APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Erick Bailey, was found guilty of second degree murder and felony murder. His conviction of second degree murder was merged into his conviction of felony murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This controversy involves a maternity dispute. An unmarried, heterosexual couple had three children by obtaining eggs donated from an anonymous third-party female, fertilizing the eggs in vitro with the man’s sperm, and implanting the fertilized eggs in the woman’s uterus. The couple intended to rear the children together as father and mother. When the couple’s relationship deteriorated, the woman filed a parentage action seeking custody and child support. In response, the man claimed that the woman had no standing as a parent because, lacking genetic connection to the children, she failed to qualify as a parent under Tennessee’s parentage statutes. On this basis, the man  sought sole and exclusive custody. Employing a broadly-framed test that looks to the parties’ pre-conception intent to determine maternity, both the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals held that the woman was the children’s legal mother. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that the man, based on his representations and conduct which induced detrimental reliance by the woman, is estopped to deny the woman’s status as mother. We vacate the adoption of the intent test by the court below and also vacate the holding of the Court of Appeals that the man is estopped to deny the woman’s maternal status. However, we affirm on separate grounds the holding of the courts below that the woman is the children’s legal mother with all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. Our holding in this regard is based on the following factors: (1) prior to the children’s birth, both the woman as gestator and the man as the genetic father voluntarily demonstrated the bona fide intent that the woman would be the children’s legal mother and agreed that she would accept the legal responsibility as well as the legal rights of parenthood; (2) the woman became pregnant, carried to term, and gave birth to the children as her own; and (3) this case does not involve a controversy between a gestator and a female genetic progenitor where the genetic and gestative roles have been separated and distributed among two women, nor does this case involve a controversy between a traditional or gestational surrogate and a genetically-unrelated intended mother. Our holding today is tailored narrowly to the specific controversy now before us. Having concluded that the woman is the children’s legal mother, we also affirm in full the judgments of the juvenile court and Court of Appeals concerning comparative fitness, custody, child support, and visitation

In this post-conviction action the petitioner contends that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of the effect his plea would have on his eligibility for rehabilitative programs and less restrictive forms of confinement during his federal sentence; and (2) his plea was involuntary and unknowing. Following our review, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise the petitioner of a collateral consequence of his plea and that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Lorenzo Bene Ware, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, class C felonies. The trial court denied the defendant's request for probation and sentenced him to serve concurrent terms of three years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. After considering the record and the relevant authorities, we conclude the defendant has waived this issue and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Former lessee appeals grant of summary judgment dismissing her wrongful ouster lawsuit against former landlord. We affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Halbert Varnell, of driving under the influence ("DUI"). The Defendant admitted that he had three previous DUI convictions, and the trial court sentenced him for DUI, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The Defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his DUI conviction; and (2) the trial court erred by permitting improper closing argument by the State. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I find it necessary to dissent, respectfully, as to two parts of the majority’s Opinion.  I concur with the majority’s Opinion except as further expressed herein.

The petitioner, Danny James McAlpin, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Bobby Lee, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Lee was convicted of attempted first degree murder and received a sixty-year Department of Correction sentence as a career offender. On appeal, Lee contends that trial counsel’s failure to call favorable witnesses denied him his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Plaintiff sued defendants for sexual harassment, assault and battery and retaliatory discharge. A jury returned a verdict for various damages, as well as punitive damages. The Trial Judge, acting as 13th juror, essentially approved the jury’s verdict, but reduced the punitive damages from $500,000.00 to $150,000.00, and awarded plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $282,964.50, as well as discretionary costs. On appeal, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand with instructions.

The defendant, Brandon Miller Waire, was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to resell and possession of marijuana with intent to resell. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of six years and two years, respectively, which were ordered to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. The defendant was fined two-thousand dollars in each case and ordered to serve his sentence on intensive probation. Later, the probation was revoked and the defendant was ordered to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly revoked probation. The judgment is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff 25 percent disability to the body as a whole as a result of sustaining a neck injury but dismissed plaintiff’s claim for depression and a lung injury. On appeal plaintiff contends the court was in error in determining she had made a meaningful return to work and the award for the neck injury should have been larger. Plaintiff also cites error for dismissing the lung and depression claims. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Nelius O. Ellis, contests the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Terry Stephens, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that his judgment is void because his sentence was imposed by the trial judge rather than a jury, in violation of the requirements of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a dispute between the parents of an eleven-year-old boy over child support and private school tuition. The child’s mother filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking to obtain an increase in child support and to hold the father in contempt for failing to pay medical bills. The father responded by filing a petition seeking a deduction in child support because of reduced earnings. Following a bench trial, the trial court reduced the father’s child support and denied the mother’s request to require the father to pay the child’s private school tuition. The child’s mother has appealed. We have concluded that the trial court properly decreased the father’s base child support obligation because of his reduced income. However, we have also concluded that the trial court erred by failing to require the father to pay a reasonable portion of the child’s private school tuition.

The Petitioner, Mark Grimes, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.
The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This divorce action was dismissed by the trial court after the parties resumed cohabiting. This ruling was not appealed. The issues on appeal involve Grandparents’ right to intervene, joinder of third parties, the appointment of an attorney ad litem and the assessment of fees of the guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem. We affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves a boy whose mother placed him in the care and custody of an aunt when he was two months old because she could not take care of him. The aunt furnished all the child's needs and raised him as if he were her own. After he reached the age of ten, the mother filed a petition to have custody of the child restored to her. The aunt subsequently filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. After a hearing, the trial court denied the mother's petition for custody and terminated her parental rights. We affirm the denial of the petition for custody, but we reverse the termination of parental rights because the grounds were not proved by clear and convincing evidence.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, James Aaron Earnest, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, the above-captioned matter is dismissed.

The petitioner, Lester P. Parker, III, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. His post-conviction relief petition attacked his 1997 conviction of attempt to possess cocaine with intent to deliver, as a result of which he received a two-year suspended sentence. His post-conviction claims of the state's suppression of exculpatory evidence and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are spiced with allegations that the prosecution was the result of conspiratorial retaliation for his championing a fight against corruption in the Alcoa Police Department. The post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm.

This Court reversed a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiff’s action and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court entered judgment for Plaintiff, as authorized by the appellate court, and also, on motion of Plaintiff, awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Defendant-Appellants appeal, asserting that the award of attorney fees was not authorized by the appellate court and, therefore, the trial court did not have authority to award same. Appellants also assert that the award of attorney fees was excessive, and Appellee asserts, in a separate issue, that the award of fees was inadequate. Both parties appeal. We affirm.

The defendant, Teresa C. Graves, was convicted of theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, for which she was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender, to nine years in the Department of Correction. The defendant was granted a delayed right of appeal and raises two issues: (1) whether she should be given a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction. The State also appeals and raises two issues: (1) whether the delayed appeal is time barred by the post-conviction statute of limitations; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not sentencing the defendant as a career offender. Following our review, we conclude that (1) the defendant's delayed appeal is not barred by the post-conviction statute of limitations; (2) the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly before this court; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction; and (4) the defendant should have been sentenced as a career offender. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for resentencing as a career offender.