APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In June of 2001, the appellant, Ricky Grover Aaron, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and false imprisonment. As a result of his convictions, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven (11) years for the conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and eleven months, twenty-nine days on his conviction for false imprisonment. The trial court further ordered that the appellant’s sentences be served concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a federal sentence he was already serving.

On July 8, 2004, this Court affirmed both the appellant’s convictions and the sentence imposed by the trial court. See State v. Ricky Grover Aaron, No. M2002-02288-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1533825 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jul. 8, 2004). On July 14, 2004, the appellant filed a petition to rehear, urging this Court to consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), delivered on June 24, 2004, on his sentence. Finding the position well-taken due to the potential impact of the Blakely decision upon the current Tennessee Sentencing Act, this Court granted the petition to rehear on August 2, 2004. The parties filed supplemental briefs fully addressing their view of the impact of Blakely on the appellant’s sentence. After a thorough review, we conclude that in light of Blakely, the trial court impermissibly considered certain enhancement factors to arrive at the appellant’s sentence for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Therefore, we modify the appellant’s sentence for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor from eleven (11) years to nine (9) years. Accordingly, the portion of the previous opinion of this Court affirming the appellant’s sentence is vacated. All other portions of this Court’s previous opinion are affirmed.

This case involves a custody dispute between the parents of one daughter. Mother lives in Belgium, and Father, the primary residential custodian, currently lives in Lewis County, Tennessee, although he has also lived with his daughter in Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington State at various times since the parties' separation in 1998. Father has refused to allow most of Mother's visitation since the divorce became final, has interfered with communication between Mother and Daughter, and has convinced Daughter to falsely accuse her maternal grandfather and stepfather of sexual abuse. The trial court found that these occurrences amounted to a material change in circumstances and found that it would be in the best interest of Daughter to make Mother her primary residential custodian and to allow Daughter to move to Belgium with Mother. We affirm the trial court.

I concur with Judge Smith’s lead opinion; however, I am writing separately for two reasons.  First, I have reconsidered, and upon further reflection, retreat from my earlier position that sentences found to be in violation of Blakely should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in the trial court. Until such time as there is clear authority for our courts to deal with Blakely issues, whether by case law or by statute, judicial economy and sentencing considerations, including uniformity of application of sentencing factors, dictates that most sentences found to be in violation of Blakely should be modified, if at all, by the appellate courts. Clearly, the appellate courts have been given the authority to do so by the legislature Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(c).

Laurie Ann Searcy sought, by post-divorce Petition, a modification of the child custody and visitation privileges provided by the divorce decree. The trial court held that no change of circumstances had occurred “with a negative impact upon the child” and denied modification. We hold that the trial court applied an improper standard for determining the change of circumstances issue. We hold, however, that no change of circumstances has occurred under Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff-Appellant instituted a detainer action in general sessions court seekingpossession of property owned by Plaintiff-Appellant. From an adverse judgment in general sessions court, Plaintiff-Appellant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Defendant-Appellee filed a counter-claim in circuit court, alternatively requesting that if she is forced to vacate the premises, she should be awarded damages for improvements made to the premises. The trial court entered judgment for possession to the Defendant-Appellee. Plaintiff-Appellant appeals. We reverse.

The petitioner, Morris Pepper, appeals as of right from the Lincoln County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and sentence of life imprisonment. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jerry Anderson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Terry Webb, of robbery, a Class C felony, and theft of property five hundred dollars or less, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the defendant’s theft conviction into his robbery conviction and sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender, to fourteen years. In this appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for robbery; (2) that the trial court erred when it denied him an opportunity to impeach a witness at trial; (3) that the trial court erred when it denied his request to alter the proposed jury instructions; (4) that the trial court erred when it allowed the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant; and (5) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Hayden, pled guilty to aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated rape. His plea did not include an agreement as to his sentences, and he was subsequently sentenced by the court to twelve years for the robbery, twenty-five years for the kidnapping, and twenty-five years for each of the rapes. The sentences were imposed in such a manner as to result in an effective sentence of sixty-two years. The Defendant subsequently filed a direct appeal, claiming that his sentences were excessive. This Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. See State v. Robert A. Hayden, No. M2000-00901-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 WL 567869 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 25, 2001). The Defendant then filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. He further alleged that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because he was under the influence of medication at the time. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Brian K. Mitchell, appeals pro se from the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner attacks his conviction for especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, for which he received a thirty-year sentence. He contends that his sentence is illegal because, although he is a Range I, standard offender, the sentence he received is the maximum within Range III. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

The appellant, Linda Herron, was convicted by a jury in the White County Criminal Court of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction and the trial court's jury instructions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground of relief entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a child support action. The trial court awarded Mother retroactive child support, set base child support, and ordered Father to make monthly payments into educational and future child support trust funds. The trial court also ordered father to pay private elementary and high school tuition, provide health insurance, and maintain life insurance. The trial court awarded Mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees. We affirm as modified and remand.
 

