APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Action was filed by plaintiff's Conservator to recover assets transferred by his wife prior to her death. The Trial Judge awarded certain assets to plaintiff and plaintiff appealed.

In 1998, the defendant, Chad Kilgore, who was indicted for aggravated assault, was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered into a forensic services unit for treatment. The defendant was never transferred from a local mental health care facility. In 2003, the defendant filed a motion seeking relief from the prior order. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and directed transfer. This extraordinary appeal followed. Because the appeal was improvidently granted, it is dismissed.

The Appellant, Roger Dale Bryan, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and driving on a revoked license, third offense, by a Bedford County jury. The verdict returned by the jury found Bryan guilty of both driving and being in physical control while under the influence. On appeal, Bryan challenges the legal sufficiency of the proof supporting each basis for conviction. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient for both and affirm the judgments of conviction, which were merged into a single conviction for DUI.

Appellant Don Pickard appeals the action of the trial court finding that he defamed Sergeant Sam Spicer in public statements to the news media. Spicer cross appeals from the action of the trial court in dismissing his malicious prosecution action against Don Pickard, Stace Thompson and Howard Morris. We affirm the action of the trial court in the defamation case and affirm the action of the trial court in the malicious prosecution case as to Howard Morris. The malicious prosecution case against Don Pickard and Stace Thompson is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Harrison Pearison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Skyla Sepeda Smith, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Davidson County Criminal Court. In the petition she alleged that the conviction she received after pleading guilty to one count aggravated child abuse is illegal and void because a conflict between the guilty plea and the judgment effectively resulted in an illegal sentence. The Davidson County Criminal Court dismissed the petition. Because the petitioner does not present a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This case involves the dismissal of Appellant’s legal malpractice claim against Appellee on the basis that Appellee, after the initial dismissal of Appellant’s medical malpractice claim, failed to file a County entered a judgment for Appellee. Appellant subsequently appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, which dismissed Appellant’s cause for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit

This appeal by K.L.K. (“Mother”) challenges the Juvenile Court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on three statutory grounds, and further challenges that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in her daughter’s best interest. We conclude there was no clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the Juvenile Court, but that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the third ground. However, we also conclude there was no clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, reversed.

This case arises from a divorce action between the Appellant and Appellee. After a hearing, the trial court divided the marital property, granted Appellee alimony in futuro, and awarded Appellee her attorney's fees. After denying Appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court increased Appellee's award of attorney's fees. Appellant appeals to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendants, husband and wife Benjamin Bernal Bobadilla and Sheila Teresa Gaye Bobadilla, were each charged by the Greene County Grand Jury with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress, Benjamin Bobadilla pled guilty to the indicted offenses in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and Sheila Bobadilla pled guilty to facilitation of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony, and the misdemeanor drug paraphernalia count of the indictment in exchange for an effective three-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), both defendants reserved identical certified questions of law; namely, whether the search warrant and accompanying affidavit issued for their home violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions as well as Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c). Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel (“Appeals Panel”) affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the employee failed to carry his burden of proof as to causation. The employee has filed a motion for review pursuant to Section 50- 6-225(e)(5)(B), Tennessee Code Annotated (Supp. 2003). That statute requires that a motion for review be filed within fifteen days of the issuance of the Appeals Panel’s decision. We hold that the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for review is jurisdictional and that the Court therefore is without jurisdiction to consider a motion that is not timely filed.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Calvin Reeves, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Defendant does not appeal the revocation of his probation but argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of confinement instead of an alternative form of sentencing. After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action to establish coverage under an insurance policy. The  plaintiffs’ home was insured by a homeowners policy with the defendant insurance company. The insurance company canceled the policy for nonpayment of the premium and claimed that it mailed a notice of cancellation to the insureds at that time. Six months later, the plaintiffs’ home was damaged by fire, and they filed a claim on their policy. The insurance company denied the claim. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to recover on the policy, asserting that they never received the cancellation notice, and that the insurance company did not properly cancel the policy. At trial, the insurance company representative testified about the company’s customary routine of sending cancellation notices, and it was undisputed that the insurance agent and the mortgagees received notices. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs based on, among other things, its determination that the insurance company did not prove that it had mailed a cancellation notice to the plaintiffs. The insurance company now appeals. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the cancellation notice was mailed to the plaintiffs.
 

Two children were placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services because of the mother’s inability to provide stable and sanitary housing. The Department established permanency plans whereby the mother would obtain and maintain stable and sanitary housing, pay child support, attend parenting classes, work with Homemaker Services to learn how to keep the home clean, obtain a parenting assessment, and undergo counseling for her mental health issues. A third child was born while the mother’s other two children were in the Department’s custody. This child was born prematurely and required extensive hospitalization and was also placed in the Department’s custody. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to all three children, which the juvenile court granted on the grounds of abandonment due to failure to pay child support, failing to comply with the permanency plans and persistent conditions. We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment, but affirm the termination of parental rights based on persistent conditions and failure to comply with the permanency plan. We also affirm the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in  this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the  children to terminate her parental rights.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Carl E. Muncey, of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, Class A misdemeanors, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and fined him a total of $2,500. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentences for the possession of cocaine and marijuana convictions consecutively and that all of the convictions be served consecutively to Washington County sentences. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the trial court improperly applied enhancement and mitigating factors; (2) that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and (3) that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentences. We conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant relative to the lengths, manner of service, and consecutive nature of the offenses in this case. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering these sentences to be served consecutively to the Washington County sentences, and we remand the case for modification of the judgments by deleting any reference to the Washington County cases.

The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the petition is time barred and the petitioner has not advanced any grounds for which the statute of limitations should be tolled. We affirm the dismissal by the trial court.

The appellant appeals from an order revoking her probation. After review, we conclude that the violations of probation conditions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm the trial court's judgment.

This case arises from the Estate’s suit to recover a debt from defendant Corporation. The parties reached an agreement regarding payment of the debt, and the trial court entered a consent order reflecting the terms of this agreement. Appellant then filed a rule 60.02 motion for relief from the consent order. The lower court denied the motion, finding that Appellant was not a party of record in the suit and, accordingly, had no standing to challenge the judgment. We affirm.
 

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Marsha Karen Yates, and ordered her to spend the remainder of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Larry Arnell Adams, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated spousal rape, one count of assault, and two counts of rape. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including consolidation and sufficiency. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.