APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Randall Carver, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to one count of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Lake County Circuit Court. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we remand the case to the habeas corpus court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We granted permission to appeal these cases and then consolidated them to determine a question common to both: whether the admission at trial of an unavailable witness’s “excited utterance” to law enforcement officers at the crime scene violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him. We conclude that—depending on the particular facts of a case—an excited utterance can be “testimonial.” If the statement is determined to be “testimonial,” then under Sixth Amendment analysis as outlined in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the defendant’s right to “meet the witnesses face to face,” it is inadmissible unless the witness was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. If the statement is not testimonial, then admissibility is governed by the standards of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v.Maclin and dismiss charges against the defendant for reckless aggravated assault; we affirm the lower court’s conviction in State v. Anderson of the defendant for burglary of a building other than a habitation.

The plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for both cognitive impairment and a disfiguring scar resulting from a work-related accident. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff did not suffer cognitive impairment as a result of the accident. With regard to the benefits for disfigurement, the trial court erred in calculating benefits as an award to the body as a whole pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) (1999). Injuries for disfigurement are instead governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(E) (1999), which limits the benefits for disfigurement to 200 weeks. Because the plaintiff's disfigurement may not be classified as an injury to the body as a whole, the trial court erred in limiting the award to two and one-half times the impairment rating as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) (1999). After an independent review of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence supports a vocational disability of 20% due to the disfigurement. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, John Allen, Jr., and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation, and in revoking his probation and ordering that the sentence be served by incarceration. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Joseph Brown, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years for each conviction and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.  Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he did not knowing, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas. The post-conviction court denied relief.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we must dismiss the petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The trial court determined a material change of circumstances had occurred which warranted modification of the parties’ child visitation scheduled. Father appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Joey Lee Smith, appeals from the circuit court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties' briefs and applicable law, we affirm the court's dismissal of the petition.

After fourteen years of marriage, Donita Dale Dowden ("Wife") sued Ronald J. Feibus ("Husband") for a divorce. After trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the parties' marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro of $1,000 per month. Husband appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony, in awarding Wife 50% of Husband's federal pension when a portion of that pension was earned prior to the marriage, and in dividing an award that Husband received from a personal injury lawsuit. We affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that his judgment was void and that his sentence was illegal. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant in this divorce case appeals asserting that the trial court erred in failing to treat his admittedly untimely Motion for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend the Divorce Decree as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 Motion. We affirm the action of the trial court.

Petitioner, William T. Yelton, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his Bedford County theft of property conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has appealed, and the State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Finding the motion to have merit, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Charlie M. Gardner, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Having reviewed the record, we find that the motion has merit and grant same. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Jackson, Jr., appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellants Ben and Janice Dick ("the Dickes") appeal the trial court's grant of pre-judgment interest against the J-Bar Corporation ("J-Bar") on a promissory note issued by J-Bar to Appellees Ronald and Judith Parrish. Because we find that the Dickes lack standing to appeal this issue, we dismiss.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing his three petitions for writ of error coram nobis in which the petitioner alleged that newly-discovered evidence and his own diminished capacity mandated a new trial. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the petitions for coram nobis relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The unsuccessful plaintiff brings this appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Stephanie Wilwayco, M.D., and St. Thomas Family Health Center. Upon de novo review we affirm the action of the trial court.

This is an action by Alton Bowman seeking damages against Smith County Motor Co., Inc. arising from the purchase of two vehicles. Bowman claims damages based on alleged misrepresentations and fraud concerning his intent to purchase disability insurance when he purchased the vehicles. He contends he requested both disability and life insurance when he purchased the vehicles from the dealership, however, only life insurance was provided and the contracts executed by the parties at the time of the sale clearly evidence only life insurance was provided. Bowman suffered a stroke subsequently and when he attempted to file a claim for disability coverage he was notified he did not purchase disability insurance. Bowman filed suit seeking damages in the amount of the balance owing on the vehicles. The case went to trial and at the close of Bowman's proof, the dealership moved for a directed verdict on all issues, which the trial court granted. On appeal, Bowman contends the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict and by failing to grant a voluntary non-suit as to the issue of negligent misrepresentation. Finding there is no material evidence to support a verdict for Bowman, we affirm the grant of directed verdict. We also find that Bowman did not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1) by providing an unequivocal notice of dismissal in open court and, thus, affirm on this issue as well.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Eric Fields, was convicted of the following offenses and received the following concurrent sentences: aggravated robbery of Yousef Nahhas, a Class B felony, twelve years; conspiracy to possess more than three hundred grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony, twenty-five years; attempted second degree murder of Officer Dariet Wallace, a Class B felony, twelve years; aggravated robbery of Officer Wallace, a Class B felony, twelve years; and unlawful possession of a handgun, a Class E felony, two years. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, for his conspiracy drug conviction, and as a Range II, multiple offender, for his remaining convictions. The convictions were the result of a jury trial, and the total effective sentence of twenty-five years was the result of a negotiated agreement of the parties done in lieu of a sentencing determination by the trial court. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of sexual battery and received an effective sentence of eighty-four years as a multiple offender. His convictions were affirmed and his sentence was reduced to eighty years on direct appeal by this court. State v. Andrea Spencer, No. W2002-01483-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22204526, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2003), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2004). On February 24, 2004, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance at trial because his counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare the defense. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Tyrus A. Rogers, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. Because the petitioner has failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this quo warranto action contesting annexation by the City, the Trial Could held landowners were not entitled to a jury trial and they had the burden of proof to contest in the annexation. Following trial, the Court held landowners had carried the burden of proof to invalidate the annexation. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's preliminary rulings, but reverse the invalidation of the annexation.

This appeal involves the imposition of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against a lawyer. The lawyer filed a civil rights suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against five state judges seeking monetary damages to punish the judges for their judicial actions in a prior case. The judges filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and later imposed monetary and other sanctions against the lawyer. The lawyer insists on this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against him. We have determined that the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions fashioned by the trial court are carefully tailored and are clearly warranted by the lawyer's conduct.

The Defendant, Eddie Gaston, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty-five years for each of the other convictions, and it ordered that all the sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it ruled on several different evidentiary issues; and (3) the trial court committed sentencing errors. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On appeal, the defendant, Larry Peoples, contends that: (1) the State improperly impeached defense witnesses by failing to request a jury-out hearing before cross-examining them regarding prior bad acts, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608; and (2) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court denied his request for a mistrial or a curative instruction. We conclude that, while the State certainly should have requested a jury-out hearing prior to impeaching the witnesses, the defendant waived the issue by failing to raise a timely objection. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We accepted review of this cause under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, in order to address a question of first impression: whether the right to DNA analysis created by the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 may be waived by implication. Because the clear language of this Act provides that a petition for analysis may be filed at any time, we hold that the filing of such a petition is not subject to implied waiver. This holding, however, affects only eligibility to file the petition; the requirements set forth in the Act must be met before relief may be granted. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to this opinion.