The appellant, AB Bonding Company, Inc., appeals the order of the Davidson County Criminal
Court denying its “Motion to Remit Forfeitures” in the case of criminal defendant Elijah D. Truitt.
Because the record fails to reflect the entry of final judgments of forfeiture, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant was convicted for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of marijuana, possession of hydromorphone, possession of diazepam, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The possession of cocaine conviction was a Class B felony and the other convictions were Class A misdemeanors. The jury also recommended fines related to these convictions. The total of the fines was just over $40,000. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight (8) years for the possession of cocaine offense, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the other offenses. These sentences were run concurrently. The trial court then granted the Defendant's request for alternative sentencing and suspended the Defendant's sentence for possession of cocaine for all but thirty (30) days and allowed him to serve ten years on intensive probation. The defendant appeals his sentence. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from a denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, John Henry Sparrow, III, was convicted by jury verdict of attempted especially aggravated kidnaping and received a twelve year sentence. This Court upheld the Defendant's conviction on direct appeal. See State v. John Henry Sparrow, III, No. M2000-03238-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 560958 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 16, 2002) (not for citation). The Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. The Defendant now appeals to this Court, raising the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Cedric Anthony, was indicted in count one for the aggravated robbery of Teresa Stegall, in count two for the aggravated robbery of Regina Davis, in count three for the aggravated robbery of Antoinette Hubbard, and in count four for the aggravated robbery of Leslie Ross. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of all four counts of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years for each offense. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences for counts two, three, and four to be served concurrently, and his sentence for count one to be served consecutively to the other counts for an effective sentence of sixteen years. Defendant does not appeal the sufficiency of the convicting evidence but argues that his aggravated robbery convictions in counts three and four violate the principles of double jeopardy. Defendant does not argue on appeal that his conviction in count two of the aggravated robbery of Ms. Davis raises double jeopardy concerns. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence for count one, aggravated robbery, to be served consecutively to the other sentences. Since the filing of the briefs, Defendant has also asked us to consider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) on his sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery in counts one and two. Because the facts and circumstances supporting the offenses in counts one, three, and four support only one conviction for aggravated robbery, we modify Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery in counts three and four to aggravated assault. We remand Defendant’s convictions in counts three and four for resentencing during which the trial court may only consider Defendant’s prior convictions as an enhancement factor under Blakely. We affirm Defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery in counts one and two, and affirm the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing.

The Petitioner, Keith Hatfield, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

I agree with the majority’s analysis in this case, except for its conclusion regarding whether Mother presented evidence demonstrating a need for child support based on income amounts in excess of $10,000 per month, for both the retroactive and prospective child support. Moreover, an upward deviation is warranted by Father’s failure to exercise visitation.

The Appellant, Craig S. Cook, presents for review a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Cook pled guilty to Driving Under the Influence (DUI), first offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days jail confinement, to be suspended after service of ten days. As a condition of his guilty plea, Cook explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test administered by a private hospital in the course of medical treatment. Cook argues that the procedures utilized to obtain the results of the test violated both his constitutional right to privacy and due process. On appeal, the State asserts that the question presented is not dispositive and, thus, this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. After review, we agree that the certified question is not dispositive. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Larry Wade Gibson, was found guilty by jury verdict of one count of failure to report to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) sexual offender registry, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, 180 days of which is to be served in confinement. The Defendant's sole issue on appeal is whether the statute imposing criminal penalties for noncompliance with Tennessee's sexual offender registration act as applied to him constituted an ex post facto application of the law in violation of both the federal and state constitutions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sheila Ann Jones, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing following her guilty plea to attempt to commit aggravated child abuse. Because the record supports the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

The Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit alleging that he was unlawfully deprived his right to practice his religion and that certain of his religious tapes were confiscated and he was denied the right to congregate and worship in accordance with his faith. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit and Plaintiff responded with his own affidavit. Having determined that there are disputed issues of material fact, we reverse.
 

After the Jefferson County Circuit Court revoked his probation, the defendant, Johnny Arwood, agreed to consecutive sentences in exchange for being placed back on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without first conducting a sentencing hearing or ordering a presentence report. We vacate the trial court's judgments and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.