntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed.

A petition to declare the defendant a motor vehicle habitual offender was filed and served on him. He did not appear at the hearing, where a default judgment was entered. Subsequently, he filed a motion to set aside the default order, arguing that the service of the order on him was inadequate. The trial court denied the motion, and we affirm that denial.

The Defendant, Kenneth W. Nesbitt, was convicted of two counts of selling cocaine by a Carroll County jury and sentenced to eight years on each count to be served concurrently. He appealed his convictions and this Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences, and our supreme court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal. The Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Defendant now appeals to this Court alleging that the trial court erred in denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty in 1998 to delivery of over 0.5 grams of cocaine for an agreed fine of $2,000 and an eight-year sentence, as a Range I standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. In this appeal, the defendant contests this denial. After review, we affirm.

On October 19, 2000, the appellant, Paul C. Michael, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of violating the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-10-616, a section of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act. On November 22, 2000, he was sentenced to two years incarceration suspended after service of ninety days. He brings this appeal claiming his conviction is invalid because the order declaring him an habitual motor vehicle offender was not properly entered pursuant to Tennessee Rule Civil Procedure 58. We hold that an individual must utilize the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to challenge an order declaring the individual an habitual motor vehicle offender. Because the appellant herein did not mount his attack on such an order pursuant to Rule 60.02 the appellant cannot obtain relief. Moreover, the unreasonable amount of time the appellant waited to mount his challenge after having actual notice of the order declaring him an habitual motor vehicle offender precludes relief pursuant to Rule 60.02. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jarrett Sherrard Sibert, was convicted of attempted first degree murder by a Warren County jury. After a sentencing hearing on January 14, 2000, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to 24 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeffery Bowers, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Fayette County of speeding . He now appeals to this Court alleging that his conviction should be reversed due to a conflict of interest in the Somerville City Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.