APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Kevin D. Guffey, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours, and imposed a fine in the amount of three hundred sixty dollars ($360). The trial court also suspended the appellant's driver's license for one year and ordered the appellant to attend "DUI school." Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Eslie L. Morgan, of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask the victim an improper question during redirect examination. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Nadia Coffer, appeals the lower court’s denial of her post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner originally entered guilty pleas in the Shelby County Criminal Court to especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted first degree murder and received two concurrent fifteen-year sentences, the minimum sentences for these Class A felonies. On appeal, the petitioner contends her pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The jury convicted the defendant of especially aggravated robbery and theft over $10,000. The trial court imposed consecutive twenty-five-year and ten-year sentences, respectively. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred in not allowing him to move from the defense table to view evidence on a monitor; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fourth offense, and violation of the implied consent law. He contends on appeal that (1) there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop and (2) the evidence was insufficient because the officer used a non-standardized test. Crossing the yellow line on several occasions and almost hitting a trooper provided sufficient probable cause for the stop, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Tim Holt, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Hancock County Criminal Court for first degree, premeditated murder. The defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously allowed the defendant's wife to testify, violating his privilege regarding marital communications, (3) the trial court erroneously allowed prejudicial exhibits to be entered into evidence, and (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on second degree murder. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Terrance G. Motley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-four years in the Department of Correction. At trial, Motley waived his right to be represented by counsel and proceeded pro se. On appeal, Motley raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by failing to ascertain if his waiver was knowingly and intelligently given; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. After a review of the record, we conclude that issues (1) and (3) are without merit. With regard to issue (2), we conclude that failure to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter was error, but harmless. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are
affirmed.

I fully agree with my colleagues that the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure do not recognize a petition to rehear the denial by our supreme court of an application for permission to appeal. In several instances, our supreme court had observed that there is no authority for such a petition. See, e.g., John Wayne Slate, Jr. v. State, No. 03C01-9201-CR-00014 (Tenn., at Knoxville, Feb. 6, 1995) (stating that “a petition to rehear the denial of a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal is unknown to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure”). In this case, however, as in some others, our supreme court “denied” the petition, thereby acting on the request. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202(a) requires a post-conviction petition within one year of “the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken.” In Lease v. Tipton, 722 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1986), our high court issued an opinion resulting from a petition to rehear its denial of an application for permission to appeal. Further, the Advisory Commission Comments to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 provide that the court “generally disfavors petitions to rehear following denials of applications for permission to appeal.” (Emphasis added.) The Comments do not indicate that such petitions are prohibited.

The defendant pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault of her three-month-old son and was sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court incorrectly applied some of the enhancement factors. However, the factors that were correctly applied substantially outweighed any incorrectly applied factors. There were no mitigating factors. The record does not indicate that the sentence was excessive. In light of the defendant's extensive criminal history, the trial court did not err in denying alternative sentencing.