APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Timothy Tillery, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation. On appeal, he argues (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the probation revocation proceeding because his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Edwin Milton Socall, was indicted by a Montgomery County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI), reckless driving, violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked license (DORL). Following a bench trial, Socall was found guilty of first offense DUI and second offense DORL. He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but thirty days suspended, for DUI, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended, for DORL, second offense. At the bench trial, Socall was represented by retained counsel; however, no court reporter was employed to transcribe the proceedings.

Following his conviction, Socall requested that he be found indigent for purposes of appeal and requested appointed appellate counsel. The trial court granted his request and appointed the public defender's office. Because the proceedings below were not transcribed, a statement of evidence pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) was prepared. On appeal, three issues are presented for our review: (1) Whether "the failure to preserve evidence through the use of a court reporter or tape recording" deprived Socall of an effective appeal; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of first offense DUI and second offense DORL; and (3) whether the trial court erred by ordering Socall to serve thirty days in confinement. After review, we find issue (1) is without merit and issue (3) is waived. Moreover, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support Socall's convictions for DUI and DORL, second offense. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony Carpenter, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by sentencing him to twenty-three years incarceration. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion, but I disagree with its view of when the defendant’s speedy trial right began and with its view of the due process analysis, which indicates that the burden of proving the state’s improper intent is on the defendant. On the other hand, I do not believe that the record justifies our awarding the defendant the relief he seeks.

The appellant, Galen Dean Eidson, was indicted by a Sumner County Grand Jury for second degree murder. Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Eidson pled guilty to the reduced offense of reckless homicide. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Eidson to four years confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Eidson raises the following sentencing issues for our review: (1) Whether the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to total confinement in the Department of Correction. Upon de novo review, we find that a total confinement sentence of four years is justified in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Sumner County Criminal Court is affirmed.

The state has appealed from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hardeman County granting the petitioner habeas corpus relief and finding that his two consecutive three-year sentences had expired. The state asserts that the sentences have not expired and that the petitioner is not entitled to be released from prison. Because the state has not filed an adequate record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shane Wendell Yankee, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal judgment. The issues presented for review are whether the appeal is permissible under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and, if so, whether the denial of relief was proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and was placed on judicial diversion. Thereafter, a warrant was filed in which the defendant's probation officer alleged that the defendant failed to report as directed and failed to pay fines and court costs in a timely manner. After a hearing on the warrant, the trial court revoked the defendant's judicial diversion and entered a judgment against the defendant, requiring him to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration rather than eleven months and twenty-nine days probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to the Class E felony offense of possession of three and one-half pounds of marijuana with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell, and to the Class A misdemeanor of possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia. He now appeals his two-year sentence to the Department of Correction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The state appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of a three-count presentment against the defendant, Harry M. Nimmons. The trial court premised its dismissal of the presentment upon the lack of a preliminary hearing prior to return of the presentment, although the court found that the lack of a preliminary hearing was not attributable to bad faith by the state. Because there was no showing of bad faith by the state, we reverse the trial court's order and reinstate the presentment against the defendant.

The appellant, Donald Paul Presley, pled guilty in the Anderson County Criminal Court to voluntary manslaughter, a class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Moreover, following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. The appellant now appeals the trial court's denial of any form of alternative sentencing. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Courtney Anderson, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury on multiple counts of theft of property, forgery, and one count of misdemeanor possession of a handgun. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Anderson pled guilty to a reduced number of the charged offenses and was sentenced to an extended term in the Department of Correction. The resulting convictions reflect Class C, D and E grade felony offenses. The trial court found Anderson to be a career offender for all convictions and ordered consecutive sentences. In this appeal, Anderson contends that the effective sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. After review, we find that Anderson's designation as a career offender for the Class C felony convictions was in error. Furthermore, we are unable to reconcile the effective sentence pronounced by the trial court with the sentences reflected by the judgment of conviction documents presented on appeal. Accordingly, we remand for clarification or correction of the sentence imposed and for resentencing on the Class C felony convictions.

The State sought revocation of the defendant’s probation for his allegedly failing to report to his probation officer within seventy-two hours of his release from jail, failing to provide proof of employment, failing to complete required community service work, failing to provide a DNA sample, and failing to pay probation fees. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the probation, finding that the defendant had violated four of its conditions. On appeal to this court, the defendant presents the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

This appeal comes to us after multiple hearings in the trial court, and again in our court, on the issue of whether the Appellant's term of probation had expired at the time the alleged probation violations occurred. This issue, which has consumed considerable time of both courts, could have been resolved in less than one minute, if the State's probation officer would have checked with her office and obtained this readily available information on-line. This check would have confirmed that the Appellant's two-year sentence expired before the record in this case was filed on appeal. Because the Appellant completed this sentence on October 17, 2000, the issue of whether continued confinement is warranted based upon violations of conditions of probation is now moot and the appeal should be dismissed. See State v. Edward Shane Rust, No. 01C01-9707-CC-00258 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 1, 1998); see also State of Tennessee ex rel. Raymond Lewis v. State, 347 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1961).

The appellant, Harold J. Douglas, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand jury on one count of second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Douglas was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Douglas raises one issue for our review: Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the verdict, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Antonio Bonds, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury on one count of premeditated first-degree murder. On September 30, 1999, a jury found Bonds guilty of the indicted offense and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Bonds raises one issue for our review: Whether "the evidence of [his] identity as the culprit is sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." After review, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the verdict of first-degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.