APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of theft over one thousand dollars, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years incarceration in the local workhouse. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon his guilty plea, the Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent ten year sentences to be served on community corrections. Several months into service of his sentences, the Defendant was arrested and his community corrections sentences were revoked. The trial court subsequently resentenced the Defendant to two consecutive ten year sentences. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court was without authority to impose consecutive sentences and that consecutive sentences are improper. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Cyrus D. Wilson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.¹ The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his trial was tainted by due process violations. After an evidentiary hearing the post-conviction court denied relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jerry Lynn Sanders, appeals from his convictions of aggravated burglary, theft of property less than $500.00, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. He asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his request to admit into evidence a notarized statement wherein the alleged victim stated that he wanted to dismiss the charges in this matter. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, indicted for the false reporting of a bomb threat at an elementary school, was convicted of the offense of harassment, and fined $1000. No motion for a new trial was filed. In a pro se appeal to this court, the defendant raises essentially four issues: (1) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether he was denied the right to testify at trial; (3) whether the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of harassment. After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Jared Richardson, pled guilty to two counts of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six years for each count, to be served in the Davidson County Workhouse. The trial court also assessed a fine of $3,500 and ordered the defendant to forfeit his weapon. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court should have imposed probation or some other alternative sentence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant pled guilty to selling over twenty-six grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana. As to his conviction for possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine, the Defendant reserved the following certified question of law: whether the search warrant was void for execution more than 120 hours after issuance. We hold that the five-day period in which a search warrant must be executed is to be computed using calendar days rather than hours. Thus, a search warrant is valid if executed by midnight of the fifth day after its issuance, with the calculation of days to exclude the day of issuance. We further hold that the search warrant in this case was properly executed within the five-day period and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition, contending that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

Petitioner was originally convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced to thirty-seven years as a Range II offender. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged his indictment was void. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The SREE General Partnership was formed for the purpose of owning and managing motel property in Nashville, Tennessee. During the ownership period, the property deteriorated. The partners sued a co-partner for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that his negligent management of the property was what caused the deterioration and resulting economic loss. The trial court ruled for the defendant. We affirm.

Defendant was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury on the charge of rape of a child. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to sexual battery and received a two-year sentence. The issue of how his sentence should be served was submitted to the trial court. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that it is necessary to remand for a new sentencing hearing since the trial court relied upon the defendant's failure to make a public confession at a church in determining the sentence.